October 10, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
to it lliat tlic enemy 13 rendered impotent. Tlie unfortunate 
thiuf! is that cuilte a cousiderable section of tLc public is of 
opiuion that '" the Js'avy is doing uothinp; " on account of the 
fact that it has done its woik so well that tlie main CJerman 
I'lcet prefers to keep out of danger. AV'ill the public which 
demands an impossible Trafalgar be good enough to realise 
that for years the German view of things has publicly been stated 
and restated ad r.auseum : " JCo matter what the circumstances, 
the plain duty of the German Fleet is to attack. Only in the 
attack can victory reside." 
This attack has not been delivered. It is unlikely to be 
tlclivci-od until economic pressure forces it. But why not ? 
A good tliousand jears ago the all-powerlul Athenian Navy 
met its doom because the Democracy put in its oar wrongly. On 
the people of England to-day it depends that the sauic old 
mistake is not repeated with the same terrible result. 
If the man in the street can be persuaded to crab the Navy 
and to insist on its " doing sometliing," Germany is going to win. 
If, on the other hand, the man in tiie street will merely remain 
indifferent and " trust the Navy," Germany's chances sink to .•:ero. 
Thus and in such way the twentieth-centiuy Trafalgar lias 
to be fought by the public, and the only weapon is blind onti- 
dence in the British Kavy. Blind confidence be it noted. It 
may take some doinu'. but it has to be done. 
,^* 
■^^H 
-^;tt^>"^ 
» NOTIFlEp 
British Mines 
= Area Germans Have 
Presumably Mined ; 
With Passages. 
ON THE HIGH SEAS 
GENERALLY. 
Sinii>ly because tlie British Navy is too much in the way. 
The Higli Sea Fleet has no prospects whatever of ad\-antage 
by coming out. In consequence it remains inactive. 
To adopt the chess simile, which I have used before — it is 
" in check." The ultimate result may be " checkmate," or it 
may be merely '' stale mate " (for which the Germans are playing). 
But why expect tliat Admiral .rcllicoe shoidd go in for a reckless 
<'.\'chaDge of piee^js which at the be»t could merely provide head- 
liii'-s for the daily press ? 
Or to i)ut it another way, would any card j)layer as fourth 
liand with the four of diamonds in his hand play his ace to take 
the three ? Germany's game and Germany's hope is that the 
British public, looking for a Trafalgar, will demand the ace to 
be ])ut down. 
1 have insisted till all readers must be more or less tired of it 
that t\u: main elements of this war are psychological. I am 
afraid, however, that I must continue to insist on the point. 
In the strongest possible fasliion I wish to impress that Germany's 
game is based on the expectation that presently the British nation 
will demand that the Navy "does something," trusting to luck 
that the things really accomplished by it, being inconspicuous, 
will not count. 
A Trafalgar won by " the man in the street'" is an unthink- 
able thing along all the lines of past history. But the past is 
the past. The present war is along hitherto unknown lines. 
To .say that it is being fought in the streets cf London .sounds 
hyperbole ad ahsiirdum. Yet it is something like the situation. 
First place is naturally claimed by 
t!ie Einden, which, as briefly mentioned 
last week, has now added five to her 
previous bag of si.t in the Bay of Bengal, 
and has probably added more since. 
As expected, after shelUng Madras she 
made for Pondichcrry, where, for no 
apparent reason, she anchored on Sep- 
tember 2Ith. She, however, presently 
made off without doing anything, where- 
ffom we qjjay assume that she was intent 
on combining a hasty sweeping of boiler 
tubes with such moral effect as was to 
be obtained by anchoring only little 
more than a mile away from CJovernment 
House. 
The Emden steamed away leaving 
Pondicherry unharmed ; but the result of 
her commerce raiding has since come in. 
She has now eleven ships to her credit. 
But— well, eleven is not much out of four 
thousand. To equal the privateers of 
Nelson's days the Emden and her consorts 
must multiply all their captures by 
something like thirty. And when, if 
ever, they have done it, the fact 
will still remain that a destruction of 
10 per cent, in the old Great War 
of an odd hundred years ago did not 
destroy British commerce. The 90 pec 
cent, left carried on quite merrily. 
The 99 per cent, left over to-day 
are hardly likely to worry more than 
their predecessors of the last Great 
Wat. Losses can be created — they are 
bound to be created. But no matter 
how long tlie German corsairs may 
remain adoat, there is no question of 
their accomplishing any damage that 
really matters. 
Another predatory cruiser has now 
turned up on the East Coast of America, 
and it is also now reported that the 
remaining cruisers at Kiao Chau have 
broken loose. This information is doubt- 
ful, liut, be the cruisers many or few, 
the damage that they can do is strictly limited and their 
ultimate fate is certain. 
Of far more moment is it to record that the Cameroons 
in West Africa have now fallen into our hands, and that the 
Ciimberl-and, stationed in those parts, has captured eight German 
merchant ships and a German gunboat. 
Germany's cruisers (the Emden especially) are putting up a 
verj- good fight. They are acting from cleverly preairanged 
bases, and most of them have so far cleverly evaded iuter- 
ceptioa by our defending cruisers. But there is nothing to 
suggest that this state of affairs can be maintained for more than 
a limited time. It may take weeks or it may take months, but 
.oooner or later every German commerce raider will meet lier 
fate. Before that occurs considerable damage will no doubt 
be done, but the ultimate failure of the commerce war and the 
probabilitv that it will eventually cost as much or more to 
Germany than the damage inflicted on us is self-evident. 
The Germans do not appear to be greatly perturbed by the 
loss of trade which we have caused tliem. At any rate they 
profe.s3 not to be, and in matters of this sort it is never wise 
to assume that the enemy is merely bluffing. They must cer- 
tainly have calculated that the Britisli Fleet would destroy 
their over-seas tiade and capture ail tlieir over-.seas possessions. 
The latter was unavoidable; the former they have minimised 
so far as possible by laying up their merchant ships. An instruc- 
tive article in the Time's of October ."rd quotes from Herr Heineken, 
head of the Nord Deutscher Llovd, the view that all Germany 
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