LAND AND WATER 
October 24, 1914 
largely dependent on it) by a much simpler scheme 
C\hl paucity of the communications, tbc natural 
strength of the defensive line, and the simple (and 
inadequate) distribution of its niilway system. 
Ijut there is this one last contrast between the 
Western and the Eastern positions, more important 
than all the rest: the Eastern position-the struggle 
in Poland— lends itself to a decision much more 
obviously than does the Western conflict m rrance. 
In other words, though a deadlock is a possibility 
(and has, indeed, obviously been envisaged by the 
tJerman General Staff as a conclusion not wholly 
unfavourable to their cause), yet it is far more prob- 
able that one or other of the two opponents will 
establish a decisive superiority after the first few days 
of fighting. . ■< 1 • 1 
This probability (it is no more) is a capital aid 
to our judgment of the campaign. It means that 
the thesis which has been always maintained m these 
comments— that the result in Poland would be the 
prime factor in the general result of the whole cam- 
paign throughout Europe — still holds. 
But why does one say that the Eastern position 
lends itself to a rapid decision more than does the 
Western ? 
Because {a) there is room for outflanking ; (d) one 
party at least can count upon a continual arrival of 
reserves ; (c) either line, if broken or turned, lacks for 
a long distance to the rear any prepared defensive 
positions : either pai-ty, if compelled to retirement, 
would be compelled to a long and disastrous 
retirement. 
(a) That the first point is true — as to room for 
outflanking — is evident from the very nature 
of the position upon the map. It ends 
near Warsaw ; that is, only at the begin- 
ning of the vast plain which stretches 
thence to the Baltic. True, that plain is 
cut by a whole belt of marsh and lake on 
the boundaries of East Prussia, the northern 
boundary of Eussian Poland. But there 
is ample room between for a turning move- 
ment round Warsaw to be undertaken by 
whichever party shall have so decided a 
numerical superiority as to permit of such 
an action. 
Of any considerable turning movement upon the 
other flank, the southern, which is the extreme right 
of the Austro-German line and the extreme left of 
the Eussian, there can be no question ; for here the 
extremity of either line reposes upon the " tangle of 
the Carpatliians." 
{b) The knowledge that Eussia can, at not too 
remote a date, count upon the arrival of 
increasing numbers must urge the Germanic 
Powers to attempt a decision before those 
reinforcements arrive. At any rate, even if 
a full result cannot be hoped for, the advent 
of these new bodies (though they should 
not have the value of the first line) must 
prompt the enemies of Eussia to strike a 
heavy blow at the Eussian army before it 
is further strengthened. 
(c) There is not afforded by nature any good 
defensive position parallel to the line' of the 
Vistula and the San for a long way on 
either side. If the Eussians be compelled 
to fall back, the rivers behind them provide 
doubtful positions. If. it is the Germans 
who fall back, thoy have indeed prepared a 
line within the immediate proximity of their 
own frontier, but, as yet, nothing very 
serious in between. We shall see, if they 
have to go back to the line of Kielce- 
Petrokow whether they have sufficiently 
entrenched i/ia( ; but even if they have, it 
wQl be as open to outflanking upon the part 
of the Eussians, as is the present German 
line along the rivers. Further, the difllcul- 
ties of communication would prevent rapidity 
in retirement, and though that handicaps the 
pursuer as well, it handicaps him less, for it 
does not gravely affect his cavalry and light 
artillery. 
We may sum up and say, first, that a decision is 
to be expected upon this field probably before there is 
any final result in the west, and that, according to the 
nature of this decision (according to whether it is 
adverse to the German cause or not) we shall either 
(1) see the western German line in France retreating 
in despaii- of receiving reinforcements from the east ; 
or (2) see sucb reinforcements arrive in great numbers, 
and the campaign in France enter upon a new and 
very different phase. 
This is by no means certain, it is only conjecture. 
It is always possible that a decision might be reached 
in France and Belgium before the first undecided 
actions upon the Vistula and tbe San had begun to 
show wliich way the tide was flowing. But it is far 
the more probable event that an appreciable result in 
Poland wiU in a short time release men for the west, 
or, in the absence of such reinforcements, compel the 
Gei-man Ime in the w^est to retire. That is why it is 
the business of all of us to keep our eyes fixed upon 
this unfamiliar eastern field. 
So much being said, it is further evident that for 
tbe Germans to acbieve a decision in their favour they 
must pierce the line before them. Conversely it is , 
evident that the Eussians must attempt to turn by the 
northern flank (the only available one) the position of 
their enemies upon the further bank of the two 
streams. The Germans do indeed attach a great 
importance to the possession of Warsaw upon their 
extreme northern flank. It would give them a bridge 
across the Vistula (there is but one other — at Ivan- 
gorod), and it would give them depots, a great accession 
of that moral position to whicb they attacli so great a 
political value (even at this advanced stage of the 
campaign) and last, and most important, the great 
town with its fortifications at Memlin (New 
Georgievsk) just below Warsaw, which would cover 
and protect the Gei-man left from Eussian assault and 
from Eussian tui-ning movements even for some time 
after the perpetually growing additions to Eussian 
strength begin to be felt. 
While, then, the (rermans must naturally attempt 
to take and hold Warsaw they could not themselves 
attempt a turning movement there, and to get behind 
the Eussian line in the Vistula, because, pst, they 
are not in sufllcient numbers even now to do so, and 
secondly because those numbers of theirs are diminish- 
ing, in proportion to the enemy's, with every day that 
passes. The principal Austro-German effort must, 
therefore, be to cross the rivers Vistula or San at 
certaiii points, there to break the Eussian line, destroy 
its cohersion and its unity of command, and leave it 
for a long time to come permanently inferior to its 
opponents. Such a result would leave Germany free 
to transfer numbers of troops to the Western theatre 
of Avar, even though she would still be condemned 
to preserving a very large force in Sou.tliern Poland. 
On the side of the Eussians it is equally obvious 
that their attempt must be a turning movement 
round by the north — by Warsaw. They know tliat 
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