LAND AND AVATER 
OctoLcr 10, 1914 
from r)0 io IJO miles, yet tlio o.ssonlials wliieli cli:s- 
tiii<,'iiish a battle and a field of battle fi-om a cam])ai{j:ii 
a!id the "theatre" iu which that campaign takes 
place still distinguish the very extensive lines along 
which to-day a decision is ivaehed. You have the 
two fronts, the contact of one with the other, the 
coho>ion of either party, the attempt of the one 
cilluT to break or t«> envelop the other. And the 
whole action is tactical, not stntteglcal. 
U.sing then the term " battlefield," greatly 
extended as it has become iu time and space, tor the 
.scenes of these ])ro(ractcd modern actions you have, 
1 siy. in the J'jastcrn theatre of war two distinct 
iiattlelields wheivin it is sought by either party to 
reach a decision n])on the soil of Poland. These two 
liiittleJields are indejKMident of one another, 'i'hey 
aiv occupied on the (jcnnanic side by two separate 
cohesive bodies. 
(1) The bwly which has been struggling to 
obtain possession of the Upj)cr Niemeu and the 
crossings thereof between (Irodno and Xovno. 
(2) The botly which is concerned to arrest nnd if 
po.ssible to thrust back the great ]'u.ssian Army, 
wliich, since its victory at Jjemberg lias been pressing 
westward through (lalicia towanls Silesia. 
It will Ik? remembered that it was remarked in 
ihe.se notes last week that the Southern of the two 
fields was the more imjxn-tant. 
When you have two separate actions of this sort 
going on, one well in front of the othei-, tlie ultimate 
<lecision Avhich will affect the fortunes of both is most 
likely to arise in that field wliich contains the larger 
total number of combatants. If you have a situatmu 
such as that presented in the accompanying diagram, 
where an action is going on between black and white, 
A I{ and C~]) with 
success of G — II against E — F Avill ultimately 
threaten the commnnicatious of A — B. In other 
words, when two actions like these are being fought 
out, not abreast of one another on one line, but criss- 
cross, one of the two will be the master action con- 
trolling in the long run the results of the other. It 
must nearly always be the larger of the two sets of 
bodies iiivolved Avhich so conti-ols the action of the 
smaller set. Supposing A — B to be successful against 
0— D, A— B will none the less ultimately have to 
turn back if G — H lias been successful against the 
much larger body of A— B's fellows at E — F. 
The elements contained in this diagram are 
precisely those governing the general operations in 
the Eastern theatre of war. It will be apparent that 
A C 
-> 
CommuniccLbons 
E G 
B D 
F H 
Co, 
^nitnumca.tions 
«J 
in the Northern battlefield you had in front of the 
iNiemen a successful advancing (Jerman bodv, A 1] 
pressmg npon u defending Bussian bodv, C 1)' 
Wilde down south near the Upper A'istula Vou ha.-l i 
Jnuch larger body, G-~-H, advancing against corre- 
spondingly large Germanic forces, E F." T'he result 
of the action, E-F, (J-H, would ultimately control 
the movements of the action A— B C— D For 
however successful A-B might be in the ' north.' 
y* n and L-F w-ere really deciding the issue of the 
ar in the whole of the Eastern theatre. 7'/.^ ^^ere 
the principal forces engaged. If F F wins for 
instance and pushes tf-T-Il back, the success of 
A-ii becoines of comparatively small importance. 
11 b— H wins he will be threatening by his larr^e 
numbers the communications of the smaller body 
A— K and compelling its retreat. 
All this is supposing that' A -^B in the north 
continues to advance, but, as a fact, this smaller 
Geman army winch has been attacking the Bnssians 
on the Niemen, and advancing to cross that river, 
a. failed and i.s^ now in retreat. Meanwhile, the 
mu h larger Austro-Germany Army which is .,r,. 
as L Sr'^'f f?r'^ ^'^'^*" tlie Upper \-istula 
J'as not yet reached that decision-aud upon the 
