LAND AND WATER 
September 19. 1914 
TTuNvevor wo munl>or them tlicre Averc in the luain 
tlim- <,M-eat (loriuan lUiissos, (1), (;.'), and (;5) advancing; 
into France from the north, and pushincf back on to 
tlie b"ne A'crdini — Paris the French line with its 
]{ritisli coutini^cnt. Tliis French line one may rono-hly 
represent, not in size but in jMisition, by the band 
A —15 Itctwecn the fortified line A'erduu - 'Lonl (N'— T) 
September 9th roughly represented by this sketcli, iu 
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PARIS 
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UlAIB-VM Ol' Tim KLKMKNT.-i Ol' THK inAXCO-GERMAX J-OSITIONS 
OS SKl'lKMBKK (>!H HKFOllK TlIK OKltMAN KKTltKAT. 
and Paris (P) in wiiich. l)oHi as to ])roportionate size 
and as to position the Jlritisli contingent is represented 
bv the shaded ]»ortioii. AVitliiu and to the east of 
I'aris the Fivucli comniaudcrs had kept back a large 
reserve, represented by the s(]iiare l)lock X. 'i'hat Avas 
the ])osition on September ;5rd and Itli, when the 
lary-est of the (iernian armies, No. 1., was at the gates 
ot till' French ca])ital. The commander of this large 
(u-rnian army (!) got wind for the first time of the 
existence of this large reserAc in these two days. He 
thereupon attempted with great lx>Ulness not to retreat 
hut to turn suddenly at right angles to the direction 
he had hitherto been ])ursuing, join up witii Army 
No. .■2 along the line C — D, and in conjunction witii 
that Army, and with Army No. 3 break through 
the .Vllied line and cut it into tw(». In this attempt 
to march right acrc>ss the front of the French left and 
the Hritish contingent, along the line C — D, which was 
too hold, he was caught ; and he had to retire the way 
he had come, while tlu- men of the great reserve at X 
were jxuiring through and round Paris after him 
along V] \'\ and the British contingent was jxninding 
up heiiind him. 
Tliat is the whole story which explains the 
cliange iu the camj)aign, and it is the only story which 
explains it. 
15ut once so considerable a change had been 
effected in tlie position of Army (1), the ])osition of 
Army (..) and of Army {'^) was at once gravely 
<-oin])romi.sed. ]n.stead of the three main German 
mas.ses forming a continuous line, two-thirds of them 
were now threatened in flank, and the retirement of 
Army No. (1) u])on their right compelled them to 
retire also ; mass Nf). (.'2) having to go back somewhat 
more ])recipitately than mass No. {'■)). Thus the entire 
( rcrman advance was converted into a full German 
retreat, and from being originally in such a ])osition as 
is indicated in the following sketch (where the black is 
SliCOXI) POSITION (SKITKMBER ih'H TO IOtIi), WHBS THK OKUMAX 
KIUllT HAD BEUUN TO KKTKEAT, SUOWINO IS(JI,\TlOS Of OKT.MAN 
CENTliE AM> LEJr'T. 
Avliich their centre and eastern portions at A and iJ 
stand for a moment in an exceedingly dangerous, isolated 
])osition. From this position they could oidy exti'icate 
themselves by retiring in their turn and taking up a 
united line again Avith the army that had retired from 
Paris, so that by the Sunday morning the whole 
German line was in retreat towanls a defensive ])ositiou 
along the Ai.sne (60 miles from Paris) after the fashion 
indicated upon the sketch below. 
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PARIS 
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KtSERVE 
SKI-IKMBKE GtH. — IlKST POSITION, KKFOKK THE KETltE AT C»' THE 
OKUMAN l-.KJHT. 
(rerman and the white the Allies), which Avas the 
jKtsitiou on September ord and 4th, the (rerman 
armies wei'C compelled to pass through a stage upon 
TIIIKU POSITIOX (SEPTEMBER liTH'), WHEN" THK WHOLE OEEMAN 
I.I.NE WAS IN CONCEllTKD KETUEAT TO ITS PKEPARKU POSITION 
* ON THE AI.SNE. 
Now to this general scheme of the retirement, 
which was thus forced upon the nuiss of the German 
forces, must be added one in\portant modification. 
There was present iu the field not only the three main 
masses (1), (i). and (3), but a 1th body ( f) whi(^h 
had come round not from the north but from Luxcm- 
l>o\irg under the Crown Prince, and had already begun 
to bombard Verdun. Should Verdun fall, and the line 
of forts connecting it Avith Toul, yet a ')t\\ body (5j 
Avould be present upon the fUmk of the French line, 
imperilling its adA'ance and checking the retreat of the 
other three German bodies. 
The task before the French, therefore, was not 
merely the simple one of following up a general 
German retreat. It could not depend upon the 
continuance of that retreat saA'e by hokling, until it 
had driA'cn the (icrinau line past it, the fortress of 
A'erdun, and that fortress, as avc know from the 
experience this Avar has given of the lessened resisting 
])ower of fortification against modern siege artillery, 
was in grave peril. 
So much for the general scheme, the sudden 
retreat of the first German mass on the left before the 
French lteser\e, the subsequent retirement of the two 
other CJerman masses to the east of this, and the peril 
of Verdun. 
I Avill now take each of these in detail and first 
describe \Ahat took place Avhen the Western (ierman 
Army tried to march across the Anglo-French front, 
failed in that bold attempt, and Avas compelled to 
retire Aeiy rapidly toAvards the north-east. These 
<>])erations, the first part of the General Pattle of the 
JMarue, mav l)e called T/ic Bafilc of Mcaur (tir the 
J}attle of the Ourcq). 
Next T shall describe in detail the ground over 
Avhich the German centre retired, and the French 
centre advanced through the plateau of Sezanne and 
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