LAND AND \\^\ T E R 
Soptoml.rr It), ]i)14 
but not easy to move fonvaril from ; particularly upon 
what would 1)C the v.orkint;- wiiit;- of a new advance, 
that pari* of the line which lies between Craunne 
and the V^iUey of the Oise beyond Soissous. 
Another interest of the Uernian ])osition is 
■whether it is in peril uj)on either of its win<fs. In 
other words, Avhether the Germans can be manoeuvred 
out of it hy a French movement ariMind their west — 
beyond Com])iei,Mie, or round their east- — between the 
main army and the Crown Prince's. In the latter 
ease there would be disaster. Jt would mean the 
separation of the German force, as a whole, into two, 
and the ])iercing (jf its centre by a French advance 
directed due north, alont;: the valley of the l^j)per 
Aisne. The disaster would not necessarily be 
immediate. But the separation would mean the end 
of all offence in France and the begiuninjif of a 
defensive war on (lerman-Belgian soil. If the French 
get between the Crcjwn Prince on the Meuse and the 
main defensive German line north of Plieims, that 
■ini'.sl follow. For though both sections of the retreat 
would reunite towards the Phine, they would have 
lost the initiative for good. 
But sueli a gaj) between the Crown Prince's 
Army and the main defensive line presupposes negli- 
gence or inalnlity on the part of the enemy. It 
presupposes that liis forces here are not linked up with 
the forces of the Crown Prince, though far round the 
noiih of Argonne ; and to presup])ose negligence or 
inability in an enemy who lias conducted so masterly 
a defence and so rapid and inexpensive a retreat is 
surely foolish. We cannot presuppose without better 
evidence any chance of the Fivnch working round by 
the east through such a gap. 
The other question, whether the Allies may not 
be able to work round the left or loest of the German 
line is mucli more open. It is possible that they here 
IiaAC further troops. It is probable that they have 
the use in a rather roundabout way of hitherto 
undamaged railwaj's. It is certain that nothing is 
held by the enemy in any force, if even by patrols 
(which I doul)t) west of the Oise river, and it is 
therefore conceivable that a Fi-eneb manoeuvre round 
by the west may be attempted and jjossibly that it 
may succeed. The Germans have large bodies of their 
Cavalry here posted to watch and prevent it. But 
even so, when the Allied line does overlap the western 
German flank, w even l>efore it does, while it merely 
threatens, tlie German line, having got its convoys 
away eastward and having built its bridges across the 
two rivers Aisne and Meuse, can retii-e in order and 
intact. 
One truth must l)e borne in mind in these critical 
days. It is the truth to which these notes are always 
recurring. So long as the army of either opponent 
remains in no marked inferiority to the other that 
opponent will not remain permanently upon the ' 
defensive. Even if the, Gennan army does not 
attempt a counter-offensive from its present positions 
(tlie least likely of the two alternatives), even if it 
continues its retirement north and east, it none the 
less awaits, and has somewhere ])repared for, a counter- 
offensive later on ; and the retirement, so long as it is 
carried out in good order, means nothing one way or 
the other to the ultimate issue of the campaign /////// 
one or other of the combatants has forced his opp(nient 
to a Incision, and lias, in that JJeeision, achieved his 
purpose of largely weakening in numbers, or destroy- 
ing in cohesion, the organised force resisting him. 
'J'he main (Jerman line, then, is .standing upon the 
defensive from about the middle of the Argoime, 
roujul to the north of Rheims and alouij the Aisne. 
It is composed of the concentration of tlic three main 
(Jerman bodies, the iirst and largest body under 
Von Kluck from in front of J*aris, the second 
from in fi-ont of Sezanne, the third from *in front 
of N'itry. So far as the telegrams Avhich had 
reached London by Wednesday afternoon inform us, 
this (German concentration on the defensive lino 
was still very actively maintaining its defensive at that 
moment ; it Mas \ igorously counter-attacking the 
offensive Allied line, and everywhere holding its own. 
if it had not new reinforcement (as was ]>i-ol)al)le^, it 
had at least received new muniti(ms, and, if it were 
only fighting to cover a retirement of convoys, it was 
givin<>; those convovs everv leisure to retire. 
But the defensive line occupied by the Germans 
north of Pheims and along the Aisne does not 
exhaust the field. There is a fourth body west of 
the jVIeuse, and east of the Argonne, a somewhat 
isolated body, which is of peculiar imjjortauce to the 
fortmies of this cam])aign. The ])osition and chances 
of this fourth body I will attempt, from the ver^' few 
indications we have received, to describe. That 
fourth body is, as we have seen, the army of the 
Crown Prince, formerly in fi-ont and to the west and 
south of Verdun ; to-day to the noi-th of that town. 
THE CROWN PRINCE'S ARMY. 
SCMC or HILCS 
KKKTCII SHOWING THE VEBDUX-TODL LINK AND rOSITION OF THB 
CKOWN I'BINCe's ABMV BEFORE THE GERMAN KETKKAT BEGAN. 
AV'e have continually seen in these notes how a 
fortified Hue, nmning from the great f(jrtress of 
Verdun to the great fortress of Toul, bars the move- 
ment of an invading army from the cast upon Paris, 
and how in particular it prevents the use of lines of 
communication into France from the great depots in 
Alsace-Lorraine; for one of the main railways passes 
under the guns of Verdun, two others converge under 
the guns of Tonl, and the railway connecting the two 
fortresses is everywhere under the guns of the forts 
that unite them in a line along the valley of the 
Meuse. Wi} have further seen that in this war (so 
far) the (ierman claim to reduce modern fortitication 
quickly by modern howitzer fire has been very largely 
successful. It was almost immediately sv;ccessful at 
Liege, wholly successful at Namur, and successful 
after about a week or nine days at !Maubeuge. 
If Verdun had fallen, or if the line of forts 
between Verdun and Toul has been pierced, the cam- 
])aign would ha\e changed altogether in aspect. The 
(Jerjuans woidd no longer have had to feel nervous, as 
they now do, about their long communications througli 
Belgium : they would have had immediate short 
8* 
I 
