LAND AND WATER 
September 26, 1914 
•war ■was declared tho Eoningslerg docs not appear to have 
been in commission anywhere. 
This cruiser happened into Zanzibar, where she found our 
old third class cruiser I'egMus, of the Cape Station, lying by 
in the open roadstead sweeping boiler tubes. The German 
iu-nied with a broadside of five 40 calibre 4.1's, opened fire on 
the J'fyafiis, which could only reply with a bi'oadside of four 
old 27-calibre 4-inch of shoi-t range and high trajectory. 
The Gcnnau cruiser, according to our official accounts, 
killed twenty-five of tho crew of the Pegasus and wounded 
ilfty-two out of a total of 234. There are also ten missing. 
If tho Gei-man cruiser had any sense at all, her con-esponding 
loss was absolutely nothing. She had merely to steam to and 
fro at long range and fire at a stationary target which could 
not reach her with replies. 
The I'egasiis is reported as having been beached- — she 
jn-obably drifted ashore a blazing wreck. The German cruiser 
was last seen steaming south. 
So far as we are immediately concerned, this means that 
simultaneously with the Emden's performances in the Bay of 
Bengal we have to look for a. German cruiser on the Cape of 
Good Hope station, where we have nothing regularly stationed 
capable of catching a 23i-knot cruiser. 
Out of which we may expect to hear of German activities 
in that direction. 
The third incident is that, also on Sept. 14th, the British 
amicd liner Cannanla encountered the German armed liner 
Cap Trafalgar (or her sister, the Berlin) off the East Coast of 
South America. This battle between two enormous liners is 
certainly the most curious conflict of modem times. Their 
very bulk protected them against the small guns with which 
they were each armed in this " battle of haystacks." 
At the end of one and three-quarter hours' firing the 
Berlin (or Cap Trafalgar) capsized and sank. Her return fire 
killed nine men in the Carman ia, seriously wounded five, and 
slightly wounded twenty-one. The survivors of the German 
ship, whose losses are not known, were picked up by a collier 
from which she had been coaling. 
The British losses indicate that tho battle must have been 
engaged furiously on both sides, but that our shooting was 
much the better. 
This is the second German armed liner to be disposed of. 
Both were caught coaiing — apparently the only chanco of 
bringing them into action. The mission of a commerce 
destroyer is not to fight if she can possibly help it; even a 
victoiy may impair her utility. The problem of adequate 
repression of corsairs is tlaus considerably amplified. 
From the public point of view the circumstance that the 
British Navy has so far only eliminated two of the commerce 
raidei-s may seem to suggest a certain inadequateness. Such a 
view, however, is entirely incorrect. Tho Gemian raiders 
appear to be kept supplied with coal from vessels which may 
be lying anywhere. These come out us required and coal the 
raider at sea or in any convenient bay. The exact problem 
before our Navy is best to be expressed popularly by getting 
•someone secretly to select a certain letter on this page and for 
the reader then to endeavour to discover what particular word 
that letter is in. Just a little something can be done along tJie 
line of probable words to be selected, but veiy little. Blind 
chance must of necessity be the predominant factor. 
Elsewhere, yet again on Sept. 14th, an attempt was made 
to blow up H.M.S. Dwarf in the Cameroon River. Tho 
attempt failed. Two days later the Dwarf was rammed by a 
German merchant ship, but she was only slightly damaged, 
while the Gemian ship was driven ashore with some consider- 
able loss. The incident has, of course, no bearing on the 
general issues of the war, but it sci-vcs to illustrate the tenacity 
with which the Germans are conducting operations, and also 
that they are by no means unfruitful in ' dodges." 
THE NORTH SEA. 
From further details to hand it appears that our sub- 
marine E9 (Lieut.-Com. Jlorton) succeedetl in toi-pedoing the 
German cruiser Ilela within six miles of the German coast. 
The Ilela, it may be stated at once, was no material 
loss to the German Navy. She was a vca-y old tub armed 
-with four 15| pounders. Reconstructed and rcboilercd in 
1910, she was possibly capable of some 21 knots, although 18 
knots is the most ever ofiicially recorded of her. Beside her 
our old Speedy (mined by Germans) was a moro efficient fights 
ing unit, albeit though of less than half the size. 
Physically, then, the Ilela was no loss whatever to Ger- 
many. Psychologically the submarining of a German Dread- 
nought in the North Sea would have been of less value to u.?. 
Up till now the Gemians have generally regarded our 
blockade as something up by Scapa Flow and tho Orkneys in 
the North Sea and behind the Straits of Dover in the South. 
The submarining of the Ilela has now taught them that 
our effective blockade commences inside their " front door,'' 
that IS to say, well inside the impregnable fortifications oi 
Heligoland. According Eo calculations, Gorman ships insida 
the Heligoland area might come and go as they listed. British 
vubmarine E9 has now indicated to them that this is a mis- 
taken calculation on their part, and it is difficult to overesti- 
mate the impoi-tance of this. We do not know the exact, 
location of the High Sea Fleet, but it is probably not at its base 
at Wilhelmshaven. If it be at Cuxhaven, or in tJie Canal, it 
is .vii-tually blockaded there and cut off from its base by our 
submarines. Whether our submarines are thei'e or not their 
presence will have to be assumed. It might be claimed by 
some that the High Sea Fleet is " bottled in." 
Personally, howevei-, I do not incline to this opinion. 
When all is said and done, a submarine is not a vessel which 
can stay under water for more than a limited time. For 
that reason modei-n makes of submarines are now all ai-mcd 
with guns, as a protection against any gunned enemy waiting 
till they come to the surface. 
We must not, thei-efore, expect miracles out of our .sub- 
marines which form the inshore blockades Rather we may 
expect that if and when the Germans come out at the 
" selected moment " for " Der Tag," they will have to precede 
HAMBURG 
THE DOTTED LINE BKPRESENTS ASSUMED INTEKIOB GEEMAN 
DEFENCE LINE. THK BLACK BABS EEPEESENT WHAT GEEMANT 
HAS TO LOOK FOE ON ACCOUNT OP TUB ENTEEPKISB OF ir.M. 
SUBMARINE e9. 
the movement by a considei-able force of armed submarines and 
destroyers. 
With submarines the "machine force" is absent. All 
depends on individual initiative. 
I have no exact knowledge of tho German submarine 
service, but I can pretend to some fair knowledge of the 
German Navy generally. On the strength of that knowledge 
I confess to blank surprise that the U15 managed to get wheio 
she was when she was sunk by the Birmingham, or that any 
subiaarine should have sunk the ratJtfinder where she did. 
I am inclined to regard these boats as having been com- 
manded by exceptionally able officers. There probably remain 
one or two otliei-s equally able with whom sooner or later we 
shall come into contact. But — so far as my knowledge can 
take me — tlicre is nothing in the German Navy's ordinary 
routine suitable for the peculiar morale required of an effective 
submarine. To explain, a submai-ine to be -effective must 
essentially be — for want of a better word — " democratic." 
The old " master and man " idea is utterly unworkable in a 
.submarine. The " ego " of the officers and that alone counts 
for anything. 
On Tuesday afternoon it was officially announced that the 
A hovlcir had been submarined at a spot not stated, but presum- 
ably off the Dutch coast, as survivors were landed at Yuminden 
and Amsterdam. Her sister ships, the Hogue and Cressy stood 
by her, and presently shared tho same fate. Thus already 
have we heard of those " other Gei-man submarine officers " 
of whom I had written above before this news came to hand. 
As fighting units none of the three lost cruisers were of 
any particular value. They were verging on the obsolete. 
Originally designed for 21 knots, some fifteen years ago, they 
were capable of little more than 17 knots at the time of their 
U* 
