September 19, 1911 
L A K 1> AND \V A T E U 
coiiiiminioations open t]iroii<i-li Alsacc-Lorraiiio. Tlie 
Fivucli forces alonii^ the Moselle and the ]\Leurtlie 
■would have been imperilled and perhaps cut off. The 
French line from the Argoniie to I'aris would haxe 
been taken in Hank by the existing (Jerman forces in 
Lorraine, which forces, reinforced from the (fermau 
centre, might have been strong enough to roll up the 
French line AACst of the Argonne. 
As- a fact, Verdvm, Toul, and the line Ijetween 
them, held. Uut it Avas the particular mission of the 
Crown Prince's army to reduce one of the two for- 
tresses, ^'erdun or Toul, or better, because more 
economic, to break some\\here the chain of foiis 
l)etween the two strongholds. AVith that object, the 
Crown Prince took up his headquarters at St. Menehould 
just at the western gate of the Argonne (so as to be in 
touch with the main German armies in Champagne) 
and began to operate with his separate army against 
the Toul-Veixluu line. 
Jt is imix)rtant to note that this army was sejmrate, 
and not a true portion of the general German line. 
That general line ended at Eevigny, on the edge of tho.se 
woods wliich bound the Champagne ])lain to the ea.st. 
Tlie Crown Prince was acting almost independenth- 
of this general German line (the extremity of which 
Liy south of him), though no doubt he was keeping in 
touch with it. His function was not to help to break 
the Allied line in Champagne, or even on the edge of 
Champagne, but to do the ])ai'ticular and local work 
of isolating Verdun, by breaking the line of foi-ts 
between Verdun and Toul. Then, presumably, he 
would proceed to the reducing of A'erdun itself. As 
1 have .said, the value of the Crown Prince's task, 
should it be achievetl, lay in the fact that it would 
eliminate the barrier protecting the flank of the 
long French line from Tonl — Verdun to Paris and 
would 02)en new, good, and rj/ei/c short lines of 
communication for the invaders from their depots 
in western Germany : a relief as welcome as water 
to a thirsty man. 
We have no indications as yet to tell us precisely 
when all those dispositions had been taken which made 
it possible for the Crown Prince to begin his attack m\ 
the Toul — Veixlun line of forts which blocked the 
e:usy communications from Gennany. 
His araiy appeare to have been somewhat Ijelated 
and never very fortunate. Perhaps he interfered. 
It was twice thrown over the Meuse in its first 
attempts to cross a fortnight ago, and, even after the 
genei-al French retirement in front of the general 
(Jerman advance to the west left the Meuse open, the 
Crown Prince's anny (with which we should, ])erhaps, 
include that of Wurtemburg) advanced with difficulty 
tlirough the wooded and hilly country to the west 
and north of \'erdun. 
At last (and, it would seem, not earlier than a 
week ago) it was in a jwsition to begin operations. 
It jx>ssessed, we may be certain, the 11 -inch 
howitzers with which hitherto all the serious siege 
work has been conducted (of these I will speak agpdiu 
in a moment), and there could have been no more 
<lifficulty in getting them down by rail and by road 
to the middle MeiLse valley than there was in getting 
them in front of Maubouge. It was only a question 
of another day or two's travel. But it would seem 
that the fortifications of the eastern frontier were 
more thoroiighly held than those of Maubeuge. At 
any rate, they have been more successful. The first, 
and, as matters tuinied out, the only, attack was 
delivered on the work at Troyon, and the selection 
of this point was as wise and as thoroughly thought 
out as lias been every paii of the German scheme — 
until some unexpected accident has come to Impose 
new di.spositions upon the German commanders. 
Troyon was chosen because if it fell Verdun 
would be isolated from Toul, the line would be 
broken, and the frontier open to the invaders. It is 
true that no line of railway here crosses the Meuse, 
nor even any principal road, but with Troyon capturetl, 
the victors would be astraddle of the line between 
A'erduu and Toul, they would have cut the road and the 
railwa}' between the two places and, much more 
im])ortant, they woidd have cut the line of forts 
Ijctween the two places. Troyon Avas well chosen 
because it commanded the Avide.st gap in that line of 
forts coming between what is called the Fort of Parodies 
and the Fort of Genicourt. If Troyon had been taken 
the German forces just to the east could have advanced 
from their rail-head at Thiaucoux-t by Vigneulles to 
cross the ISIeuse \mder the captured work (there is a 
road all the way, though it is not one of the principal 
roads), and this advance would have been free fi'om 
disturbance by the garrison of Verdun on the one 
hand and the garrison of Toul on the other. Further, 
Troyon is, of all the Avorks along the Meuse, perhaps 
the stronjjest, and A'et (under the circumstances of 
this campaign) the most vulnerable ! 
I'his paradox is due to the fact that these forts 
along the Meuse between Verdun and Toul have been 
built for an expected assault, not through violated 
neutral territory, but from the legitimate and existing 
Franco-German frontier. Troyon is admirably situated 
to Avith.stand an attack from the east. It is not 
similarly well situated to Avithstand an attack in 
reverse from the Avest. It is dominated by the 
heights above Woimbley on the edge of the »voods 
CaniMU.- CiaeS 
TlUf' 
xno/x 
VILLACS- 
O fOOO 7000 
» 1 1 
4000 
SOOO 
6000 
RoJLgres iaEicffLisK Yujrds 
SKETCH .SHOWS THE VULSERABILITT OF FOET TROYON' TO -VTTACff 
IROM 'IHE WEST. 
of Avhich there are positions GO ft. above the Avorks 
of Troyon : and it is doubtless upon this escarpment 
to the west of the Meuse that the German howitzers 
Aven; emplaced. 
Troyon M'as relieved by the necessity under 
Avhich the Crown Prince found himself of retiring 
when the third great German body —that stretching 
from Peronne past Frerc and A'itry through Cham- 
pagne to llevigny — had it.self retired past the edge 
of Argonne and' hud left bt. Menehould behind 
uusupi)orted. 
9* 
