Soi)t.nubev 19, 1911 
LAND AND WATEU 
Tliis |)Or:itioii wliicli the German anuies (with the 
exception of that of the Crown Prince, isolated beyond 
Argonne iijwn the extreme left) took up upon last 
Sunday night and Monday morning is naturally 
divided into two quite different sections. The first, or 
eastern, section runs from a wood called " The forest 
of the Eagle," or " de L'Aigle," just north of 
Compiegne to the large village of Craoune, a distance 
of about 30 miles. 
This first half of the CJerman position, the 
western half, is everywhere parallel to the river Aisne 
and it follows the first ridge to the north of that 
river, a ridgre in which the sliort northern tributaries 
(which are no more than brooks) take their rise. This 
line of heights is nowhere more tlian five miles from 
the river, and nowhere less than three, ft is a good 
deal cut up along its front by ru\ines, for the iiortheru 
brooks tributary to the Aisne run in rather deep little 
trenches with steep sides. It is an even ])lateau, 
more or less, exactly following the valley of liraisne 
below, and only broken by these short lateral clefts 
which gi-eatly aid its defence by their steepness as 
also l)y their wooded slopes. 
The second, or eastern limb of the position 
oros-ses the river Aisne near to and just south of 
Neuchatel and then runs along a low, flat ridge 
admii-ably fonned for artillery and parallel to the 
course of the river Suippe. This ridge runs, as does 
the Suip2)e, below it in a great curve north-west and 
north of the town of Kheims. This second or eastern 
section of the German defensive liue is of a length 
>\hich we cannot discover from the telegrams. If it is 
])roperly linked up with the Crown Prince's army on 
tlve east it is not less tlian forty mih's long, for that is 
about the distance from Neuchatel to the Argonne 
across the great plain of Champagne. If it is not 
properly linked up with the Crown Prince's army 
on the east (a very unlikely chance I), then there 
i.s a gap somewhere about jVfonthois of which the 
French will certainly take advantage ; and in that 
ca.se this eastern luie is only as hnig as the first, or 
about ^JO miles long. 
Yon have, then, the (jerman armies taking up 
this defensive line, certainly 60 — more probably over 
70 — miles in length, and awaiting the assault of 
the Allies. 
// mud be rememhcrcd Ihal the enemy s aiiiiies 
(ire intact, that they have lost little in prisoners or guns 
— nothing comparafjle to what the Allies lost in their 
rapid retreat from the Belgian frontier— and that 
they are still in numbers certainly equal to their 
opponents and probaMy superior. 
Now of what nature is this defensive jwsitiou 
which the Germans have taken uj)? 
Tlie very first thing a student notes about it is that 
it has Iwen carefully thought out. It is not a chance 
position taken up haphazard or under the stress of 
some too rapid retreat which has at last been given 
breathing space. It is a line upon which, in case 
of retreat, tlie German commandei's had detennined 
to stand, and it is the line on which they can best 
stand between Paris and the Meuse. It has been 
studied thoroughly by spies during peace, and it is 
very good. 
Consider first the character of the heights held 
l)etween Craonne and the Forest of the Eagle (or 
<le I'Aigle). Tliey are everywhere xmifonn, save 
in the ravines of Morsain. The open ridge rarely 
rises to more than 300 feet alx)ve the river; it 
only falls to less than 200 ft. above the river upon 
its western edge towards tiie forest, and this fall is 
c very svhere gradual. 'I'he line of the plateau is every- 
where fairly even. It is, as I have said, cut up on it;? 
front by the ravines through which the northern 
tributary brooks of the Aisn > fall ; and the^se ravines 
are steep and wooded. But though such a disposition 
of the land a little interferes with the homogeneity 
and evenness of the defence, it is much more of an 
obstacle to the attack. It is here from Soissons along 
the Aisne for about ;20 miles that the British 
contingent is at work. 
So much for the western section of the German 
line along the Aisne. But the eastern section of the 
line, which runs from Craonne across to the woods of 
the Argonne in a flat curve across the plains of Cham- 
pagne, is even better suited to defence. 
It is a line of low woodland on a crest ujwn 
which a wide shelf of plough land falls down to 
the shallow depression in which runs the white and 
muddy water of the Suippe river, a tributary of 
the Aisne. The slope in front of this ridge of 
wood is quite bare, .save for a few artificial plantations. 
It consi.sts, as I have said, of huge stretches of plough 
land, now stubble ; and from this almost uniform line 
of slight elevations it sinks southward and eastward 
down to the Suippe in a perfect natural glacis. On 
the furtlier or southern side of the river rises a 
corresponding but longer slope of perfectly bare and 
open land which can be swept in all its breadth by 
artillery on the opposing ridge. This line north of 
the Suippe, commanding a glacis before it and 
dominating a slight and long rise beyond the water, 
is perfect, and that is the eastern section of the 
Gennan line. 
The two sections of the line, therefore, that from 
Compiegne to Craonne, and that along the Suippe in 
the north Champagne country are each in different 
ways exactly suited for defence. I repeat, it was no 
haphazard which made the (Jerman retirement halt 
precisely along this series of jjositions. It was a 2>hiu 
known and studied. 
The interest of the action now engaged on this 
excellent line has many aspects, but the first is 
the question whether the German annies intend a 
counter-offensive, or rather intend to cover the 
ix'tiremcnt of their convoys across the Meuse ? 
Evei'ything in war must be conjecture iu the 
shape of alternatives. Tlie best and surest comr 
inander himself in the field does not know from day 
to day what the hazard of war will bring. He does 
not know (if it brings victory) exactly what form the 
victory will take, nor how it can best be used : he is 
ignorant of it until it Ims come about. He does not 
know (if it brings defeat) how that defeat will come 
or how it may best be retrieved. 
It is not possible, therefore, to say that the 
]X)sition taken up by the Germans does not mean u 
counter-offensive in the near future. It is impossible 
to say this for the simple reason that, even if the 
(rerman commandei's do not intend it upon this 
Wednesday (when I am writmg the present lines), 
they may have an opportunity for intending it (and 
may therefore take it up) by the time these lines are 
on the machines upon Thm-sday. 
But on the balance of jn'obabilities it would seem 
that they rather intend to cover a retirement over the 
Upper Aisne, and later over the Meuse or into Belgium, 
than to attempt an immediate counter-offensive. Their 
forces upon the left or east, tho.se of the Crown Prince 
and those of the German armies in Lorraine, are 
cei-tainly moving northward and eastward — that is, 
retiring. Further, the oj)portunities for a counter- 
offensive are weak along the line which they have 
taken uji. It is essentially a line difficult of assault 
?• 
