October 17, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
Tnuoh the largest number of their effectives were 
npon the left, between Tarnow up to and just across 
the Vistula — to tlie line of the Vistula itself, and that 
retirement is one of about sixty miles. It has been a 
duly organised retreat, made for the purpose of 
concentration, and averaging about ten miles a day. 
Lest there should be a misapprehension as to the 
nature of this retirement and as to its gravity, it is 
mo.st important to appreciate that we are dealing with 
the concentration of at least two Russian armies. The 
Russian army which I have marked in dots upon this 
sketch map as A — the same which had been going 
forward so successfully through Galicia and towards 
Cracow — was well ahead of the Russian army which I 
have marked B, and which was concentrating east of 
tlie Vistula at the same moment that the army A was 
advancing through Galicia in front of it. The Russian 
forees wliicli less than a fortnight ago faced the 
.advancing Germans along the line Stopnitza-Kielce- 
Pietrokow were advanced forces thrown forward in 
front of the main Russian body upon and beyond the 
Vistula. In other words, while the advanced Russian 
bodies on the north of the line were falling back 
towards the Vistula, other bodies from the east were 
coming up to reinforce them. 
Rut note that this necessity for a concentration 
upon the Vistula south of Warsaw, in face of the 
unexpectedly strong German advance, compelled the 
body A to fall back very much further east. It had 
to get behind the River San if it was to be in line with 
the main body to the north, and in getting behind the 
River Han, A had also to give up the investment of 
Przemvsl. 
At the moment of writing, Tuesday evening, 
what you .seem to have in this all impoi-tant theatre 
of the war is a situation made up of the following 
elements : — 
{a) Ru.ssian for<^ of unknown amount but very 
lai^e — certainly over 1,500,000 men — 
hold the line of the River Vistula from 
Ivangoi-od to Sandomir, and thence 
southwards, holding the line of the 
River San up to the neighbom-hood of 
Jaroslav. There are further Russian 
forces to the south, but I am concerned 
with the immediate battle line alone. 
(6) An Austro-Genuan force of unknown 
amount, but presumably approximately 
equal or a little less, has advanced in 
the last ten days from the line 
Peti'okovv — Tarnow to this same line 
of the Vistula and the San. The 
German reinforcements are on the 
north, or left; the concentrated Austnan 
forces, both those intact and those 
fonned from the remnants of the army 
defeated at Leinberg, form the south or 
right of the allied line. 
(c) The Russian retirement behind the Vistula 
and the San has not been the result of 
any check in the field, still less of any 
defeat. It is quite evidently due to the 
fact tlmt the most rapid concentration 
of the Russian forces now in southern 
Poland with the reinforcements coming 
from the east, is best effected by a 
retirement of the first to meet the 
advance of the second. It is equally 
evident that tlic Russian commanders 
fcave deliberately taken up the defensive 
behind or upon the Vistula and the 
San. 
{d) In connection with the retirement of the 
one army and tlie advance of the other, 
there have happened a number of those 
incidents Avhich always mark a retire- 
ment before the enemy. The advancing 
enemy picks up stragglers, bogged guns, 
and so forth ; and the retiring army 
loses them . All that is quite unimportant 
to the ultimate issue, except in the case 
of a disorganised movement. The chief 
point (no doubt exaggerated) which the 
Germans can make in this connection is 
the picking up of 2,000 men, wounded 
and otherA\ase, in the neighbourliood 
of Grojec. 
(<•) This concentration upon tiie Vistula and 
the San has partly relieved Przemysl. 
At least, it has apparently disengaged 
the western section of the invest- 
ment. 
It is probable that at the moment of writing full 
contact has already been taken from north to south 
and that the struggle is engaged. And upon that 
struggle, as I have pointed out several times in these 
comments, much more will depend than the fate of 
Polish territory and of the eastern campaign. For if 
or when the Russian forces behind the Vistula and the 
San pass from the defensive to the offensive, and if or 
when tlie allied Gerlnanic forces before them begin to 
retire, the threat upon Silesia is at hand. In propor- 
tion to the completeness of such a victory the 
" pressure " upon the .allied powers, and particularly 
upon the German empire, would be severe. Silesia 
would be in peril, and the western march of the 
Russians would be resumed. 
If, upon the contrary, the Russian forces are in 
part disorganised by a German victory, or even held, 
then will come the opportunity for Germany to bring 
both German and Austrian troops westward and to 
attempt a final decision of the campaign in France. 
For among other things that the war has shown is the 
organisation whereby the Prussians can with unex- 
pected rapidity transfer troops from west to east along 
their parallel lines of communication. 
I sum up and say that upon these operations which 
have the Middle and Upper Vistula for their theatre 
depends, more than upon any other, the immediate 
future of the campaign. 
THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH 
POLAND. 
Tlie great importance of the coming action in soutli 
Poland belittles what has happened in the north of 
that country. But in view of the rather violent 
denouncing by Berlin of the Russian official com- 
muniqu6s, it is as well that we should be clear as to 
what has happened. To be thus clear wiU serve the 
double purpose of making us understand one import- 
ant detail of the war, and also (what is perhaps of 
more value) it will enable us to test the value of the 
German official communique under defeat. It may 
well be that this piece of psychology will be really 
useful to us in the near future. Hithei"to, the 
German official communiques have been models of 
exactitude. They have suppressed unpleasant truths, 
but they have not as a rule told direct untruths, nor 
have tliey shown any sign of " nerves." But, as I 
tliink I can show, the Gennan off.cial communique 
dealing with the mosi recent operations in North 
Poland is both disingenuous and full of " Hcrves." 
11" 
