October 17, 1914 
LAND AND WATEE 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
NOTE. — THIS ABTICLB HAS BEES SCBMITTEB TO TUB TRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES KOT OBJECT TO THE POELICATICN AS CEXSO:iaD 
AND TAKE3 NO KESPONSlBILITYv FOB THB COREKCT.N'KSS OF THE STATEMENTS. 
nr ACOOBDANCa with tub EEQUIREMKXTS of THK TKESS bureau, THB POSITIONS OF TROOPS OX PLANS lUrSXKATIXO THIS 
ARTICLE MUST ONLY BB KKOARSED AS APPROXIMATE, AND KO DEFINITE BTRKNQTH AT ANT POINT IS INDICATED. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND 
PROSPECTS AT THIS MOMENT. 
THIS week is the critical week in the first 
phase of the European War. 
Contact is established upon the 
Vistula, the lines in France have reached 
their maximum of extension, the 
Germanic powers (not their opponents) have put the 
last recruits and the last reserves into the field. 
From this week we must expect — from this week 
onward — some decision. 
It is the moment for taking stock not only of 
tlie strategical position in which the opposing forces 
now find themselves tlu'oughout Europe, but also of 
the main movements which have led to these 
positions, and of the main strategical results which 
may or should proceed from those positions. And in 
connection with this task of " taking stock " we wiU 
do well to note in passing certain novel conditions of 
warfare — such as the weakness of the fortress — ■ 
emerging from the two months of struggle. For, it 
is upon our appreciation of these novel conditions 
that the soundness of our judgment for the futm*e 
will largely depend. 
In appreciating the situation as a whole, we 
have two things to consider which appear everywhere 
in human effort. They are the material and the 
moral elements in that effort. 
To take first the mat^^rial : — Here is an outline map 
showing in the roughest possible fashion the two gi'eat 
material factors in the present situation. These ai*e : 
(2) The opportunities of supply and of communi- 
cation open to either party. 
Opportunities of supply for petrol, for horses, for 
copper, and the rest, and, what is less imi^ortant to 
tlie Germanic Powers, for food, I have marked with 
aiTows; and the numerous arrows which I have indi- 
cated for England, for France, and for Eussia signify, 
of course, the perfectly open field of supply in such 
things which these three Allies have behind them. 
Russia has behind her an indefinitely large supply 
coming over her Plains from the East, whether of 
horses or of petrol, of copper, of nitrates, or of almost 
any other necessary. France and England have an 
equally immeasurable field behind them for the pro- 
vision of such supply afforded them by the ocean, so 
long as the ocean is kept open by the superiority of 
the British Fleet. 
The opportunities for this external supply which 
is partially afforded thi-ough neutral countries to the 
Germanic centi-al Powers I have marked by broken 
arrows. I have marked it thus differently because 
the supply is doubtful, and with increasing difficulty 
obtained. For instance, there may be some limited 
and difficult supply of petrol to be obtained in this 
fashion by the Germanic Powers, through occasional 
cargoes coming by Norway ; but the only direct supply 
(so long as that is continued) would be from Roumania. 
In the same way the main communications by 
which each body of Allies moves or can move its men 
and material I have indicated by lines of dots, 
but these, of course are, in the case of the sea, almost 
..^'f^- 
(1) The position of the opposing lines (of as numerous as the ports are, while a whole gridu-on 
which the Germanic are in thick blaci' and tlie of railways behind the "Western field of war supplies 
AUies in open white). the Western front of the Allies in France. These 
