LAND AND \YATEE 
October 10, 1914 
This is simple enough, as outside the trade routes the whole 
S „ b rfor less L'uainhabited desert Presently, of course, 
their bottoms will foul, bnt that will hardly be yet. . 
The "German Fleet" inside Kiao-Chau probably consists of 
most of the other ships of their China squadron. These are 
(or were) : — „• r x 
Four cunboats-////s, Jaguar, Tiger, Luchs 
Three river gunboats— Tsuir/iau, Vatefland, OUer. 
Two destroyers— TaA-« and S 90. 
One miscellaneous— Tifanio. t.j<< iw^, „ 
Of these the Tsingtau is that much paragraphed sold-for-a 
dollar " Bunboat. One of the destroyers has been fik-prc- 
sumably by land fire from the Japanese, which has also put the 
Ittif more "or less out of action. . . , , , 
The Kaiser is understood to have ordered the gamson to bold 
out to the Lwt. It may obey instructions and do so. But the 
difference between that and imiiirdiato stirrender only exists in 
terms of useless sacrifice of life. It is unlikely to delay the fall 
of Kiao-Chau by more than a few days. 
CO; 
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' K I AU ,' 
C H A U .' 
BAY ; 
HWANG 
TAU BAY 
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HAI 
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',C.EVELYN 
KIAU CUAU (tSINQ-TAd). 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
Official news from the Adriatic is mostly unimportant, and 
in all cases very stale. Unofficial news carries us very little 
further except that Italy appears to be the only sufferer from 
Austrian mines, and Austria has had to compensate heavily. 
The only other sufierers have been Austrian warships and 
merchant vessels. On a rough calculation Austria to date must 
be something like 500 per cent, out of pocket over her mining 
investment. 
To the time of writing the only thing of real importance 
achieved by the Allies in the Adriatic is the capture of Lissa. 
This advanced base being secured, Cattaro can well be. left alone 
80 far as naval operations are concerned. A blockade is quite 
as effective and a great deal cheaper than a bombardment. 
Elsewhere the Dardanelles question has obtruded itself. 
The Turks temporarily closed th« Dardanelles because vessels 
of the Anglo-French Fleet stopped and searched ingoing traffic. 
This Turkish protest is unlikely to have the remotest effect on the 
Allies' strategy. So long as the Goeben and Breslau retain their 
crews on board them, so long will it be necessary to make certain 
of their destruction should they emerge from their place of 
presumed internment, and to intercept supplies to them. 
In the press of more exciting matter it is not properly recognised 
what a nuisance the Goeben business is, nor how difficult it is to 
deal with. It is the old story of Punica fides. Germany has 
certainly achieved one advantage in this war. She has given 
us reason to believe that given a weak and complacent neutral 
no ordinary laws of war will count with her. And we are paying 
for tliis by ships diverted from the Adriatic operations. This, 
come to think of it, is a strategical gain for Germany. It is, to be 
sure, along similar lines to the tactics of Ananias in the past, 
but for the present it serves. I cannot help thinking that 
matters could be simplified were the Allied Fleet to make it 
clearly public that, in the event of the Goeben and Breslau re- 
appearing these ships wiU be regarded as pirates and no quarter 
whatever will be extended to their crews. Then, should they 
emerge and presently intern themselves again in some Turkish 
harbour, no awkward questions about neutrality could be raised. 
A pirate has no legal status. 
It is abundantly clear that Germany has not complied with 
international law in the matter of the internment of these two 
ships. It 13 equally clear that unless international law is to become 
a dead letter something must be done to assert the necessity of 
observing it. •' 
In the distorted perspective in which we necessarily see naval 
events just as they happen, this matter of the Goeben and Breslau 
appears as a quite minor matter. But if one truism more than 
another can be accepted as Gospel for the present war it is the 
old proverb, " It is the little things that count."_ 
The centre of Mediterranean interest is not in the Adriatic, 
where the Allies are bound to accomplish more or less as they 
list, but outside the Dardanelles and the possibilities of a re- 
incarnation of the Goeben and Breslau. Of itself the menace ia 
of no great account. But it has some decided value as " the 
menace that waits." 
THE NORTH SEA. 
The Admiralty notification that mines have been laid in a 
certain area in the North Sea— I have roughly indicated the area 
bv a diagram (see next page), because latitudes and longitudes 
convey little to the non-technical reader — is the immediate answer 
to the submarining of the three Cressys. 
The mine field will considerably hamper future German 
submarine movements, especially those of such submarines as 
may happen to be out and which will know nothing of the danger 
awaiting their return unless warned by those " observation 
stations " which the Germans are supposed to have established 
on our East Coasts. 
The weak point of a mine field is that " roads through it " 
must necessarily exist, and these can of course be observed, 
either directly as our submarines observed them inside the Bight 
of Heligoland or by the misuse of neutral fishing craft. On this 
account alone the closing of all British harbours on the East 
Coast to alien fishing craft or craft so registered is a very wise 
measure, while the public notification of the mine field will 
render pretty clear the status of any fishing craft found prowling 
about the prohibited area no matter what flag it may chance 
to be flying. 
German submarines can still emerge from the Heligoland 
direction, but they will have to come along a more or less well- 
defined route, where there is just enough vagueness in the 
Admiralty statement to leave it not quite clear whether other 
mined areas than those mentioned do not exist. 
Out of all this we can take it that, so far as the British Navy 
is concerned, the mine is taken to be the answer (or one of the 
answers) to the submarine. A submarine travelling on the 
surface has a fair chance of crossing a mine field without much 
risk, but a submarine on the surface is no particular danger to 
anyone. She is easily to be aimihilated by destroyers and torpedo 
boats if detected, and detection is not very difficult. 
In connection with this matter attention may be drawn to 
the circumstance that German official reports of submarine 
movements have frequentlj' referred to " ten-day cruises." 
Now, by simple arithmetic we can easily calculate that there 
are few if any German submarines capable of ten-day cruises 
unaided, allow as we will for lying by on the surface at night. 
The utmost radius of any tiling up to U 24 is " on paper " 2,000 
miles on the surface. Supposing surface cruising for only twelve 
hours out of the twenty-four, this works out about eight days 
at ten knots, without taking into account fuel expended in 
re-charging accumulators for under-water work. 
Of course it is possible for a boat to lie below water with 
no machinery working, and so far as machinery and fuel supply 
is concerned to carry this on fairly indefinitely, so long as she 
can keep on renewing at intervals her air supply. Nothing very 
definite is known as to what the fresh air supply method in 
German boats consists of. but in any case it is not a matter 
to be arranged for in a few minutes. 
Apart from this machinery question there is the human 
element to consider, and, altogether, I for one refuse to believe 
tliat any German submarine can manage to be self-supporting 
for ten days under war conditions. Assuredly these ten-day 
submarines must have floating bases of some sort, bases which can 
liardly have proceeded out of the Heligoland Bight, imless they 
were established at least nine weeks ago. 
We have got to face the circumstance that Germany is not 
basing her efforts against us from her own shores. Slie has 
probably been particularly careful so to arrange matters that no 
neutral is either involved or suspected. Bttt bases of some kind 
must exist. 
It is none too soon that we have virtually closed North Sea 
traffic except to vessels conducted by our own pilots. We 
perhaps ought to have done it the instant that the Ainpkion 
was lost, without regard to neutral susceptibilities. No honest 
neutral can possibly object to the precautions which wo have 
taken. As indicated last week all neutrals, save the Dutch, 
have suffered badly from the German system of indiscriminate 
mine-laying. The only possible answer was to lay mines every- 
where where the Germans have not done so, but apparently 
mean to lay them. 
It is, of course, the duty of the British Navy to " smash the 
enemy." But a liigher and more important duty still is to see 
12» 
