LAND AND WATER 
October 3, 1914 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
4 
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1 
, bai^) 
L.^2> 
^ VCATTAROC Torpedo base) 
General line of 
Franco-British 
blocVade 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
IT appears that Cattaro, an important Austrian torpedo 
base, is now being %'igorously attacked by the Franco- 
British Fleet. Three Austrian battleships are said to be 
inside the harbour. It may be so : but they will pro- 
bably turn out to be old coast defence ships at the best. 
We arc also told of further losses to Austrian torpedo craft 
blown up by their own mines. These stories may be true : but 
they bear a suspicious resemblance to events of some weeks ago. 
The Austrians have made such an extraordinary muddle on 
land that it is always possible that they have done something of 
the same kind at sea. On the other hand, the Austrian Navy 
was of known efficiency in the ordinary way. 
It has no prospects whatever of accomplishing anything, 
and I am strongly inclined to believe that (except perhaps a few 
old vessels of no fighting value) it is all safely inside the defences 
of Pola, and wUl remain there, trusting to luck that the conclu- 
sion of hostilities will see it as a force of some kind of poten- 
tiality. In matters of this sort we must not. accept what we 
w^ould Like to see, but what is the obvious thing to do. 
Now, it would be obviou.^ly ridiculous for the Austrian; to 
split themselves into three Lsolated divisions, as they have been 
reported as having done. It would simply be asking for the 
ultimate destruction of one or perhaps all three of the divisions. 
It is infinitely more probable that they have accepted the 
inevitable and adopted the only wise course of refusing to be 
drawn into action. 
It is probable that Cattaro will ultimately be reduced. 
Since Lissa has already been occupied, it will form a convenient 
base for the blockade of the Adriatic. But beyond that we 
should not expect too much. If a superior fleet prevents over- 
seas supplies and destroys trade it has accomplished the main 
purpose for which a fleet exists. Here, as elsewhere, the public 
woidd do well to remember that point. 
Indeed, it may be questioned whether (supposing the 
fortifications to be as important as reported) operations against 
Cattaro were necessary or advisable, exceft in so far as tha 
provision of a handy base may have been a prime necessity. 
Naval warfare only accidentally consists of " Isushimas " : the 
real work is far better expressed in that Mahad phrase, " Tha 
silent pressure of Sea Power." 
Battles come under the head of clumsy necessities. The real 
measure of success in naval operations is the stultifying of any 
eflorts on the part of the enemy. Good chess players do not go 
in for a reckless exchange of pieces in the hopes that sonicthing 
may result therefrom. They play for the definite object of 
checkmate. The main rules of naval warfare are singularly 
analogous to the rules of chess. 
ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY. 
On September 22nd the German cruiser Emden appeared 
off Madras at 9 p.m., and her first two shots succeeded in 
firing some of the petroleum tanks of the Burma Oil Company. 
These tanks are fully exposed in the open roadstead, but at 
the same time the Emden made such remarkably good shooting, 
seeing it was night, that it seems clear that she must have been 
in possession of very accurate knowledge as to the exact location 
of the tanks. 
The exact damage done was not very great — roughly, about 
£20,000. Probably doing damage was not so much the prima 
12* 
