LAND AND WATER 
October 17, 1914 
to-dav It is whether the garrison romamed too long 
witliin the walls of Antwei-p, and whether, therefore, 
the small drafts of the Allies sent in to counsel and 
aid such prolonged resistance were justified m their 
aiTival and in that prolongation. There is no doubt 
of the object: the object was to see whether the 
German forces in front of Antwerp could not be held 
until the Allies had done the trick further south and 
had pierced into the German lines east of Lille. At 
any rate Antwerp fell before that success w^is 
achieved (for it is not even yet achieved), and the 
delay therefore proved not an advantage but a hurt. 
Instead of the garrison getting away in good condition, 
for use in the field, when the first breach had been 
made in the fortifications, only a portion got away ; 
another smaller portion— but over 20,000 men— are 
prisoners of war ; not, indeed, in the hands of the 
enemy, but interned in Holland. These include a 
certain number of Englishm en . It is evident that every 
liour's delay, as the Germans advanced northward 
towai-ds the city, naiTOwed the belt between the Gemian 
lines and the Dutch frontier. For Antv.erp lies 
squeezed up along that frontier. And along that belt 
the retreat had to be conducted. That belt was 
naiTOwed so much when Antwerp fell that pai-t of the 
evacuating garrison, including 2,000 British, would 
not or could not risk the defile and took refuge in 
Holland. 
But the second point is not of academic interest, 
but is still of poignant and practical interest, and that 
second point concerns the immediate value of this 
act to the Germans. This is threefold. 
(a) What number of troops has the fall of 
Antwerp released for the use of the 
enemy. 
(b) Of what quality are these troops. 
(c) In what direction will they probably be 
used. 
(a) As to the numbers actually released by the 
fall of Antwerp. 
We have first of all the two guesses and the 
biassed statement. 
The biassed statement talks of 200,000 men. 
Now we may dismiss that immediately. The care- 
fully organised Prussian system of influencing opinion 
includes fantastic stories spread through Copenhagen 
and Eome, as well as the reasonable stuff from 
Amsterdam and the really sober and accurate official 
communiques. This German talk of 200,000 men 
released by the fall of Antwerp belongs to the first 
and worst category. The two guesses are the French 
estimate of 60,000, and a local estimate (on the 
sources of which I need not dwell) of 45,000. 
I conceive the French estimate to be the nearest 
to the ti-uth. More than 45,000, of whatever kind 
of troops, the Germans must have had in the face of 
the resistance they had to meet upon the Nethe, 
and of the probable (though, as it turned out, not the 
actual) ta^k before them in the occupation of a city 
which, with its suburbs, counts nearer three-quarters 
of a million than half-a-million in numbers. But 
since we may be absolutely certain that in an action 
where their artillery was sure to succeed and uud(?r 
such active menace to their communications through 
northein France, the Germans would not waste a 
single man before Antwerp, we need not put the 
numbers at over 00,000. 
Nor are all those 00,000 released. A certain 
number— not large— will be required to police 
Antwerp itself and to occupy the neighbourhood. A 
much larger number are accounted for by the necessity 
of facing the line of troops parallel with the soa-coast, 
Belgian, English, and French, from north and south of 
Ostend onwards. Say that 40,000 men are released 
from directly in front of Ant;vcrp and you have 
probably an exaggerated statement. ISIoreover, the 
same act releases for the field a much larger number 
of Bclo-ian troops, who can give and have given a 
very good account of themselves against an equal 
number of the German reserves. 
We may sum up and say that the direct result, 
the full amount of extra troops free for Gcrnum work 
from before Antwerp, is not the significant point in 
the matter. Call it a division and not two divisions 
and you will not be far out. TF/tat is far more 
important is the effect of the fall of Aidicerp in 
releasinrj men now used a!oji(/ the communications 
between TAege and the French frontier, and the tlminff 
of the fall of Antwerp for the arrival in France of new 
German trooj^s. 
So long as the Belgian Army lay within AntAverp 
it potentially threatened tlie main line of German 
communications through Belgium. Headers of these 
columns will remember the raid upon the railway- 
between Louvain and Brussels some three or four 
weeks ago. Now the getting rid of this threat 
means (1) the release of men kept, on account of the 
threat, on the main line, Liege — Namur— Hirson ; 
(2) the pov/cr of moving forward into France new 
troops. 
Let us take these points in order. Wliat release 
of men Avill be effected from the main line through 
Belgium by the withdrawal of the Antwerp menace ? 
Nothing very great. 
Of two things, one. Either this astonishing nCAV 
Prussian doctrine (that murder and fire arc tolerable 
to the Eui-opean conscience for the purpose of securing 
communications through hostile country) has been 
successful, or it has not. Either the railway line 
from Liege to Hirson wanted its regular com])lcment 
of men a mile (and a division could have held it 
anyhow), or it did not. Li cither case the fall of 
Antwerp onlij releases the force that was ]}>'(: i^iouslj/ 
masking Antwerp. It does not release any consider- 
able force kept upon the main line of communications 
to the south. There is no more mere terror than before. 
But here comes in the second point. The 
Germans quite certainly attacked Antwerp at this 
late moment in order to be free to move through 
Belgium on to tlie Allied flank new troops Avhich, 
till this moment, they had not ready. AVhat are those 
troops ? 
It is certain that Germany is about to bring 
through Belgium agaiust the Allies in France very 
considerable new forces. Of what they avIU consist 
we can only guess. They cannot come in great force 
until there has been some decision in the east ; they 
may be the better trained of the new conscripts ; they 
may be yet further bodies tentatively and perilously 
withdrawn from the left and the centre of the long 
German line in Franco. But though the bringing of 
those forces upon the flank of the Allied line, that is 
u}X)n the Fi'anco-Belglan frontier at Lille, and to the 
west thereof, is the most probable event of the near 
future, and though the fall of Antwerp will facilitate 
the movement, I do not sec whence the enemy can very 
seriously increase his value (not his numbers) In this 
field. The German Government has undoubtedly 
called up all its boys and old men. Unlike the French, 
it will keep no reserves, but stakes all on now. Equally 
undoubtedly it is now ready to put into the field in 
France some new trained and probably mixed force : 
it would not attack Antwerp till that w^as ready. But 
of what value will that force be ? 
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