LAKl) AND WATER 
Septeialx-i- i9, 1914 
got in tlio otoniiil coinpromiso hotween mobility and 
■weight. One Power tliiuks that a /v////(V lighter gun is 
worth while on account of its greater iiiohility. 
Another Power risks a slight loss of mobility for the 
sake of a raihcr heavier gun. 
It is true that the shells dropped by these 
howitzers have produced more effect ou fortification 
than was expected. It is not true that they have 
always, and will neces.sarily always, jjroduce a wholly 
uncalculated effect. The heaviest artillery in a modern 
fortress will always outrange them, and though the 
howitzer can hide — that, coupled witli searching 
trenches, is the whole purpose of its high-angle lire — 
yet, in most cases, only good a?rial observation could 
direct its tire sufHcientl}' accurately from any distance to 
make its effect immediately decisive. It is probable or 
certain that we .shall see not only fortresses u])on this 
side of the frontier, but fortresses upon the other side, 
yield to howitzer fire more rapidly than had been ex- 
pected by those who theorised in jieace time upon these 
machines ; but it is not true that we shall see miracles. 
It is certain that wlien the history of their bombard- 
ment comes to be written, we shall find that Namur 
and even Maubeuge A\ere not as heavily gunned as 
they might have been, or were not sufficiently provided 
with trained men or adequately defended. It is a 
matter upon which we nui.st hold our judgment in 
suspense, because we ha\e not yet full data upon it ; 
but it would seem that the big 420mm. howitzer 
(17 inches or rather less) has hitherto done nothing 
off rails and very little on rails. There is no reason 
Avhy you should not make a liowitzer as big as the 
Shot Towei', save the loss in mobility ; and hitherto 
the consensus of opinion has been that at somewhere 
less than a foot you had arrived at the maxim\im 
calibre wbicli could be combined with any real mobility 
for this type of weapon. 
THE QUESTION OF MUNITIONS. 
One of the mo.st interesting hints we had froni 
the telegrams during Yon Kluck's retreat upon the 
Aisne was the apparent dearth of ammunition from 
which that General and his command suffered. This 
would seem to have been particularly the case with 
his artillery. The action fought along the right 
bank of the Ourcq n]X)n September 7th, Sth, and 0th 
was, m the main, an artillery duel of peculiar violence, 
and it would seem as though, Avhen the retreat was 
undertaken upon the 10th, throughout that day, as 
also throughout the 11th and \i^\, the retiring 
German forces were short of shells. 
Now we know that they were also, durmg those 
days, ju.st out of touch with their main line of com- 
munications by rail, which main line runs along the 
Oise valley by Noyon and Comj^icgne and Creil ; and 
the incident suggests what commonsense would also 
teach one : the capital importance in a modern cam- 
paign of multiplying railway communication Iceland 
one to one's base, ])articularly for the su])ply of 
projectiles to gims in the field. 
Modem quick-firing artiller\- can dispose of 
something like ten times as much ammimition in the 
sjime time as could the guns of twent}' years ago. It 
could, at a maximum rate of firing, dispose of far 
more ; but in practice it can and does di.spose of it, if 
the artillery duel l)e severe, at this enormous rate. 
One of the vital questions, therefore, that Avill 
l)robably crop up in the course of the present campaign 
will be this question of the exhaustion of artillery 
sup2^1ies. It is probable that the story of General 
Pan having captured an ammunition column upon his 
left (and the German right) during or just before the 
battle of Meaux may bo accurate ; but apart from 
this, it was the temporary loss of the railway which 
presumal)ly made all the difference ; and, perhaps, not 
a little of the manoeu\Ting which is going on at the 
])resent moment upon the western extremity of the 
CJerman defensive line has for its intention not only 
the outllankiug of that extremity, but the denial to 
that present defensive German line of the main railway 
which here runs direct fi-om the Jielgian depots 
through Noyon to Compiegne. 
THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 
In the east<>rn theatre of Avar the decisive result 
of hist week, Avhen the Ilussian armies overwhelmed 
the second Austrian Anny by Lembei-g, has not up to 
the moment of writing (Wednesday afternoon) been 
followed u]) by a corres2X)ndingly decisive blow, such 
as was proniised us, against the first Austrian Army. 
It will be remembered that the second Austrian 
Army, which had been drawn up between Kamionka 
and Halicz, was after several days' fighting forced 
back upon Lemberg and broken to pieces. The 
victorious Eussians in this part of the field then .stood 
right upon the flank (.)f the first Austrian Army, largely 
reinforced by their Gennan allies, and having their 
right at Tomaszov exposed to the Russian attack. So 
far as can Ije gathered from the rather confused 
accounts which have reached us in the west, the 
Russians did damage this first Au.strian Army on its 
flank at 'i'omaszov, but they did not roll it up, and 
their general attempt, upon failing to do this, consi-sted 
in a manceuvre to get round its left wing near the 
Vistula and force it backwards. 
The latest telegrams received point to some 
measure of success in this manoeuvre ; but that 
mananivre, Ije it remembered, is not a decisive one. 
the first Austrian Army is not enveloped ; it is 
only being pushed back. The Russians have crossed 
the lower part of the River San, apparently at the 
])oint and in the direction indicated by the arrow in 
the accompanying maj). They have by their own 
. Russian Poland 
G A'tit-C I A •Kxmoria. 
^c^< f Mi let 
account already got astride of the railway between 
Cracow and the strong fortress of Przemysl (though 
it seems diificult to understand how they can have 
got .so far in so short a time) ; they have — again 
according to the official account— secured the position 
of Gorodok; and they certainly have reached Mosiska. 
If you draw a line through these places, with a 
hy2)othetical point for the place in which they shall 
have CTit the railway from Cracow to Przemysl, you 
will see that the Russian jwsitions form a half-circle 
round the Austrian Anny, which is falling back 
everywhere upon Przemysl. How far this success 
has been continuous and thorough, only the future can 
show. If even a half-circle can be draM'u from the 
mountains to the mountains, enclosing the first 
Austrian Army round and in Przemysl, with the 
main railway pass over the Carpathians behind 
it held by the Russians at Lu.sko, there should 
at least be a decisive result against this fir.st 
U* 
