LAND AND WATER 
October 17, 1914 
admiral will be Yillcncuvc, not Nelson. 
THE FAR EAST. 
The advance upon Kiao-Chau continues. Thcio is reason to 
believe hatXhe Lman warships in the harbour w.U presently 
fill victims to land attacks from the Japanese, who ba^e the 
iSulbinxperience of two previous wars to bruig on results of 
this nature. 
THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY. 
At the moment of writing the German predatory criiiscrs 
are taking a rest. This, presumably, means that by easy stage 
?h'v aro^ proceeding to fresh huntmg grounds, whence a 
; rudescenee of attack may be expected. To /he "^f" .° 
known corsairs the light cruiser Leipug (twenty-three Knots) 
in a great many minor places our consular service is represented 
by any handy foreign resident. In peace time this system 
(common to all countries) is economical ; but war is indicating 
its disadvantages. A neutral cannot possibly be expected to 
throw the same energy into the business as a Britisher. I ain 
inclined to fancy that one immediate result of this war will 
be a very considerable change in our consular service, unless 
" Britain for the British " is to remain a mere empty chat- 
Tlie Admiralty has just issued an official statement ia 
connection with the duel between the Carmania, and the Cap 
Trajalrjar. The outstanding feature of the report is that we 
ajtpcar to have aimed steadily at the waterliuc of the enemy, 
whereas the enemy aimed at the Carmania s upperworks. This 
is a reproduction of what used to take place in the Great War of 
a hundred years ago. 
Unfortunately, we are still without data as to whether the 
high aim of the Gei-mans was merely bad gunnery or whether 
it was of deliberate intent. Probably it was the former. 
EH Belgian. 
Dutch. 
WrcNo^^ 
5^ 
./!^y^3. 
THK EiVtK SCHELDT. 
must now be added. Her original port was Kiao-Chnu, but her 
last heard of " stamping ground " was ofi the west coast of 
South America, where she has made two captures— one of these 
worth about £120,000. 
Vigilance on the part of British consuls all over the world 
m detecting suspicious supply craft and warning our cruisers 
is the surest method of capturing German corsairs. Unfortunately 
THE WAR IN THE AIR. 
In the bombardment of Antwerp the Geraians are 
reported to have employed six Zeppelins. As explained in 
previous articles anything German which is lighter than air 
is for public purposes a " Zeppelin," so for " Zeppelin " we 
had better read " dirigible airship." 
Now the Germans started this war with sixteen big rigid 
airships built or completing and six others in course of 
construction. At the very outside they had nine Parsevals or 
inferior non-rigid imitations. This gives a maximum total 
of twenty-five all told- Of these we know that three have been 
dcstroyetl for certain, probably double that number. We 
shall not be far wrong if we put the total of available and effec- 
tive airships at somewhere about eighteen to twenty. Secret 
Zeppelins are as impossible as secret Dreadnoughts— they are too 
big to try to hide. 
At least as many dirigibles will be required on the Russian 
fi-ontier as on the western side. From which we can calculate 
that the number of dirigibles of all kinds available for service 
against Antwerp would have been between six and nine. 
We had better assume the latter number; because fragile 
craft like dirigibles are never likely to be able to materialise 
in full strength at any selected moment. 
Two more raids have been made by our aeroplanes on the 
German airship sheds at Cologne and Dusseldorf. No success 
seems to have attended the Cologne attempt, but the flame seen 
issuing from the Dusseldorf shed is clear proof that there is 
certainly one Zeppelin which will never fly again, also probably 
one shed that will no longer be of any use. 
FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS AND THEIR 
DEFENCE. 
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B., late R.E. 
SPEAKING with an experience of many years, there is 
nothing so dillicult to teach in peace time as the 
construction and " siting " of field entrenclmienls. 
Men very soon get tired of lifting earth, with 
unaccustomed back muscles and blistered hands, on 
some disused patch of uninteresting land — all that can be 
spared them for the purpose. The whole idea of digging 
a pit and squatting in it to shoot seems so childishly simple 
that in a very short time the interest slackens, and unless you 
are lucky enough to have the assistance of war-experienced 
sergeants and .subalterns, the whole business becomes tedious 
and subvereive of discipline in the highest degree. 
This last remark may require elucidation for civilian readers, 
OS the connection is not at first obvious ; but, in reality, it is verv 
simple. Men come back from trenchwork thoroughly stiff 
and sore, with an appalling thirst on them. The canteen ia a 
confortable resort, and though dmnkenness is now almost 
extinct, yet the eonplc of extra glasses of beer and the next 
morning's muscular stiffness, not to mention the blistered hand.-^, 
bring them back to work in just that condition of nervous 
imtabriity which renders friction with authority nearly 
inevitable. Someone or other loses his temper, a eouple of 
men are marched back to the guardroom, and a settled gloom 
tlescends on the trenches. Every little shift or evasion is 
practised to save the sore hands and aching muscles, unless you 
have with you some of the above-mentioned assistants, to cheer 
the men up and interest them with bits of practical experience. 
Fortunately, during the last few years there have been many 
such men in the regular army, and nothing struck me so much 
when watching the Infantry Pioneer classes at Chatham as the 
greatly increased interest in their work which all ranks showed, 
as compared with my experience as instnictor in earlier years, 
and reports from the front show how much we are profiting 
from this altered state of things almost daily. If instruction in 
fieldworks had not become a living reality, had it remained 
in the " before the war " condition, matters on the Marne might 
have taken a very different course. 
The real difficulty of this class of instruction, and I write 
for the benefit of the very many officers fresh to the work in the 
New Armies, lies in the absolute simplicity of the fundamental 
ideas and the extreme difficulty of reconciling all the conflicting 
tendencies contained in these ideas. The bedrock principle 
all through the practice of warfare is " to kill your man first 
before he can kill you " ; clearly, when he is dead he can do you no 
further damage. But, to begin with, you do not always know 
where he is, or how he intends to attack you ; so you dig a hole to 
get cover from both sight and bullets, and wait for him to 
commence operations or, at the best, to give himself away. 
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