September 19, 1914 
LAND ANT) WATEE 
Wm ^\ ^ 
SKETCH KUOWINO THE rOSlTIOXS OF THE FOUliTlI GKBMAN 
GBOCr (4) UXUKK THE CROWN I'RIXCB IS FBONT OF VEKDUN, 
AXD OF THK OEKMAN ARMT (5) IN LORRAINE. 
the mai-hilies of St. Goiid, next the retreat of the 
(lennau k^ft from Vitry over the flat country of 
Cliampagne, and lastly the neighbourhood of Verdun 
and the nature of the peril to that foi-tress. 
THE BATTLE OF MEAUX 
(or of The Ourcq). 
Tlie field of operations which we are alx)ut to 
' follow under the general title of the Battle of Meaux 
(the original action which turned the tide of the cam- 
paign), runs from Paris on the west to the sources of 
the Petit florin upon the east, from the Seine and the 
town of Nogent upon the south to the Eiver Aisne 
and the town of Soissons upon the north. 
At some time upon Wednesday, September iind 
(and the anniversixry of Sedan), or possibly as late as 
Thursday, September 3ixl, the first German Ai'my, 
under General vonlOuclc, numbering perhaps 200,000 
men, perhaps somewhat more, was still facing Paris, 
and advancing towards that town from the neighbour- 
liood of Creil, Compicgne, and Senlis. It then got 
Avind of a veiy large reserve which had secretly lx?en 
gathered by the French commanders within and behind 
the fortifications of Paiis, and this news altered all its 
an-angements. 
At this moment the command of Von Kluck 
roughly occupied the |X)sitions marked on the map by 
■ the shaded portions A A. 
SCMt of ZS MILLS 
I'LAN SllOWIXfl THR POHITION OF THK OERMAN EKIHT WIXO 
(abmt I ndkr VON kluck) on kepteubkr 3rd. 
It had ill front of it three forces which (until 
the reserve behind Paris could come up) were still 
inferior in numljcrs to itself. These three forces 
were : — 
(1) That line of the French forces on the 
extreme left whicli the French call their 0th Army. 
(2) The Jh'itish ooutingent wliich had just gone 
soutii of the ^fanie, l)lowiiig up the bridge of Lagny 
b('hi7id it in its retreat, and which had m front of it 
the forest of Crccy. 
(3) That Frencli 'iuvw, known as the oth French 
Army, which lay to tlie light again, probably along 
the Seine. 
The general, Von Kluck, in command of tlie 
(Jerman Army at A A, finding himself threatened liy 
this unexpected reser\-e in front of him, which had been 
hidden by the fortified zone of Paris, and which had 
been gathered there by the French commanders wdth 
the object of thus turning the tide, determined in this 
difHcult situation to act as follows : 
He proposed to march right away across the 
]\[arne and across the river called the Grand Morin, 
in the direction of the arrow B B, and in two days' 
march to have joined and concentrated up against the 
(ierman armies to the cast of him, which then, with 
his forces added, could have pierced the Allied line 
somewhere along the middle Seine — say, beyond 
Xogeut. 
It will be apparent that, finding thus unexpectedly 
in front of him forces which, when they had all joined, 
would be superior to his own, Von Kluck had no 
clioice but either to retreat the way he had come (and 
so leave the other German armies to the east of him 
isolated and exjwsed upon their western flank) or to 
decide as he did, and to march along the line B B to 
join them. 
But observe that this march along the line B B 
was one of those hazardous operations which every 
elementary text -book uix>n strategy (and, for that 
matter, all his-torical experience as well) defines to be 
the most dangerous of all. lie proposed to march 
right along his enemy .h front. He risked doing so 
iH'cause he under-estimated the power remaining to 
the French and British contingents upon that front of 
tiiking the comiter-offensive after the severe experience 
of their recent retreat from the Belgian frontier. 
He was aware, however, that this big reserve 
behind Paris would, while he was hurrying south- 
eastward, come up along such lines as C C and 1) 1) 
and gradually reinforce the line of his enemies. He 
was consequently concerned (r/) for certain German 
detachments which lay isolated to the north, notably 
in the direction of Compiegne, and [li) for his com- 
munications, which lay rouglily along the Ime E E. 
He therefore left a very strong body upon the 
l)lateau which runs west of the Biver Ourcq, and 
particularly large forces around the villages of 
JVnchard and Bregy. "With the rest of his anny he 
undertook that perilous advance in front of his enemy's 
lines which he, or his superiors, prefen-ed to the 
confession of failure involved in a retirement. 
Upon Saturday, September 5tli, the columns of this 
first Gennan Army, Von Kluck 's, the largest German 
Army in the field, crossed the Marne at Trilport, La 
Ferte Sous-Jouaire, and just l)elow Chateau Thierry. 
The French 5th Army fell back before this advance ; 
and on Sunday, the fith, the remainder of the Germans, 
with the exception of the large rearguaixl which had 
Ix-en left to keep off the increasing French pressure 
along the Ourcq, had pushed right down through 
Coulommiers to the neighlwurhood of l^rov'ins. Its 
cavalry patrols had even reached the Seine in the 
neighbourhood of Nogent. 
The situation then upon the Sunday night may 
be summai'ised in the following maj). 
It was in that night, the night between Sunday 
and Monday, the Gth and 7th September, that the 
counter-offensive began. The French 5th Army 
attacked with the bayonet and recovered some little 
ground north of the Seine, and by daylight on Monday 
both the 5th French Army and the British contingent 
advanced northward against the enemy. The British 
8* 
