LAND AND WATER 
October 3, 1914 
The resultant out of everything published or not published 
is that " Run for it " is the "only safe answer to a submarine 
attack. This, of counso, is analogous to the answer to the fire- 
ships in the old davs. So the "' new danger ' is not so very new 
after all. 
The German story that U9 alone was responsible for the 
whole business of sinking the Crcssies may be dismissed at once 
a.s absurd. 6'9 has only three torpedo tubes, and the 250-ton 
submarine able to reload her tubes in a submerged condition has 
yet to be invented. There were certainly two German sub- 
marines engaged — more probably from three to six, that is to 
say, two divisions, for submarines work in tlirees. 
L'9 and her sisters carry two tubes forward and one aft. 
This after tube is a species of reserve one, and in a general way 
would not be made use of. The class is not big enough to do 
much in the way of carrying spare torpedoes, and it requires 
a good deal of imagination to picture any of them reloading tubes 
while under water in action even if they did. 
Now, we know that at least six torpedoes were "fired, of 
wliich five hit and one missed. That is the number of torpedoes 
Bcen, and that suggests at least three boats wliich fired two 
torpedoes each, as it makes no allowance for unseen torpedoes 
which missed. 
\yhy the Germans persistently assert that UO alone did the 
n'>ischief b somewhat of a mj'stery. The most reasonable 
explanation is that UO did most of the work, and that thev are 
seeking to create the impression that one German submariue is 
worth three British sliips. The idea that L'9 was the sole 
survivor of a division is more pleasurable than pi-obable. And 
since German reports spoke of " hopes " of U9 returning safely, 
it would look as though the other boats had got back, but that 
the t9 is missing. Only the Cressij appears to have fired at 
anything, and she only two or three shots, with moderate 
uncertainty as to the result. 
An mcident of some importance is the story fairly general 
amongst the survivors of a mysterious trawler which was about 
at the time, and which one of our cruisers was reported to have 
fire.] \t and sunk. The suggestion is that this trawler was 
directing operations under the guise of being a surreptitious mine- 
layer. If so, the ruse was certainly a clever one — though it is 
hardly one which is likely to be repeated with success. 
The only other additional light thi-own on the disaster from 
the official narratives is the pleasing absence of panic in the 
British cruisers, although they were manned by scratch crews 
which had not long been together. This is a point of considerable 
importance, as although the Germans rely on their submarines 
to reduce our materiel, they must be reiving to a still greater 
extent on creating a moi-al effect on the personnel. 
The well authenticated circumstance of the singing of " It's a 
long, long way to Tipperary," and the jesting response to the 
rffect, ' It certainly is if you have to swim there," is a clear 
indication that this German success had no psychological effect 
v,-hatever on our Navv. 
The definite Admiralty order to the effect that in future no 
big ships are to be risked for life-saving is the surest safeguard 
against any similar " regrettable incident " in the future. 
Meanwhile, it may stiU pertinently be asked, " How did the 
Oennans come to be on the spot to intercept our cruisers " ? 
I mentioned this point last week, and I repeat it now. The 
odds against submarmes, cruising aimlessly, blundering into 
anything, are very smaU indeed. It is of the utmost importance 
to ascertain the German system of information. 
THE DUTCH PROBLEM. f 
When first I raised the question of Holland in these Notes 
1 did so as a subsidiary subject, and in connection with the 
circumstance that if the German Army can be suppHed m erseas 
via Holland, the starving-out blockade of our Navy must 
necessarily be handicapped, and the war prolonged accordingly; 
Last week we heard that the Dutch Government had issuefl 
orders as regards transit of food stuffs. These orders allow of 
everything which we can reasonably expect. But, according to 
details furnished by several correspondents — who give fipfures 
to prove their points — there is reason to query whether the sairt'e 
control is exercised over other contraband. For instance, h, 
very large quantity of dynamite recently went to Holland. 
It was certified by the Dutch firm to which it was consigned 
that it was required to blow up buildings in the fire zone of 
frontier fortresses ! One cannot help suspecting that some 
superfluous tons will find their way to combatants who may be 
short of the explosive in question. 
In some quarters there is a fear that too great an insistence 
on our rights, too strict a demand for clear neutrality, might 
involve us in war with Holland just at the time when the South 
African Dutch have come splendidly into line with the Empire. 
It seems to be overlooked that — no matter what German 
influences may be at work in Dutch Court circles— nothing save 
insanity would induce Holland to declare war against us. It 
would simply be throwing away'all her East Indian possessions, 
with which she does a trade of about £53,000,000 a year. The 
mouth of the Rhine is not worth that to her. Nor is any " scrap 
of paper " which Germany may have given her, 
THE FAR EAST. 
Operations against Kiao-Chau (Tsing-tau) continue to 
proceed with deliberation — the only proceedings of much interest 
being aerial ones, which are of the bomb-dropping order on both 
sides. No particular results have been recorded. 
KIAU CHAU (T£ING-TAu). 
The .Japanese must now be fairly close on the doomed 
stronghold, as the German ships in the harbour have been firin<r 
on their troops. The Kiao-Chau operations are unlikely to go 
down to history as a second siege of Port Arthur— the nearest 
historical analogy is the seige of Wei-hai-wei in the Chino- Japanese 
War. Here the Japanese closed round the shore defences in 
dehberato and methodical fashion, and then, at the selected 
monient, delivered a famous and successful torpedo attack on 
the Chinese warships, which they had previously shelled from 
the shore. 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
ZThnW *^'?*-'.'*"u' 1° ^ '"""^ s^«I° continue. 
The latest exploit has bcen the dropping of further 
bombs on Ostend, and (from aero|lane.s5 on 
certam Belgian villages. The damage doni was 
, „ . ., t"y'a . but a certain amount of alarm was cau^e,l 
I" te'llrrt "" '"^'^ P"^'" ."^J^^^'- at oTtend appears 
hJD VI u ^[""^ ",P ^"^ ammunition train, which, however 
had already left when the attack was made however, 
^hJnV ^T'^ "° particular reason to believe the theory that 
where Zeppelms are concerned (the same can hardly be slid foi 
aeroplanes) deliberate and indiscriminate bomb droppin" on 
non-combatants is intended. This conclusion we can arrive at 
irom a description of unexploded Zeppelin bombs which have 
been found. They are stated to be 4 feet long by about 8 inches 
m diameter, with picric as the explosive. Were the terrorising 
wn„n r P°P'^^t'?n ^he object, something far less expensive 
woS t '^if "^ f ^''^^'- '^^^ ^^^^"'i ■^"'1 «tl^" authorities 
Z.fih r '^'"P'oJ'e'l m seeking to ascertain how and in what 
way the Germans learned of the existence of the ammunitioa 
ilUilli 
u* 
