LAND AND WATER 
October 17, 1914 
oponin- of this door at St. Mil.icl (npon the Upper 
Xu^) while it has not yd become importuut. m.gixt 
at any moment become important 
Here you have the German Ime A-B from the 
Bel-ian frontier of France to Novon B-C from 
Noyou to the neiglibourhood of Verdun, faml by the 
Allied line. Verdun and Toul are two strong for- 
tresses with a wall or baiTier of forts between them 
On the wrong side of that wall, to the east of that 
wall, is a German force M : on the r.ght side o that 
wall, to the west, is a French force ]S_ : at b hall way 
between Verdun and Toul, is St. Mdiiel-a town right 
on the barrier of forts, protected by two of these 
forts, and standing on the Kiver Meuse, which is the 
obstacle those forts protect. A couple of w-eeks ago 
the Germans quite unexi)ectedly attacked and reduced 
the two forts (Paroches and Camp des Eomains) com- 
manding St. Mihiel town, and in an attempt to cross 
the river (which now turns out to hare been a feint) 
they were thrown back by the French force opposite 
them at N. , , . • . w / 
But here comes in the important point : Ihoiir/li- 
Ihe attempted crossing at St. Mi/dcl was but a feint and 
did not succeed {for the Allies tcilli drew none of their 
troops and weakened no part of their line under that 
menace) the gap in the line of forts, the occupation of 
ihe town of St. Mihiel, and the power that occupation 
pees of crossing the river lohcnecer sufficient forces come 
vp, is still jealously retained by the Germans. 
^ 
J^^ 
'Radius oCaction j 
from VerJunJ 
^'^ 
^ 
5 g PI Of. Mihiel •-H«mw»««»«**«'' 
'Sailwo)! to Metz 
,^y^premont 
'Radius of action ^ 
from. Tool 
xrv 
Now this is surely of capital importance. Here 
in Diagi-ara XIV. yow. may see the importance which 
Gemiany attaches to the crossing. Her forces 
occupy, and have occupied for now so many days, 
a position apparently perilous and quite al^normal in 
war. She has thrust a wedge in between the radius 
of action of the fortress of Toul and the radius of 
action of the fortress of Verdun. She keeps that 
gap open as a sort of roadway, very narrow, but just 
wide enough for her purpose. All the efforts of the 
French to advance from Toul on to the valley where 
the railway leads from Metz to Thiaucourt — which 
valley is called the Rupt du Mad— she concentrates 
forces to repel and succeeds in repelling. She similarly 
repels all efforts on the part of the garrison of 'N'erduu 
to get south and to close the issue from the northern 
side. She anxiously and successfully maintains her 
railhead at Thiaucourt, which is the end of rapid 
communication from Metz, and which, through Metz, 
communicates with all central Germany behmd Metz 
and with all the great depots of the middle PJiine. 
I hough she makes no further effort to-day to cross 
the Meuse at St. Mihiel, she yet holds tenaciou.sly to 
St. Mihiel town and bridge, and is not driven from it. 
I suggest that Germany is here keepiiio- open a 
door ; and that in the expectation of victories in tlie 
east of Europe and of consequent reinforcements she 
means to hold that door open untU she can, through 
success in Poland, pour troops through the gap and 
take the Allied line in reverse— supposing she has not 
up to that moment been able to relieve the pressure 
upon the west or right flank of the German armies in 
France. If she is not acting with some such object, 
ultirnately involving the investment of Verdun or of 
Toul, the re-establishment of communications through 
Alsace-Lorraine, and the pouring of great masses 
through which shall force back or take in reverse the 
eastern end of the Allied line, then her action is 
meaningless. And meaningless action is not the 
Prussian way in war. 
But such action as the bringing up of large new 
hordes through the St. Mihiel "door" presupposes 
the release of great numbers from the eastern theatre 
of war. It is upon the result of the fighting iu 
Poland that all ultimately turns. 
IV. 
THE MAIN ISSUE IN POLAND. 
j>RVSSIA 
. ./ CKACowGA LLC I A JsKV,, Si 
•^.-•'" 
'PRzetin'SL 
AUSTRO 'HUNGARIAN EMPIRE 
Let us turn, then, to what we may justly conceive 
to be the most important theatre of all, the basin of 
the Middle and Upper Vistula. 
It is necessary in time of modern war that news 
officially permitted to the public should be cut do^vn 
to \evy simple and terse cx2:)ression. But an inevitable 
consequence attaching to this necessity is a mis- 
apprehension of the enemy's strength in any particular 
held. Until things becrin to o^o ill we tend to under- 
estimate his strength ; and when things go ill, to 
over-estimate it. And this simply because in the 
lack of sufficient bases for judgment the emotions 
of hope or fear take the place of calculation. 
If a full story of what has happened in southern 
Poland during the last ten days were pennitted, the 
public would be alarmed ; but they would be unduly 
alarmed. 
Briefly, there has been a veiy considerable set-back 
of the tide, if we are merely considering the ebb and 
flow of the line. The liussian forces, which had beeu 
advancing almost uninterruptedly through Galicia, 
iirst discovered that very considerable German re- 
inforcements had come up to strengthen the Austrian 
armies, and next that they could effect no proper 
concentration upon their own side if the Galician 
army were to continue its western march. The 
adcanced jyarties (only) of the Russian forces therefore 
have fallen back from just in front of the line 
Pietrokow-Kielce-Stopnitza-Tarnow — upon which line 
10* 
