Sei)tcmber 1.0, 1914 
LAND AXD WATER 
Its cliai-actcr as tlie capital still of a proviace and but 
recently of a kingdom, its immense "wealth, its 
remarkable triumphs of architecture, and its com- 
mercial character all lend themselves to this conclusion, 
and make it a fit subject for the experiment. On the 
other hand no such bombardment would have any 
effect upon the disposition of the armies in the field, 
and the jjosition of Nancy mU be held or abandoned 
in the present temper of the French exactly as thougli 
it were a few fields of baiTen ground. For the whole 
mind of the nation is bent upon a strategic task, and 
not even an entry into Paris woidd have disturbed 
that mind from its immediate object, which is not the 
saving of beauty or wealth, but a final victory. 
THE EFFECT OF THE SIEGE GUNS. 
The mention of sucli a bombardment, whicli 
may even now be taking place, leads me to return 
to a matter of whicli I have spoken already in these 
comments (last week, I tbink, and the week before) — 
tbe power of resistance opposable by the Frencli 
fortresses to the German claim that modern forti- 
fication wUl always break down, and speedily, under 
tlic effect of modem siege ai-tillery. 
Namur was an exceptional case, for we see more 
and more, as the details come in, that Namur was not 
in a posture for defence. Had it held out but a 
few days, the French counter-offensive through the 
Ai*denues would, probably, have succeeded ; the line 
of the Sambre could certainly have been held. 
Namur fell with an unexpected rapidity, and one 
which will presumably not be repeated ; but it is none 
the less apparent that the German claim is largely 
successf id in practice, and that the new siege artillery 
dominates the old system of fortification. 
If that is the case, as it would appear to be : if the 
modern ring fortress, though it may have resisting 
power for weeks, has not resisting power for months 
— and, perhaps, has only resisting power for days — 
the sti-ategy of the Allies will have to consider how 
far, in any future development, the resistance of any 
modem fortification can be relied upon. 
At the present moment, for instance, the whole 
of this great line of the Allies is reposing ultimately 
upon Verdun and upon Paris. It is true that against 
I'aris no attempt has been made, nor does it appear as 
yet that heavy siege girns have been brought up 
against Verdun. But it may well be that in some 
future development of the campaign — and perhaps no 
distant development — the vidue of fortified positions 
as a pivot, still more as a refuge to armies in being, 
will disappear. We must expect to hd'ar of their 
fall under any detennined effort directed against 
tliem, and it is unfortunately true that as yet a siege 
artillery of coiTcsponding force to be brought against 
the enemy's positions, when these in theii" turn are 
attacked, may be lacking. 
There is nothing impossible, or even secret, in 
the construction of such large pieces as the Germans 
have brought forward; but it takes time. Their siipply 
to the Allies is a task to which, without any doubt, 
the attention of at least two of the three Allied 
Powers has already been turned. It is one which they 
wdl not be al)le to solve before a date distant by many 
months from the present. One might put it so bluntly 
as to say that it looks as though the Germanic Powers 
would be able to rely upon the pennanent fortifications 
they have established more than the Allied Powers 
can rely upon theirs, because the Allies cannot have 
for many months such howitzers to use against pre- 
pared fortresses as Prussia already commands to the 
number of perhaps half a hundred. 
Meanwhile, it remains true that the ultunate fate 
of this, as of all campaigns, depends, not npon arti- 
ficial works, which introduce no more than the element 
of delay, but upon the success or failure of armies in 
the field. 
THE NATURE OF THE NEWS 
RECEIVED. 
Now that we shall probably receive fuller news 
from the seat of war than has been either advisable 
or possible during the past month, it may be worth 
while to consider certain points about that news and 
the way in which we should judge it. 
The first thing to be gi-asped is that the reports 
reaching us are bound to be for some time to come, as 
they have been in the immediate past, appai'eutly self- 
contradictory. 
There are four soiu'ces from which Ave receive 
information, and the motives and the methods of 
their authors are very different. 
There is first of all the report of the journalist 
sent out by his proprietor in search of the pictm-esque 
and the vivid : sometimes such a source of information 
is acquainted with the elements of militaiy affairs, 
more often he is not. At any rate the descriptions he 
sends cannot be of value to the comprehension of the 
campaign as a whole nor are they intended to be. 
Occasionally in such descriptions you get a phrase 
Avhich suppUes you with some truth to what has really 
happened in a particular place on a particular day, but 
as a rule they tell you nothing of the general move- 
ment, the fortunes of which alone concern the fate of 
the country. 
Next there are the stories from individuals, par- 
ticularly from private soldiers, which present the very 
high local interest, but must be put in the same category 
as the last, so far as general comprehension is concemed. 
Thirdly, there are the despatches proceeding from 
officers in the field and occasionally communicated to 
the public by their Governments. This source of 
information is of course of the highest value, but it is 
always somewhat belated. It will be of capital interest 
when the history of the war comes to be wi'itten, but 
for following the campaign while it is in progress this 
source of infonnation comes as a rule too late. 
Finally, there are the official digests or short 
communiques issued by the various Governments, om* 
OAvn, our AUies, and our enemies. 
This last som'ces is the only secure foundation on 
which one can build a knowledge of the campaign as 
it goes on, and it is important to appreciate what the 
qualities of these communiques are. In the first place 
they are accm-ate so far as they go, and this is just as 
true of the enemies' communiques as of ours. The 
public is apt to be confused upon this point, because 
every rmnom*, falsehood or exaggeration proceeding 
from enemy sources is lumped together with or 
without that distinction of origin. 
I can recall ni> official German communique 
which, so far as it went, was not accurate. On the 
other hand, the newspaper comment in Gemiany and 
the stories sent by the Gennan financial press are 
often ludicrous and impossible. 
But the second point about these official com- 
muniques, whether from enemies or from friends, is 
that they invariably suppress news which is unfavour- 
able to their own side. For instance, the Gennan 
communiques said nothing about that decisive action 
in front of Lemberg which must necessarily influence 
the whole of the Avar, and in the same Avay Ave have 
learned from the enemy of more than one reverse Avhieli 
neither oui- Allies' despatches nor our OAvn told us of. 
11* 
