LAND AND WATER 
October 10, 1914 
is verv mncli hrgor and tlio wliole sclicme of tlieiu and 
tlK-ir MUToundin-,^ nnu^lios and forests very mucli nmv 
con.i.licatcHl. .But even from so elementary a sketcli 
on- ran see that the few roads avaUable to an army m 
its advanee upon the Niemon are here of eapital im])or- 
tanee Every one of them (and particularly the 
raasrwav hv whidi the main adv:uice wis made from 
fcJuvvalki' to' Seluv) is a series of ftV///<'.y : tliat is ot 
iJaees where an annv eannot march upon any but a 
verv narrow front :* a jdaee wlieir the echimus are 
(•(.i.'lined to one road only and eannot spread ont npou 
tidier side. . ^ , • i , 
It was on SeptemVr 2:W-d. that is, a fortiii-rlit 
ajro, the AVtnluesday before hist, tliat the Ifussian 
(ieiieral Ivemienkampl', retivatiuo; from before the 
(lorman advance, j,'ot his hist troops over tlie Nicmen 
and waited the ajiproach of the enemy to tliat river. 
'I'he jioint at which they pro]tosed to cross, or at !oast 
the cliiet of the .several points, was Drusskeniki. 'I'liey 
liad ;divadv thrown their i)ontoons acro.ss uli<-u the 
fuiiiiter-oflensive ui)on the part of thcliussians bejtcan. 
'.I'lie opening of it was no more than the shelling of the 
Ciennan pontoon bridges as the Prussians were 
crossing them n])on the Friday, the 2.')th, and the 
next phase after the success of this check given to the 
invadei-s was a violent artillery duel between the 
mas.s«l guns of either army tiring from positions 
facing each othci; across tlie river, in the hope that 
their artillery had suflicieutly dominated the enemy's, 
the fJermans began their jweparations for a second 
crossing. This second attempt Avas made at the end 
(tf the day ; before night it had failed as tlie first had. 
I'l-om this check at Drusskeniki the Germans fell 
back upon what has been thronghont all the inter- 
vening days a retreat, sometimes so pressed as to 
involve local disasters. l»y ^Tonday, September 2Sth, 
after four dajs of this retreat, the rearguard of the 
(lernian i-etirement was at Seiny, which means that 
the main body had been covering quite fifteen miles 
a day. The whole business in its rapidity and rever.se 
was not uulikethe general retreat which we call in the 
AVest the battle of Marne. The retreat was also of 
ooni*s(i being carried out along the whole front, not 
only in the centre with tlie main columns through 
Seiny, but up North as far as ^lariampoland Southward 
as far as Augustowo. There are no railways in this belt 
l)etween tbe Niemen and the G erman frontier. The four 
(icmvan Army Corps which, according to the Freneli 
Official Communique, were involved, could not there- 
fore receive rapid reinforcement oxen if such rein- 
forcement could be spared either from the Southern 
lield or from elsewhere. Two days later, therefore, by 
Thursday, Octok-r 1st, the mass of the Clerman forces 
fell back upon a line JMariainpol-Suwalki- Augustowo, 
the retreat of the central ])ortion wliicli had to follow 
the causeway through the mar.slies from Seiiiy to 
Suwaiki being particularly painful and expensive. ' The 
i{iis.sians advancing from the line SImno-Sereje-Lipny 
on the centre drove the German centre right down 
this narrow defile. 
The decision in this extended action was reached, 
however, not in the centre, but, as seems necessary 
nowadays in any extended and lengthy modern 
action, upon one of the wings. The operative wing 
here was,^ of course, the Southern one, the Russian 
left and German right. For to get round this wing 
was to cut the Germans off from, or at least to 
endanger, their communications with tlieir own 
eountrv. There is, Jiowever on this A\ing a great 
mass of wood as well as of lake country, known as 
the Forests of Augustowo. It is nearly a we:k's 
march across by its few soft and sodden roails. 
the principal impediment to tlic general 
movement, but apparently upon the Thursday, 
This Avas 
Russian movement, but appan 
October 1st, the obstacle A\as surmonntod, or turned, 
and Augustowo was occu])ied, the Russian advance 
then proceeding to Ifatcbki, wliicb was also taken at 
the jwint of the bayonet, and it seemed as though tho 
German retreat in "this direction would have to proceed 
not by the way the CJeniian advance had come, but 
northward and separate from the retreat of another 
grouj) of Cierman forces whose action I will now 
describe. 
This subsidiary grou]) in the advanee on the 
Niemen had undertaken to protect the right fltink 
of the advanee, the investment of the fortress of 
Osowiecs. 
This separate operation upon the Southern or 
right ilauk of the general German advance upon the 
Niemen came a little behind the central main part of 
that advance. AVe have seen that the attempt to 
cross tlie Niemen at Drns.skeniki belonged to 
September .2.jth. It was not until the morrow that 
the attack upon the forts of O.sowiecs began. The 
bombardment of tliose forts continued apparently for 
no more than two days. Indeed, the retreat of tl e 
centre from Niemen miist have involved hasty orders 
from the German beadquarters to the troops on 
the extreme right in front of the fortress, and 
these began their retreat toAvards Prussia again. 
In this retreat they had the advantage of a railway 
which their fellows in the main bodies to the North 
had not. But it was just as heavily pressed as the 
retirement of the main bodies of tbe North. The 
Russian cavalry were in Grajewo witb the lirst of 
the month, and" on tbe next day, Friday the 2nd, they 
wei-e over the frontier. 
All tlie.sc operations, therefore, in Northern 
Poland and in the vallej's of the Bobr and the Niemen 
(to which the Russians have given the name of the 
"Battle of Augustowo," Avhich wei-e fouglit over a 
front of more than a hundred miles and which oceu]»ied 
altogether more than ten days) have resulted in the 
retirement of the four invading German Army Corps 
back over their own frontier, audit is probable that at 
the moment of Avriting, thongb fighting is still going 
on just west of Suwaiki, all tbe German forces have 
been withdi-awn from that part of Northern Poland 
which lies over the artificial frontier between tho 
Russian Empire and East Prussia. 
THE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN 
POLAND UPON THE UPPER 
VISTULA. 
It Avill be seen from Avhat has just been .said that 
the Russian success in Northern Poland is locally 
decisive, not that we have any account of great captures 
of men or material, but that the German object de- 
liberately undertaken has not been reacbed and the 
German plan has failed. But this failnre, as Ave have 
seen, only concerns four Army Corps. 
The operations in Southern Poland, Avbicb have 
not yet come to a decision and in Avhicb the two main 
forces have not yet even thoroughly taken contact, 
must be Avatcbed Avith far greater interest and will 
have far more effect iipon the campaign as a Avliole. 
In order to grasp tbe Avay in wbich this great 
action is being ajiproacbed, the Avay in Avhicli tlio 
opposing forces are manoeuvring for position, and the 
nature of the ground over Avhicb the shock Avill take 
])hice, Ave must master the veiy simple elements of tho 
iield, remembering that the forces that Avill join battle 
in the field, and that bave perb.aps already done 
4* 
