LA]!?D AND WATER 
September 12, 1914 
the islands being immense. Also, should Turkey bo at 
Germany's disposal, lying in wait for the Goeben outside the 
Dardanelles would not nocessai-ily be of any avail, as coal is 
to bo obtained at various points along the coast of Asia Minor. 
The principal of these are mai-kcd ou the map, but there are 
at least a dozen other harboui-s -which could be " arranged 
for," and all of them well inside International Law. 
ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY. 
The situation this week is best described as " Business as 
usual." Certain German cruisers are still at large, but they 
KAP TO INDICATK THK POSSIBILITY OF THE "GOEBEN IX THH 
LEVAKT, AND TII» DIPFICUITIES OF CATCHIXO HKB SHOULD 
SHI lUEIiaE. 
are apparently acting without any coherent plan, and their 
fcstinction is merely a matter of time. 
Material damage done by them is trivial, while the moral 
damage on which a "guerre de course" must necessarily 
depend appears to be entirely non-existent. 
It should bo generally realised that the duty of the British 
Navy is not so much the actual catching of commerce 
destroyers aa rendering them impotent. To da.te this has been 
done. British overseas trade is just as safe at present as it 
was in the times of peace. The chances of German intercep- 
tion are considerably less than the chances of ruuniug into a 
drifting iceberg. In this matter the plans of the German 
Naval Staff have gone hopelessly " agley." 
For the last week no captures of moment have been 
recorded. German trade, except via Holland, is practically 
wiped off the seas. 
In this connection the position of Holland is likely to 
become a problem in the early future. Germany is dependent 
on oversea ^imports of foodstuffs 
THE POSITION almost as much as we aie. Her 
OF HOLLAND. indiscriminate mine-laying has at 
least had sufiicient method in it 
not to interfere with Dutch Trade. The profits to HoUand 
are probably very great indeed— hence the pro-German atti- 
tude of the Dutch. 
The Dutch Navy is of no groat account, but it is still 
ample enough to have a potential danger where its small 
craft are concerned. An ultimatum to Holland would, how- 
ever, materially lessen the task of the British Navy; and 
sooner or later some such action scorns bound to occur. It 
is impossible that Holland shall indefinitely continue to 
.act the " beJievoleut neutral " to Germany. At the present 
moment Holland is (indirectly) Germany's overseas food 
centre. 
By the " silent pressure of Sea Power " our Nav}' can 
starve Germany into sun-eiider without regard to whatever 
happens in the Land Campaign, to which we are attaching 
just at present an undue importance. 
For an army to act, it must he fed. The Gei-maa 
" machine " is fed through Holland. If this war is to be 
brought to a speedy conclusion, we must declare war against 
all the neutrals who at present keep Germany in food supplies. 
If they care to keep their ships in harbour, it will be prob- 
ably a very benevolent war; there is no quarrel outside the 
food question. But — we must starve Germany into surrender. 
People generally regard this as a military war, with the 
Navy just playing round, picking up the scraps which fall 
from the Kaiser's table. They 
THE IMPORTANCE are wrong. On the British Navy, 
OF FOOD SUPPLY. and on that alone, the ultimate 
issue depends. Given an absolutely 
free hand, the British Navy would star\'6 Germany into sur- 
render inside a month, though Germans ruled in Paris and 
beat aJl the Russians back from Berlin. Psychology 
counts for much. Overwhelming the enemy by waves of 
soldiers counts for as much, or more. But — food supply 
is a larger target still. A soldier cannot fight on an empty 
belly. 
The ti-oublc is that we do not realise our " Sea Power." 
AVe have not advanced an inch sinco a hundred years ago. 
We have still no conception of what a Navy (given a free 
hand) could accomplish ; for all that most of us are ready to 
subscribe to the theoi-y that " Waterloo was won at Trafalgar," 
eleven yeai-s before. 
I have tried to think of a diagram which will explain 
how a British warship several thousand miles away can 
materially affect the local situation. I cannot produce that 
diagram. It is too complicated. 
But I can assert my conviction that, whatever may happen 
on land (in front of the footlights), the real issues depend 
upon the British Navy (not shown on the stage). Come to 
think of it, stage effects are produced on somewhat similar 
lines. The " man behind " controls results. In tliis particu- 
lar World War- the " man behind " is the British Navy. If 
the British Navy has a free hand to stop German oversea food 
supplies, the inevitable result is " Exit Germany." 
THE FAR EAST. 
The Japanese investment of Kiao-Chau is proceeding 
slowly. The whole of the sea approaches have been heavily 
mined, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the 
report that the Japanese Fleet has already removed about 
1,200 mines. This work will probably continue for some time 
to come. Various adjacent islands have been occupied^ 
mainly as look-out stations against further German efforts in 
the mine-laying directions. Japan is never likely to forgctf 
her ten-ible experiences with mines in the war with Russia 
ten years ago. 
In the course of this week's operations she has lost one 
destro3'er, wrecked by going ashore^-a very cheap sacrifice so 
far to the mines around Kiao-Chau. 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
SO FAR we have heard a good deal less than we 
expected about aerial warfare. To be sure, the 
Press has destroyed more Zeppelins than GenWny 
ever possessed, and it has now created a German air 
fleet of "82" destined to bombard Paris from 
above. Details of this sort are, however, not 
germane to serious facts. 
Turning to facts, there is good reason to suppose that 
Germany's sudden embarkation on war was by no means 
entirely unconnected with her aerial position, and a belief in 
the proverb, " Who rules the air, will rule the world." At the 
outbreak of war the approximate aerial forces available were 
as follows : 
German Fbench Russian British 
Battle Airships ... 15 I 
Scouting Airships... 10 14 3 2 { 
Aeroplanes— About equal either side. 
The Germans had two other battle airships in an advanced 
condition, and these two are by now probably completed. All 
Powers had airships building, both large and small. Austria 
possessed nothing at the moment, but one Zeppelin building 
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