September 13, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
having in any part suffered disaster, but bencefor- 
Avard faced by a Gemian army standing nortli and 
south, based upon new and better communications 
coming directly from the east in (2) — (2), having 
turned the fortified frontier Verdun-Belfort and 
eliminated it as an obstacle. 
It will be seen from all this that every effort 
AviU be made by the Allies dming these critical days 
to maintain a combination of two main elements in 
their strength, (1) the resistance of the concave line, 
especially where it is most threatened which is in the 
sag at V. (Vitry le Francois) : (2) the prosecution of 
the enveloping movement against the Gei-man right 
wing at M.- — the region of Meaux — Avhere there is so 
far a definite numerical superiority on the side of the 
Allies, though the Allies are stiU inferior in numbers 
to the total of the German line. 
If both these factors combined are maintained 
— that is, if the pressure at M goes on and the 
resistance at V holds-^there is success. If the 
resisting line breaks at V or elsewhere there is 
disaster. Even if it is only pushed back there is, 
for the moment, failure. 
Such are the comparatively simple elements of 
this most critical moment in the fii'st part of so vast a 
movement of men. Such are the three inconceivable 
issues of these grave days. 
THE CRITICAL POINTS IN DETAIL. 
It is not without interest to consider in some 
detail the ground over which both these critical parts 
of the Allied forces, the enveloping people at M and 
the resisting people at V, are moving. 
The field in which pressure is being brought upon 
the German right and turning it back from Paris, is 
the lower valley of the Mame. A sketch of this field 
is here appended. The Marne is a river which flows 
twenty miles N. by E. of the outermost Paris forts) 
there flow into the Mai*ne from opposite sides two 
tributaries. 
The one from the noi-th bears the name of the 
Oiircq; that from the south the name of the Grand 
Morin. The latter is known as the Grand Morin, 
or the Great florin, to distinguish it from another 
tributary coming in fm-ther to the east and known 
as the little Morin, or Petit Morin. It is in the 
angle formed by the Grand Morin and the Ourcq 
that the German right wing, recently in touch 
with the fortifications of Paris, was caught on. 
September 4th, 5th, and 6th, when the presence of an 
unexpected French reserve force in and about Paris 
was first appreciated by the enemy. The German 
right Aving or 1st Army Avas thus caught by superior 
forces, among which was the British contingent, which 
contingent lay at first along the Grand Morin four days 
ago, was ah-eady across the Petit Morin by Tuesday, 
and is now across the Marne in its advance against the 
German retreat. It has upon its right the 5th 
French Army ; while upon the Ourcq is the larger 
body known as the 6th French Army, which has 
behind it those reserves recently called up from Paiis 
and from the west of that town. 
It is evident that while the Germans in their 
retirement before these superior numbers wUl delay 
the advance of every opposing unit as much as 
possible, they_}vill, or should, show peculiar energy in 
resisting the north-western side of the angle, the 
French advance across the line of the Ourcq. For as 
this advance proceeds the German troops stUl lingering 
or hampered in the north (whence they have come) 
are in danger of being cut off, and the cavalry of the 
French resei-ve and other bodies which it can spare 
from its superior numbers, tend perpetually to approach 
the line A. B., by Avliich the German right wing or 
into the Seine just above Paris having come in a 1st Army originally advanced and by which it still 
great bend across the Champagne country. If we fix receives its supjjlies. 
our attention uj)on the town of Meaux, we shall see Upon the pressure that can be exercised in this 
that in the neighbourhood of that town (which is some field of the war very largely depends the success of the 
