October 17, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
To forecast a single development in war is 
impossible, but to state necessary alternatives is 
possible enough. 
Now, among aU tlie theoretical possibilities of 
the situation, among all the ways in Avhich the block 
may break up to our advantage or disadvantage, two 
are very much the most likely — (a) in the west the 
alternatives lie with far greater probability between 
the Allies hvcaMng the Geninan main communications 
and the Germans iarning the main Allied line ; {Jj) in 
the cast — that is, in the Vistula — the alternatives 
obviously lie between an action, however prolonged, 
which will ultimately release German troops for the 
■west or will ultimately call for German reinforcement 
from the west eastward. No great action upon the 
Vistula — with wet weather coming on and cold, with 
very poor roads, and hardly any railways — can be a 
draw. It may be prolonged but it will not be a draw. 
You will certainl}' have the initiative passing to the 
one side or to the other of the hosts that face each 
other to-day in southern Poland. 
Obsers'c the consequences. If the pressure upon 
Germany here ceases, or is relieved, German brought 
back forces returning to the west may pass through 
the gate on the Meuse that is still open at St. IVlihiel 
and may so force back the whole right of the Allied 
line and open those shorter communications with 
Germany which I have alluded to so often in these 
columns. If, on the contrary, pressui-e on Germany 
and south Poland increases, Silesia is in danger and a 
withdrawal of troops from the western field, the 
maintenance of a mere defensive in that field, will be 
imperative to our enemies even if they have gained 
successes hitherto against the Allies in France. 
The whole position may simply be put thus : — 
Tlie Germans having failed to break the Allied 
line in their attacks in the western front in Prance at 
Arras, at Albert, and at Eoye, have a better chance of 
turning it by bringing down their reinforcements 
(following on the fall of Antwerp) upon the flank of 
the Allies, that is, between LUle and the sea. Already 
their cavalry are threatening such a move. Already 
they are in Lille. 
The Allies, on their side, have no opportunity of 
turning a German line, which now extends right up to 
the Dutch frontier, and may, at any moment it 
chooses, touch the sea. But they may break it ; and an 
ob\ious place for their efforts is in the neighbourhood 
of the Franco-Belgian frontier. 
[Meanwhile, whichever of the forces in north- 
eastern France now in movement has the better of 
the other, what happens in southern Poland will be 
the final and decisive thing. For if there is here an 
action which releases existing and victorious German 
forces, those forces can in a few days appear where 
they -ttdU in the western field, and particularly 
through the gate of St. Mihiel, which is being ke^jt 
open at a great effort. But if the Russians are 
victorious in south Poland, then, no matter what 
happens in France, the menace overhanging Silesia 
will be of such weight that the Germans will certainly 
turn to a defensive in the west, and will use eveiy 
man they can spare for the defence of the valley of 
the Oder. 
Upon the upper part of that valley lie the wealth, 
the mines, half the indu.strial life of modern Gennany. 
To threaten this with destruction is like threatening 
the destruction of Lancashire and the West Eiding. 
In the lower part of that valley lie the pro- 
jjerties of the very class, the Prussian military caste, 
■which is at the heart of this war, and whose claims to 
over-ride the public law of Europe, and to destroy the 
lesser nations, is the spiritual motive maintaining the 
whole of this disastrous business. 
The elements of the problem are, therefore : — 
(1) The efEect of the fall of Antwerp, the number 
and quality of the troops thus released ; 
(2) The ajDjjearance of these and other reinforce- 
ments upon the Western-German front between the 
Belgian frontier and Noyon ; 
(3) The way in which the gate at St. Mihiel is 
being kept open by the Germans ; and 
(4) The positions in south Poland, with their 
chances of victory and defeat, upon which, more than 
upon any other factor, the future would appear to 
turn. 
Each of these four main elements has, in the last 
few days, developed wdth great rapidity, and I 
jjropose, in conclusion, to examine each. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
FALL OF ANTWERP. 
When the Gennan effort was first opened against 
Antwerp it was certain that the fortress must fall, nor 
was it very difficult to set limits within which that 
fall must come. 
One of the three or four very great conclusions, 
hitherto disputed, now established by this war, is the 
conclusion that modem howitzer fire dominates modern 
permanent works — at least, the modern permanent 
works of the type which all the great ring fortresses 
had. After the fall of the fort Camp des Eomains 
and the consequent German occupation of St. Mihiel 
just below, it was no longer possible for anyone to 
believe that Liege, Namur, Maubeuge, and the rest 
had each suffered on account of some peculiar local 
circumstance. 
We can even give a time-table. Manonvilliers, 
a very strong isolated work, fell (seven or eight weeks 
ago) after not less than seven and not more than 
eleven days' bombardment ; the last of the Liege forts 
after seven ; the last of the Namur forts after two or 
three ; the last of the Maubeuge defences after eight. 
Troyon successfully resisted for five days, and was 
then relicA'cd. Camp des Eomains appears to have 
succumbed to two or three days of the same form of 
attack. 
The weapon, therefore, by which Antwerp was 
accounted for was simply the 8-inch and perhaps also 
the 11 -inch howitzer. 
The forts of the south-eastern section (Waelhem, 
Wavre St. Catherine, Lierre) were silenced in more 
than forty-eight and less than sixty hours. A short 
chance of resistance lay in the mobile defence of the 
garrison, especially along the line of the Nethe. But 
the numerical superiority of the enemy over the 
rcmaininor jramson enabled him to cross after a 
three days' resistance. Then the howitzers were 
further brought up to bombard the city itself, and 
there was no particular military reason why it should 
continue to hold out. The value of a garrison 
numerically inferior to an investing enemy lies in the 
fact that behind fortifications it can employ and divert 
from other fields the more numerous forces opposed 
to it. When the fortification has gone, and it can no 
longer serve this purpo.se, its only proper place is 
the open field. The garrison of Antwerp withdrew 
somewhat late, but more than half seem to have 
re-established contact by the western road with their 
fellows and with the Allies near the sea coast. 
Now there are two points in connection with 
these events. The first is only of academic interest 
7* 
