Sppt.Miilx'i- 19, lUll 
L A X D A X D AV A T E 11 
'riicse operations, wliicli \vore tal<iiiii- \i\mv <iii tlio 
Belgian Plain while all the above was happening in 
Fran(X>, thongli in )io way decisive last week, nor even 
as yet affecting the result, ai'e well worth our notice. 
It was apparent upon September 8th that tlie 
able but hazardous attempt oE the great German Army 
under Kluek to get ])ast the unexpected large forces 
in front of him bad failed. He Avas still heavily 
defending the line of the Ourcq, but he was being- 
pressed in from the south and be must reti-eat. Tlie 
news was presumably conveyed at once to Antwer]), 
and on the !)th the Belgian Army, which the fortiti- 
eations of that town maintained intact, resumed 
operations. Those operations were continued through- 
out the i)tli, the lOtb, and the 11th of the month, 
that is, the AVednesday, the Thursday, and the Friday 
of last week, and dru-ing those days they took the 
form of a great sortie of the Ix'leaguered garrison of 
Antwerp towards the south, the Clennans in the 
Xoi-th of B(>lgivnn falling back before this adxance. 
On Saturday, the 12th, Gennau reinforcements had 
come uj) from the South of Belgium in sutficient 
numbers to check the Belgian movement. On Sunday 
la.st, September 13tb, the Belgians retired again 
behind the guns of Antwerp. 
Jjct us see, fii-st, Avbat wastbe nature of those five- 
day operations ; secondl}, what was their object ; and, 
thirdly, how far that object was achieved. 
The nature of the operations was as follows : — 
The Belgian troops, issuing out of Antwerp, worked 
round to the south and east, driving the Germans out 
of Aerschot, and ultimately, by the Wednesday night 
or the Thursday moniing, lying along a line from 
Malines to ]jouvain. Fi-oni Malines to Louvain 
runs a canal. The Belgian line lay just to the 
ttist of that canal, and there was actually some 
fighting within the ruins of Louvain itself, ^lore 
than this, cei-tain patrols of cavalry, and, ])erliaps, 
small bodies of infantry as well, had got round 
to the railway line between Louvain and Brussels, 
cutting the same near the station of Coi-tenberg, 
which is almost exactly between the two towns, 
but slightly nearer Louvain. The line seems to 
have lx?en cut somewhere between the two X's which 
1 have marked upon the sketch. 
^leanwhile, during the whole of that Tuesday, 
"Wednesday, and Thursday the Germans were hun-ying 
up reinforcements from the south. On the Saturda\-, 
they took the counter-offensive, and the Belgian line 
retreated northward, again pivoting upon ^falines ; 
on the Sunday moniing or tbe Saturday CAening they 
repassed and evacuated Aerschot (the inhabitants of 
Avbich they put Ix'hind their lines to .saA'c them from 
tlic outrages Avhich Avould folloAv), and by Sunday 
evening they Avere shut up again behind the 
gnus <jf Antwei-p. 
The Avhole of this little manoeuvre, therefore 
(little only on account of tbe A'ast scale of the present 
Avars — for the numbers engaged cannot have been far 
short of 40, 000 men), Avas acted upon an irregular 
field (marked upon the sketch as a shaded area) the 
longest measurement of Avhich is less than thirty miles. 
NoAv what Avas its object ? Its object A\as two- 
fohl. First to harass tbe line of (ierman communica- 
tion through Belgium, and, secondly, to draw back 
again towards the iiorth certain of the reinforcements, 
small as they Avere, Avhich the Germans Avere sending 
flown to stiffen their retiring line in France and 
probably, as I have said, to guard their extreme right 
from <'nvel(ipnicnt. 
We should be e([iially in error if Ave regarded this 
little sortie from Antwerp, ending so shortly after its 
first eft'ort in a retirement, as either presenting a 
serious mciKice to the Gernian coniiiivinications or as 
futile. It did not ])resent ;•. serious menace to the 
German communication.s for the moment, but it 25ut a 
fear into the German commanders for the safety of 
those eommunicatiijus, and a fear that will less 
constantly be I'eneAved. 
The object of such an operati(m as this is to 
make the enemy just at the moment when he is most 
bcAvildered in the crush of a retreat tiirough too 
narrow an issue, feel insecure creiyfrl/ere. The object 
is not to cut his communications — [there is, unfortu- 
nately, nothing like the strength in Belgium to do 
that, and a teri-ible pity it is : a couple of extra Army 
Coi'ps put into Antwerp at the beginning of the war 
Avould have decided it in its jjresent phase !] — but only 
to harass its communications. The object is to prevent 
the commanders of the German retirement from being 
able to say to themselves : — " My lines of supply 
through ]}elgium are, noAv that I liaA'e burnt and 
harried and killed civilians, as safe as my lines of 
supply through Luxemburg, and I can count upon 
them absolutely." 
X'^oAv this harassing of tbe Germans in Belgium 
happens to be of particular value in the present cam- 
paign, because everything goes to .show that the 
German commanders risked their Avbole strength in 
the advance on Paris and left their communications 
through lielgiuni guarded less strongly than has CAcr 
been the case Avith any other army advancing through 
bostile teiritory. They haA^e already SA^acuated Ter- 
monde (after destroying it) and liaA-e only threatened 
Ghent. They baAC delibenxtely refused to occupy the 
sea coast at Ostend and Dunkirk, Avliicli they bad 
ample opportunity of doing. They liaA'e put upon 
those connnunications their A'Ciy last reserA'es in quite 
insufficient numbers, relying upon tAAO things for their 
security : the establishment of a terror along those 
lines, and the absence of a highly trained army, Avitb 
its full complement of all arms, in Antwerp. 
In other Avords, they ba\'e run tbis great risk of 
leaving the root of their communications ill-guarded, 
relying upon the ten-or created by the murder of 
ciA'ilians and priests and tbe burning of A'illages and 
cburchi's t<j make uj) for a lack of troops. X^oav this 
jjolicy of terror has been successful only up to a certain 
point. 'J'he repetition day after day of ncAV outrages 
proves that. The inferior troops of tbe last (}erman 
reseiTC left in Belgium are not AvboUy secin-e from the 
vengeance <jf those Avbose country they have raraged 
as n<3 European country A\'as raAaged before in modern 
times, and Avbose tt'rritory they first guaranteed to be 
neutral and then invaded. And Avhile their security 
is thus shaken it must be equally evident to them 
that they have mider-estimated the offensive power of 
the untrained and half-trained forces added to the 
regular forces upon their flank in Antwerp. 
I'hat is precisely tbe effect Avhicli sorties of this 
kind have ; they distract. 
The Belgians onl^' got as far as the line Brussels 
— -Louvain, and they only did that at a great expense 
of energy and imder the necessity of an innnediate 
retreat. But they compelled the Avithdrawing of 
(Jerman forces from tbe .south. They checked to 
some extent the dribble of the rennxining reinforce- 
ments into France, and, most important of all, they 
rendered the Avholly insufficient guardians of the 
German communications in Jk'lgium uncertain Avhether 
the next blow A\-ould not be more serious. 
On the other hand we must not exaggerate the 
effects which a sortie such as this has had, and here I 
Avould be.' the reader to look at the scheme of tbe 
