October 3, 1914 
liAND AND AVATER 
tCAMBRAI 
'^^ 
jAfiZes 
SOISSONS 
German line protecting the Oise Communications 
rrcnclt line attacking same about Tuesday last 
POSITIONS ON THa WttST, ILICSTBATINO THB CAFTUBl 0» 
rSBONNB AKD ATTACK ON I^SSION'T. 
from it that line whicli feeds Laon and then goes 
south itself. It is this line hy which munitions are 
brought along the German front after they have come 
by the main German railway line of communication 
down the Oise. 
Unfortunately Tergnier lies in a bay or recess 
of the general line which the Germans are holding at 
this 25oint to defend their communications ; and it 
will probably be reached later than other more salient 
points iipon that line, such as Noyon itself, or St. 
Quentin. The holding of the main line and of the 
Oise north of Tergnier would be of great effect — even 
of decisive effect — for it woidd compel a general 
German retirement back north from the defensive 
position now held to the south along tlie Aisne. But 
the capture of Tergnier, where all the roads, rail- 
ways, and waterways cross and branch, would be even 
more than decisive : it would be vital. 
(Pa.ssage deleted by Censor.) 
that the extreme point of German occupation on 
Tuesday last came as far as Chaulucs. 
(Passage deleted by Censor.) 
The nature and value of this turning movement 
round by the German right, upon which all eyes are 
now fixed, is best apparent when we remember that 
the line of the Oise and the railway following it is 
the main artery of supply by which the whole main 
German defensive position along the Aisne and across 
Champagne lives. 
In the notes of more than one student of this 
campaign it has been remarked that, even if the 
enemy abandons St. Quentin and Noyon and crosses 
the Oise, he will find upon the further eastern or left 
bank another series of positions of wooded hills which 
lie should be able to maintain at great length. But 
those who put forward this hypothesis, though it 
proves them to have followed tlie map, forget that the 
whole strength of the German defensive position 
dej^cnds upon its heavy ai-tillery. The munition of 
that heavy artillery, and, for that matter, the retirement 
of it, makes the chief line of railway up to Belgium a 
necessity, and therefore, if the enemy loses the line 
of the Oise, down which that railway nins, he avUI 
have lost everything. On that very account, the 
lighting for the line of the Oise has been the fierce 
and hardly contested thing we have been reading of 
for more than ten days past. The Germans know 
that upon holding it the life of their army depends ; 
the French know that upon their reaching it victory 
for them depends. 
If the reader will look at the above map he will 
niito the junction of Tergnier. It is a point of very 
high strategic importance, and that for several reasons. 
In the first place, it is the junction not only between 
two main lines, but also between two systems, each 
with it.s separate organisation — the i-ailway company 
called the Nord and the railway company called the 
Est. Next, becau.se it has work.shops and repairing 
sheds, and is in every way (so far as the French 
retreat left it intact) a depot for railway material. 
Lastly, because there runs southward and eastward 
Tliere is another featm-e in the main German 
communications at this point which has been a good 
deal neglected in the Press of both countries, and is 
well woi-th examining. This is the canal running 
along the valley of the Oise and connecting it with 
quite the upper reaches of the Somme near St. Quentin, 
and further prolonged so as to connnect the Oise with 
the Aisne. The branch from the Oise to the Aisne is 
undoubtedly supplying the German line on the 
plateau of Soissons. We know by the experience 
of the battle of Meaux that the barges upon the canals 
have been very largely used by the enemy for the 
transport of ammunition. Further, a canal in a flat 
country Avill probably have been subjected to less 
damage during the retreat when the Allied armies 
Averc falling back from Mons over this country than 
a railway. To carry the line of the Oise would be 
not only to cany the main line communication with 
Belgimn and with the bases in Germany : it would 
also be to carry the canal communication, and to cut 
two arteries at once. 
THE NEW GERMAN OFFENSIVE 
ON THE MEUSE. 
So much then for the turning movement round 
by the West of the main German defensive position 
and of its progress to the present date. 
But as I have already said, there is a new 
element before us in the success the Gennans have 
had during this week at the other end of the whole of 
this theatre of war, when they silenced certain forts 
in the centre of the chain between Toul and Verdun, 
and here began crossing the Meuse. 
Before I deal with that eastern movement in any 
detail, however, it will be well to point out how it 
stands relatively to the western turning movement by 
which the French are threatening the Germans along 
the Oise. 
The Gennan advance across the Meuse (as shown 
in diagram on the following page) after breaking the 
Toul-Verdun line would obviously involve, if it were 
pressed far enough and with siiJBicient strength, a 
rapid and general retirement of the French and 
English line between the Oise and tlio Meuse : for 
it would come in behmd the right wing of that line. 
But it would not be of such vital ill- con sequence to 
the Allies, however successful it should prove to be. 
