Soptembcr 10, 191i 
LAND AND W A T E R 
Tliis line is only jn-^t in toueli, if in touch at all, 
"with its old main line uf communications between 
Compiognc and Maubeuge ; but it still has its subsi- 
diary line of communications (S) (S) (S) dependant on 
the upper part of this old main line above Maubeuge, 
and it has a second Ihie of connnunications through 
Miziens, Longwy, and Luxemburg. 
The def(Misive positions -whioh it occupies along 
the Aisne and Suippe rivers {2) (.O) (.O), are hardly of 
a sort that can be pierced. They may be turned 
round the western end at AV^., or, far less probably, 
round the eastern end at E. The Gemians may 
intend a counter-offensive from this ridge (2) (2) (2), 
but more probably they are holding it in order to 
protect the retirement of their convoys across the 
Aisne and the jVIeuse behind them. Such a retire- 
ment, if it takes place, with its wings at W. and E. 
intact, can be effected in good order, Avith the German 
army unbrcjkea and as strong as ever it was prepared 
to take the counter-offensive when it so chooses, when 
it is thoroughly restored and remunitioned, and 
reposing jjerhaps ujwn the great fortress of Metz. 
But such a retirement if it is hampered by movements 
in Hank by the enemy round W. or even round E. 
may have to cross the rivers on too narrow a front, in 
which case its lines of convoys, artillery, waggons, and 
marclung men would be caught in the defiles of 
the bridges, and it would ])robably suffer heavy loss. 
Meanwhile, everyone shoidd repeat to himself that 
fundamental doctrine which was so continually insisted 
upon in these notes before the French took the 
counter-offensive : 
0/ lirn oj)po7iciif!t i/i anus, one has not ilefeated the 
other until he has hioii(/ht that other to a Decision. A 
Decision is not avhieced until the army of one of the 
two opponents is pierced or encelojted. 
The (iennan army has been neither pierced nor 
enveloped. It is to-<lay what it was three weeks ago. 
It has lost far less in projwrtion than the Allies have 
lost ; and if, though it be the less probable alternative, 
it again takes the offensive after holding the ridge 
(2) (2) (2), only, that would be an opei-ation cpiite 
consonant to the hist<ny and nature of war. 
On the other hand, if the Allies are in sufficient 
numl)ers or possess sufficiently rapid means of 
moving troojjs round the western extremity of the 
line (2) (2) (2), then the (iei'man retirement may be 
rendered difficult indeed, and jjerhaps disastrous. 
I wiU conclude this part with some mention of 
three points which are now clearer than they were 
earlier in the war — a point concerning the prisoners, a 
point concerning the German siege ai'tillery, and a 
2)oint concerning the supply of munitions. 
THE PRISONERS. 
There is a factor in the issues of this war which 
will ha considerable even if large fractions of the 
Gennan forces should be enveloped and suiTender in 
the course of it, and which \\\\\ be much more 
important if successes of this kind do not take place. 
This factor is the factor of the prisoners now in 
Gennan hands. 
The official list issued by the Gennan Govern- 
ment bears every mark of accuracy. In the case of 
the Jii'itish contingent the numbers are surprisingly 
low, less than half the total of " missing." It may 
be hoj)('d that these indicate the presence among the 
" missing" of many who will later find their regiments 
again. But at any rate, judged by this test, which 
is a fair one, the ( ierman figures are not above the mark. 
We must remember that in a retreat, and almost 
in projxjrtion to the rapidity of that retreat, the 
retiring bod\- automatically ]<jses great numbers of 
men. So slight a thing as a blister on a man's foot 
means, in a rapid retirement, a big chance of his 
capture'. Nearly all wounded fall into the hands of 
the enemy, as do that large proportion of men in a 
conscript army — men only just called up from 
sedentary occupations of all kinds — who fall out in a 
pressed march. 
It is, by the way, one of the most remarkable 
things about the first four days of this rapid retirement 
of the first German army and part of the second upon 
the line Soissous — Kheims, that it seems as yet to have 
lost so few men. AVe have not yet the full tale, but 
in the first four da\s the records sent in did not 
account for 7,000 prisoners, even adding to the 
official figures the unofficial accoimts of surrenders. 
AVell, the figures of French prisoners in Germany 
on this same list come to nearly 1,700 officers and 
nearly 87,000 men. And this does not include the 
prisoners from Alaidjeuge, in the fall of which the 
Germans clauued the very large total of 40,000 
prisoners. 
In this last item there ))robably is exaggeration. 
Many of the older men in !^Iaubeuge will have been 
pressed into the work of defending the city, and the 
estimate must have been a very rough one taken in 
the excitement of success. But even if vou halve it, 
it brings the total number of French prisoners for 
Germany at the present moment to well over 100,000. 
I repeat, if considerable bodies of the Germans 
now in retreat are ultimately rounded up, if there are 
•jeneral surrenders due to the 
cutting 
off of com- 
munications and the barring of the line of retirement, 
we shall soon have an equal batch of prisoners to set 
against this very large nujnber. It is conceivable, 
though improbable, that an exchange might take place. 
But if no such disasters overtake the Germans for some 
time to come, there will be a big jDreponderance of 
this asset upon the German side. Put the matter as 
gently as you like, but acknowledge that the Prussian 
theory of war will regard these men as hostages : that 
is at once the strength and the weakness of what is 
called the " Frederician tradition," and the conclusion 
is that the Allies must wholly disregard all threats 
and all bargains connected with this great body of 
prisoners. It is certainly the French policy to dis- 
regard that very grave sentimental w^eapon in the 
hands of the enemy. AVe may presume that the 
policy will be carried through in spite of everything, 
but we must be prepared for very bitter sacrifice unless 
corresponding numbers of the enemy fall into our 
hands. 
THE GERMAN SIEGE ARTILLERY. 
The telegrams, however confused, sensational, and 
occasionally absurd, which we receive in regard to 
Gennan siege work can, if we compare them one with 
another, give us some information as to the measure 
of success obtained by the enemy in this direction. 
It is, in the first place, quite clear that the real 
work that has been done against fortifications so far has 
been done by the German 11 -inch howitzer. Now 
this gun is nothing abnormal or new. It corre- 
sponds to the French howitzer which, if my memory 
sen'es me aright, is a 275 mm., or thereabouts: a 
calibre differing by less than one thirtieth from the 
German. If I am not mistaken there is in the 
British service a corresponding gvm of about nine- 
tenths of the French calibre, or rather less, and about 
nine-elevenths of the (jermau. In other words, all the 
great Powers possess a gun of this type. The only 
difference between them is the difference you always-. 
13* 
