LAND AND WATER 
September 26, 1914 
tlircatenintr the main German commnnications. But 
tSa resen-e upon the si.e and direction of winch 
a wise silence is presei-ved. All we know of this 
fresh French Army at this moment is that it took 
Peroune lust Saturday and is now advancing on 
St. Quentin. , ., i -.i 
Should the Germans break through, either 
between Cnionne and Berry an Bac, or between Berry 
an Bac and Bazancourt— that is, in the immediate 
iiei<'hbourhood of Eheims— it is obvious that such a 
coiSiter-offensive woidd mean a great and decisive 
success for the enemy. But in our attempt to judge 
the future we can but note that such a success has 
not been approached. For ten days every effort has 
been concentrated by the enemy upon the central 
portion of tlie line to achieve that success. If the 
centre of Eheims continues to be successfully held by 
the French, there remain the two turning move- 
ments : the operations upon the wings. 
I have said when speaking of the sections m 
detail that the advance along the west of the Argonne, 
if it shaU pass and cross and hold the railway Imc 
from Bazancourt to Grand Pre, will have important 
results. It will compel the CroAvn Prince's Anny 
upon the Meuse to go northwards ; it will narroAv the 
gate through which a German retreat could be 
effected ; it may even withdraw pressure from the 
French troops in Lon-aine. But an advance on this 
eastern side of the line would only be decisive if it 
■were made in very great force and could count upon 
ultimately holding the German lines of communication 
here. Now these go directly north from Eheims to 
Mezieres through Bethel, and are far from even a 
successful advance of the French in the east. More- 
over, of a decisive aocumulation of numbers upon the 
east, or French right, there has been no sign. The 
chief operation is upon the French left and along the 
valley of the Oise. It is here that, of the three possi- 
bilities which the general position suggests, the most 
probable of all must be looked for. It should be hg the 
turning movement here round Noyon that the Germans 
should be compelled to abandon the Soissons plateau. 
As we have seen, the main line of communication 
by which the greater part of German stores and 
artillery munitions comes is that which runs directly 
from the Belgian frontier down the valley of the Oise. 
After the fall of Maubeuge that line was open through- 
out, save of course where such bridges as the British 
contingent and the French 5th Army had destroyed 
in their retreat from Mons have been replaced by 
pontoon bridges and trestle bridges which cannot bear 
the weight of a train. But, at any rate for the most 
part, this line can be used and is being used by the 
Germans. Conversely, if that line be cut pemianently 
and held by the Allied troops, retreat is imjjosed upon 
the Germans, and if that retreat were then delayed it 
would be converted into disaster. 
Supposing, therefore, that the French centre is not 
pierced, everything would seem to turn upon the 
success of the French troops which we know to be 
operating in the Oise valley near Noyon and pushing 
up northward there, and the appearance in sufficiently 
large numbers of other troops before St. Quentin, 
coming we may jjresume from the direction of Amiens. 
There is a French Army there — marching, as I have 
said, from Peronne since kst Saturday. Upon what 
it does, and upon what the other forces further to the 
south round Noyon can do, mainly depends the issue 
of this general action : whether it shall be decisive of 
the first phase of the war in the w-est or no. 
It is just at this point, wheti one is summing up 
the whole position, that there comes in an element 
which, from the present onwards, will be of 
increasing importance: I mean what the French 
call the moral — the mental attitude w^hich is closely 
bound up with the physical condition of an army. 
AVhenever two forces approximately equal meet, 
and whenever neither has succeeded in outmanoeuvring 
or tricking the other, the spirit turns the scale. _ Tha.t 
supreme clement is not of decisive importance in the 
first days of a campaign, unless the campaign was 
be"-un with the opposing forces in very different states 
of mind— the one despondent, the other confident. 
Here there was no such difference ajiparent 
between French and Germans. Neither party out- 
marched the other : neither party showed during the 
first throe weeks of heavy fighting (from the Sunday 
when the Germans were successful on the Sambre to 
the Sunday Avlien they took up the defensive position 
on the Aisne) any lack of confidence or any doubt of 
success. The German Army of invasion, as a whole, 
like its commanders, were still confident of ultimate 
victory : so were the French and the British con- 
tingent which stood with the French. 
Now, it is an unwise thing, in the examination 
of any human activity, but particularly in following a 
campaign, to force a judgment of the future beyond 
the limits of very cautious conjecture. But it does 
seem as though, in this element of moral, time was at 
last working against the invasion. 
The counter-offensive has, indeed, been very 
vigorously taken by the Germans over and over again. 
Tliey have not slackened their heavy and accui-ate 
artUleiy Avork ; they have lost no conspicuous number 
of prisoners in these operations as a whole. But their 
position is not one in which an army nourished upon 
the tradition and led by the aims cf the Prussian 
sendee can feel its former confidence. To begin with, 
the initiative has passed to the Allied side. Next, 
the threat of a decision is against the Germans. If 
the position on the plateau above Soissons is tiu-ned 
it must be abandoned. That it may be turned is now 
an obvious and increasing peril. If, being turned, 
the plateau is not abandoned with sufficient celerity, 
it must be abandoned at a cost which may vary 
from heavy losses of materiel to disaster. 
It must further be remembered that the initial 
efforts imposed upon the greater part of the German 
forces, especially those towards the west of the line 
(which is precisely the point where the Allied efforts 
are now concentrated), were particularly designed for 
an immediate success. The enormous expenditure of 
energy demanded of these men presupposed the rapid 
reaping of a reward. True, there was little sign 
of exhaustion in the retreat after the Battle of 
Meaux upon the Aisne. But a defensive which is 
threatened upon its wings, and after many days has 
failed in every attempt at a counter-offensive, is of its 
nature a weakening thing. The spiritual factor 
which is ultimately the decider of all warfare — where 
the material factors are more or less equal — favours 
the Allies. 
THE EASTERN FIELD CJP WAR. 
In the Eastern theatre of war there is no news 
of moment this week, save the occupation by the 
Eussian Army of Jaroslav. 
We cannot predicate anything decisi\'e of the 
position in Galicia, nor conjecture even upon the 
broadest lines a date when a victorious Eussian army 
might appear in Silesia, until we have more definite 
news of what is really happening to the Austrian 
forces with their German reinforcements now upon 
the defensive along the San. 
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