September 12, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
TOWARDS the end of last week tlie Press Bureau 
reported that a number of damaged German 
destroyers were at Kiel, and that others had sunk 
outside the Canal. Speculations as to some 
further action were rife. Some surmised an 
affray with tho Russians in the North Sea, but 
it is far more probably a belated Gorman sequel to the Heligo- 
land affair. 
Wilhelmshaven — -as the map indicates — is far nearer to 
Heligoland than Kiel. On the other hand, Kiel is no great 
distance away, and, as 'Wilhelmshaven is an active base for 
destroyer divisions, it is probable that the authorities con- 
sidered it inadvisable to allow fresh and untried forces to 
contemplate what had happened to the division to which 
V 187 belonged. The boats which escaped must have been 
ten'ibly mauled. 
In this connection we have to remember that tho bulk 
of the German crews are, relative to our own men, compara^ 
lively raw, and also necessarily unfortified by those traditions 
of past warfare which are so valuable an asset to the British 
Navy. 
We have further to remember how sedulously the men of 
the German Navy have been taught to despise the British and 
British gunnery. Psychology, therefore, becomes a matter of 
extreme importance. 
Another instance of the influence of psychology on the 
German scheme of things is to be found in last Friday's night 
raid on the British trawlers in the Nortli Sea — a pei-fectly 
useless operation from the military point of view, unless, of 
course, it was infiuonced by the idea that tho fifteen trawlers 
captured can be used for further indiscriminate mine laying, 
their crews being terrorised into concealing the presence of 
German combatants on board them. 
This is a point of view worthy of consideration. If there 
is one thing moi-e certain than another, it is that German war- 
ships did not risk the danger of going out for the mere 
" glory " of capturing some inoffensive British fishermen. So 
the above is one explanation of that " German naval victory " 
over which our Press has since made so merry. 
Another, and I am inclined to think a truer, explanation 
is that the nwve was a purely psj'chological one. As students 
of history (even if not from per- 
PSYCHOLOGY sonal experience) the German 
AND ACTION. authorities cannot be unaware of 
the deadly effects of inaction on a 
fleet bottled up in harboui-. Just as later on it was deemed 
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MAP TO ILLUSTBATB THI DOCKYARDS AND PRINCIPAL PRIVATB 
riBus AT wuosa tabds oamaoed oeruan warships can Bll 
BSPAISBO. 
advisable not to allow the outposts to see the effecta of British 
gunnery on tho Heligoland destroyers, so it had been desirable 
to demonstrate, by producing the spoils of victoiy, that 
Crormany " rules the waves " in the North Sea. In attempting 
to assess any operation we have to put ourselves in the enemy's 
place, to ask ourselves Low wa would act if compelled to do 
our best with an inferior force, untried, without traditions, 
deliberately educated on false ideals as to superiority, and 
with the pusillanimit}' of the capture of the Goeben to live 
down. " Prove something at all costs " is the only possible 
move. 
And so we are very ill-advised to make merry about 
German victories (probably on the Dogger Bank) over British 
fishermen. Rather we should remember that the capture of 
a bathing machine from an East Coast watering place might 
well be a most valuable moral asset to the German Fleet. To 
the inferior naval power the most trival gain has a real v.ilue. 
GLRMAM 
AUPHION SPrtDT PATWFlNOEt 
BRITISH 
diagram to ILLDSTRATK THE EKSPECTIVJt LOSSES IN TH» 
NORTH SEA IN TERMS OF APPROXIMATE FIQHTINO VALUE TO 
SEPTEMBER 7tH (oXE MONTH's WARFARE). 
One is bound to confess that tlje German Commander-in-Chief 
of the High Sea Fleet has made no errors to date. 
More : I am of opinion that — thanks to the additional 
circumstance that we have since lost the Speedy and rath- 
finder by mines in quick succession 
THE EFFECT — those responsible for the 
OF MINES. destinies of the German High Sea 
Fleet are neither disheartened nor 
dissatisfied with the present situation. 
They have, it is true, lost three small cruisers and a 
destroyer, plus an unknown number of other destroyers 
damaged. Against this, however, they can place the fact that 
their mines have destroyed three British warships, and some- 
thing approaching a reign of terror is in process of being 
created in the North Sea. This, of course, is exactly according 
to the plan of campaign. 
Results have not in any case come up to full expectations, 
but here, at least, Germany is in a position to play a waiting 
game. We shall do well to remember this and to keep 
on remembering it. The appended diagram indicates that so 
far Germany has lost more than she has gained so far as 
materiel is concerned. But I am by no means sure that in 
her opinion " honours easy " is not the prevailing conviction. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
The item of chief interest so far this week is that Admiral 
Sir Berkeley Milne should have relinquished his command 
and a French Admiral taken his place in command of the 
Anglo-French force. 
It is desirable to slate the reason. The British admiral 
was the senior, while the French Admiral de Lapeyere had by 
far the biggest number of ships under his own command. The 
Austrian Navy is France's especial affair, and so as a matter 
of international courtesy matters have been placed in his 
hands, and tho senior British admiral has come home. A 
senior officer cannot serve under a junior one. 
There was no other solution of the problem. Everywhere 
near home tho British Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Jellicoe, 
controls things ; in the Mediterranean France is supreme. The 
weak point of allied Fleets is two leaders and the consequent 
divergence of ideas. Admiral Milne is sacrificed to a principle. 
It is a valuable principle, so no more is to be said. For good 
or ill the Allies must be one and undivided. Thus, and thus 
only, is victory to be assured. 
The Goeben is still " interned " in Turkish waters, and has 
nominally passed into the Turkish Navy. But her own crew 
are apparently still aboard her, and the possibilities of what this 
battle cruiser can do, using the Dai'danelles as a base, are 
immense. 
Just at present Turkey is adopting a peaceful policy, 
but there is no telling how long that policy will endure. In 
any case the Turks are notoriously easy to " manage," so that 
the prospect of the Goeben's reappearance has to be calculated 
for in the general plan. 
The appended sketch map indicates the value of the 
Dardanelles as a base, the possibilities of dodging about around 
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