♦September 19, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
THE cud of last week brought us alarm iug rumours 
of a German Zopi)eliii invasion of England cin 
Calais, preceded by a bombardment of Dover 
fioni across the Channel by monster guns. The 
guns we can dismiss; the suitable gun is not yet 
built. As for the Zeppelins, sheds for them, are 
not available at Calais, and a Zeppelin without a shed is a 
very harmless sort of thing. It is like the crawling wasp of 
the autumn, in full possession of its sting, but not in a position 
to use it e.xcept in special circumstances. 
Very wisely, however, the responsible authorities did not 
take tlic threat as an idle one. A naval airship was ordered 
to cruise over London, and at the same time a request, of the 
nature of a command, was issued as to the extinction of all 
jironiincnt sky sights and similar leading lights. 
All ot which is to the good. The '' aci'ial menace " to us 
.so far exists merely as '' newspaper yarns " or "' speculations 
of f.Tnatics." All ot which is very good in its way, but it does 
not nullify the possibilities of such attack. As I mentioned 
l:!st week, Germany's air superiority is probably regarded by 
lier as her trump cai'd. It is probably also a card to be held 
back and not played till the psychological moment. 
The new type aerial searchlight now in full use is likely 
to make surprise attacks exceedingly difficult, and also every 
]>hu-o that matters is by now well supplied with anti-aerial 
guns. Tlieie is consequently not the least occasion to panic. 
But .-'11 the same the danger is rail. Germany in the air is 
just about in the same relation to us (or more so) as we are to 
Germany on the water, and it is idle to imagine that in her 
own time Germany will not use or attempt to use her 
supoiiority. 
\Vc have no occasion to fear her aeroplanes. Even ftom 
the shores of Fr.Tuco they cannot well act from a French base; 
and tvcn if they did, the damage that they could do is more 
or less trivial. Ze])pclins, however, arc quite another affair. 
Once a base is established in France, London's danger will be 
.•icnte. It may come to-morrow, or not till next week or the 
week after, or later still. But the danger is there, and it 
should not be ignored. 
Germany in her own lime will seek to panic us. She 
iiopcd to do so with the commerce attack. This operation did 
not come off. The attempt left our traders cold. North Sea 
mines have l)cen little more successful. The third vial is 
liktly to eomc from^he air. If so. it will rest with the people 
of London not to acce))t the Kaiser as the instrument of the 
Almighty. Thoy will have to accept things with philosophical 
calm no easy task. 
It is inadvisable to discuss what ways and means we may 
have of meeting this possible aerial attack. For that matter 
no one knows for certain what will happen when aeroplanes 
attack .Tirships. We arc far too prone to seek the analogy of 
torpctlo craft attacking battleships. The analogy is easy; but 
it may be absolutely delusive. For all we know the positions 
may be reversed entirely. 
In any case it is idle to speculate too freely as to what 
an aeroplane can accomplish against a Zeppelin. It can cer- 
taiidy in the liist resort ram her and destroy a gas bag — with 
luck, two gas bags. But the average Zeppelin has seventeen 
bag«, and what are two among so many? At any rate, and 
in order to minimise possible future panic, it should be remem- 
bered that — according to German calculation* — a Zeppelin 
can take a great deal of punishment without suffering much 
for it vriiil she hud achieved her ohjeef. 
This, of course, is identical with the theory about; 
destroyers charging a battleship. According to the theory the 
battleship will very probably inflict deadly wounds on an 
attacking destroyer, but these wounds will not take effect 
until the destroyer has managed to achieve her especial pur- 
pose. Rightly or wrongly, Germaji aerial ideas run along 
similar linos. It is held that a Zeppelin cannot bs destroyed 
without a_t^ime interval. In that time interval she should 
have been able to do her work. It is along these lines, it. 
may be noted, that German regiments are handled — without 
regard to the ultimate loss so long as the initial object is 
achieved. 
Hence the danger. The public in London and other large 
cities can only defend themselves by implicit obedience to all 
orders as to the display of lights, and by keeping calm what- 
ever happens. The actual damage to be effected oven by a 
Zeppelin is comparatively small; the main object aimed at 
is " moral effect." 
General French has now issued a report of the Boyal 
Flying Corps, which emphasises the fact that in actual air 
fighting five German aeroplanes have been destroyed. 
The report, with the expression ' lired at constantly I y 
both friend and foe," draws attention to oils of the dangers 
to which our airmen are exposed. At the present time there 
is with aircraft no such thing as the "obviously British" or 
"obviously German" which obtains on the sea. All aero- 
planes are pretty much alike (indeed, the Germans have some 
of British make, and we some of German make), and although 
they are marked on the underside, it is rarely possible to see 
those marks under war conditions. " Shoot first and inquire 
afterwards " is about the only workable order where aeroplanes 
are concerned. 
It is persistently rejKirted that we, the French, and the 
Belgians, are adopting arrows for use against troops. The 
arrows are so designed that they will spread in falling, and 
it is cjilculaled that a bunch of 400 (the regulation supply) 
would~do more mischief than bombs, since dropped from' a 
height they would pierce men like bullets. 
Bombs from aeroplanes have so far achieved very littlu 
— real utility work consists in scouting, directing fire, "and in 
fighting any of the enemy similarly 'engaged. This last i* 
certainly more effectually done by actual coufiict in the air 
than by rifle fire directed from below, both as regards greater 
certainty (^f result, and also becausa the thousands of bullets 
discharged into the air must all fall again someuhere. No 
casualties whatever have so far been reported from this cansc, 
but circumstances in which a friendly force might sustain 
heavy casualties from returning bullets is great. The 
theory that a bullet shot upwards burns itself up in the 
air like a meteorite is iiiadmissable. All such bullets 
must fall some^vherc, and if several thousand chanced to 
fall on a friendly regiment, there would be little of that 
regiment left. 
The only proper place in which to meet aerial attack is 
in the air. 
A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE 
WAR ZONE. 
By E. CHARLES VIVIAN. 
Bar-le-Duc or Bar-sur-Ornain. — The principal 
town of tlie department of Mouse, France, .situated on the river 
Ojnain, a tributary of the Mtjuse. It is in the immediate vicinity 
of the Marno-Rliine canal, and is a station on the Paris-Strasbourg 
line of rail, b!>ing alsD connected by rail with the fortress town 
of Verdun. Its ji'ipiilation is about 17,()(KI. The town was 
founded by Frederiik the First, Duke of Lorraine, in the tenth 
century, and in nK'di*val times was strongly fortified. A few 
traces of the old fortificatiou.s, which were dismantled by 
Louis XIV. in 1670, still remain, and Bar-Ie-Duc of the present 
day is an educational centre with considerable trade in wool, 
wood, and wine. 
Bielgoray or Bilgoray. — A small town of the 
jirovince of Lublin, in I'vussian Poland, about seventv-fivc 
kilometres south of the town of Lublin. It is about five 
kilometres distant from the frontier of Austrian Galicia. and about 
five kilometres distant from the river Taucw, a tributary of 
the San, 
19* 
