LAND AND WATER 
September 2G, 1914 
Geman dofenslve l.ere ; 1»ut that defensive has not 
fouiKl itself compelled by the pressure m front of it to 
remain so far back. «. • ii 
The Gennans have found themselves sufliciently 
strong immediately in front of Hheims to retrace their 
steps and to advance weU across the Suippe and to 
heights that now threaten the gi-eat town itself. 
The positions occupied by the Germans after the first 
week's efforts, successes, and failui-es is represented by 
the dotted line which in its sinuosity with its recesses 
and salients marks the progress of the Allies and the 
correspondiBg points where the German counter-offen- 
sive of the Germans has succeeded and the Allies 
have fallen back. 
NO YON 
/ I 
LCRAONNI, 
o 
10 
ao 
I 
66 MiUs 
VI 
THE DOTTED LINE, INDIC.^TINO THE PRESENT APPROXIMATE POSITION OF THE QEKMAN ARMIE.<!, SHOWS HOW THE TURNINO MOVEMKNT 
BOUND KOTON WILL COMPEL A OENKKAL GERMAN BETIBEMKNT FROM THE ILATEAU OF SOISSONS. 
We shall not understand the whole of these 
operations — which may prove decisive, so far at least 
as the first part of the great campaign in France is 
concerned — unless we grasp the fact that the Germans 
in the course of the past week attempted, and were 
partiaUy successful in, a strong counter-offensive in 
this region, which they themselves describe as their 
" centre." 
I shall have occasion with this " Eheims " 
limb of the defensive German line (as in the case of 
the first, or Soissons, limb) to discuss the matter in 
more detail lat«r ; but for the moment I would beg 
the reader to note the two groups of heights which 
stand well south of the Suippe and close in the 
neighbourhood of Eheims. The one, called the 
height of Brimont, is marked A upon the sketch at 
the head of this ; the other, the heights of Nogent 
and Pompelle, stand right down to the Yesle, and are 
marked B and C. 
The German counter-offensive in this region was 
so successful during the days Thursday, the 1 7th, and 
Friday, the 18th of September, that it advanced thus 
near to Eheims, put up heavy artillery on these 
heights, and at the end of the movement (by the 
Saturday, the 19th) was in a position gravely to 
imperil the monuments of the town, to bombard it, and 
to make the position of the French within and to 
south of it exceedingly difficult to hold. 
This successful counter-offensive of the Germans 
just round Eheims was not continued throughout the 
Avhole length of this second limb. When one gets 
further east on to the Upper Suippe Valley (it is 
hardl}- a valley but rather a very shallow depression in 
the naked plain of Champagne) the French offensive 
was in these same days successful in its turn and 
pushed back the Germans from the line Souain- 
Le-Mesnil-le-Hurlus-Massiges, which they had taken 
up, and threatening a certain railway which, when we 
come to details, we shall see to be of great importance 
to the whole German position. In this advance the 
French captured a battalion. 
We may sum up and say that by the end of the 
third week in September, Sunday, the 20th, after this 
undecided defensive action of the Gennans had been 
maintained for a full week, the general result can be 
tabulated in the diagram of elements printed below : — 
llie first even line upon which the German 
defensive relied at the beginning of these operations 
is represented in this diagram by a double black line. 
I have already made mention of one railway, that 
behind Souain. Before proceeding to the details of 
all this great defensive action between the Argonne 
and the Oise, I will say a word upon the German 
railway communications as a whole, for upon an 
understanding of these depends the whole of our com- 
prehension of the German chances of success and of 
the German peril. 
THE COMMUNICATIONS. 
It is evidently of the first importance to notice 
exactly what the communications are behind the 
German defensive lines, and to know where they lie, 
and to consider their length, if we are to judge the 
situation correctly ; for upon a threat to those com- 
munications will depend the success of the Allies and 
the ousting of the Germans from their positions 
between the Oise and the Argonne. 
Of roads there are any number; good roads, 
along which considerable rainy weather might impede 
ti-affic, but all of which are open to the use of an 
ai-my. So far as road traffic is concerned, the whole 
district between the Oise and the Meusc may be 
treated as one field, with ample opportunity, even for 
so large a force as the German invading ai-my, to 
supply itself or to retreat. All that we have to 
remember about their numerous roads is the bridges 
over the main rivers, and these, if the retreat be 
ordei-ly, are fairly replaced by pontoons. 
But with railway facilities it is otherwise. There 
are only two lines which ultimately lead to the great 
bases of the Germans — to the depots, the stores, and 
the manufactories and arsenals in Germany, from 
which the Army is fed and munitioned. 
The first of these two lines, that upon which the 
whole original plan depended, is the main European 
trunk line which taps Cologne and its district, and 
passes through Aix-la-Chapelle, Liege, Namur, and so 
down the valley of the Oise to Paris. I have marked 
it A, A, A. 
The second line, which I have marked B, B, B, 
connects with Gennany by a more southern route. 
Save for these two lines. A, A, A and B, B, B, no 
railway leads from the enemy's front in France to 
his stores in Gemiany. 
This second line is less strong than the Belgian, 
but still is necessary. It runs in a peculiar fashion. 
It taps the Treves-Coblenz region and after going 
through Luxemburg (at which nominally iadependcut 
4* 
