LAND AND W A T E R 
Beptombor 19, 191- 
German ooininunioations tliro\ii,'li Bol>(uim and Luxem- 
Imrjj into Franco as they ajjpear upon tlu' sketcli map 
:it the l\eail of this section, anil also in the diai^rani 
upon tlie acconipan\ ins,' sketch. 
LOUVAIN 
'J'he (Jennau Armies in tlie field occupied hist 
week-end, at the moment when their retirement was in 
full swing, an area in Northern France whicli may be 
diagramniatically represented by the shaded area 
A — ]J— C — D. Supplies of food and of ammunition 
could, as long as Vei-dun (at B) and Toul (at C) held 
out, and the line of forts B — C between them, only 
I'cach this ai'ea through the line A — B. Now to reach 
this line A — B you had, of course, a very great number 
of excellent roads, but ammunition in large quantities, 
esjiecially for artillery, demands in modem times the con- 
trol of railroads as well : and of railroads there were but 
two main lines upon which the (ferman armies during 
their gi-eat advance could depend for supply. The one 
was the main line L — N— ]\[ — F, which is the great 
Em-opean line between Paris and Berlin, and in 
which L stands for Liege, N for Namur, Ikl for 
jVtaubeuge, and F for La Fere. The other Avas the 
ifreat line throiiarh Luxemburtj, X ; Lonowv, Y ; 
and Alezicres, Z. In the retreat from Paris the 
French 0th Amny has so out-flanked the tJerman 
1st Army that it can no longer dejX'nd ujwn tlic main 
line of supply from M to F, the extremity oi the 
Gennan line being pushed back east of the line ISI — F. 
fiut there are plenty of railways between M and Z, 
which I have indicated by dotted lines, and there is 
also one between N and Z. So long as Liege, Namur, 
and ^laubeuge are in German hands, these subsidiary 
lines branching south from Alaubenge imd Namur 
can continue to feed the army, and the pressure upon 
them is relieved also by a side line from (r (Crivet) 
running through Marienbourg at K. What import- 
ance the Germans attach to this connecting line is 
proved b}- their nervous destruction of iMarienbourg 
the other day. It is (me of the now too many points 
in Belgium where their policy has been to establish 
a mere terror. 
So long, then, as the first groat line of communi- 
cations ]j — M — F is held by the Germans np to and 
beyond ]\1 they can feed their armies through their 
original main line, and pressiu-e upon it is further 
relieved by a subsidiary lino running from L (Liege) 
through Louvain and Jirus.sels to Mons, where a 
branch connects again with Maubouije. It was this 
subsidiary line which the Belgians ju.st managed to 
reach, and for a moment to cut during their operations 
of lust week. '^I'hey did not get near the main line 
L — M, but they did make the defenders of it anxious. 
As for the second great line of su2)ply X — Y — Z 
running through Jjuxemburg, Lungwy, and Meziere.s 
it is perfectly safe, even while A'erdun holds out ; for 
it is beyond the striking distance of that fortress, and 
there are no French forces to the south sufiicient to 
menace it for some time to come. Should \'erdun 
fall, there would be o])en another new line of the 
utmost importance to the fJernmns. It is a line 
coming straight from their dej^ots at Metz (the line 
which I have marked upon the sketch S — T) and with 
the breakdown of the Verdun-Toul barrier (B — C) 
further lines, as I explained last week, will ])rovide 
ample and short communication from Germany and 
the Bhine bases through Alsr.c. '-Lorraine. 
From all the above it will be evident that so long- 
as the two main lines L — M, X — Z and the subsidiary 
branch lines are open to the Genuans they can be 
fully supplied, and they would but strengthen them- 
sel\es in their retreat by shortening their lines of 
coniuBinication. If the French forces could (which is 
imlikely) get round on to the subsidiary lines south of 
]\[ in the direction of the arrow marked upon the 
sketch, the (icrmans would <mly have (so long as 
Yerdun holds out) one railway line to depend u])on 
and woidd be in a very diflicult position. But failing 
this, a continued Jielgian menace to the line L- -M 
gravely incommodes them, and if it were really cut 
they would be in as difficult a position as though the 
French had got round in the direction of the arrow. 
That, as briefly as one can put it, is the menace to tlie 
German communications from the north to-da\', and 
the exjjlanation of these and subsequent Belgian 
operations from Antwerp. 
SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS 
IN THE WEST. 
The whole of the above may now be summarized 
as follows : 
^"^ t. Aix-U-Ox^mi 
otJTLixixa Roncini.T thk rnK.SF..VT position ix thk westki-.:* 
The German line which upon September Itli 
occupied the positions (1) (1) (1) and was within a 
nuirch of Paris, with the Crown IMnce's army I', 
trying to break through the A"erduu-Toid l)arrier at 
Ti'oyon, now occiq)ies the positions (2) (2) (2) from 
near Compiegne, along the Aisne, round north of 
liheims to the Argonne, while the Crown Prince's 
army at P has retired to Q. 'Inhere has been a general 
German retirement jiivoting on the Argonne and 
amounting at its maximxim to 00 miles. From a line 
convex against the centre of France it is now a liue 
concave near the Belarian frontier. 
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