October 24, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
this is largely a campaign of exhaustion. They know 
that the enemy has rendered his own commmiications 
insecure by a false policy of cruelty with the peasants. 
They know that he has in his retirement but few 
roads and railways to depend upon — roads and 
railways which would be hopelessly clogged in any 
pressed retirement. 
The Germans have massed (they themselves say 
it) not less than five anny corps in front of Warsaw 
— a third of all they have upon the Vistula. They 
advanced at first to within half a day's march of the 
city. But the Russians gradually affirmed, theii* 
superiority at this point, at any rate in the first days 
of the struggle. The fui-thest point of German 
advance before the Russian counter-offensive was here • 
reached, perhaps, last Wednesday night. Thm-sday 
things lay doubtfid. By Saturday and Sunday, if 
we are to trust the official Russian commimique, the 
superiority of the Russians upon this wing had 
definitely established itself, and the Austro-German 
line was already in some peril of being turned from 
the north. 
Meanwhile, very strong and at first partially 
successful, attempts to force the line of the rivers and 
thus to break the Russian cohesion were continuing 
in the middle of the vast field and to the south of it. 
How far these have been or will be repelled we cannot 
yet say, but apparently they have not to this date 
made any considerable prog^-ess, though some foothold 
may have been obtained upon the right bank. 
How difficult such a crossing must be and how 
strong the position is as a defensive one a more 
particular examination of the line will prove. 
The whole position fi'om the Carpathians to the 
neighbourhood of Warsaw falls into three rather clearly 
marked divisions, unless, indeed, we add a fourth 
for the billy country round Przemysl and the 
mountains at the back of it. At any rate, 
immediately to the north of this first short mountain 
sector you have the course of the River San up to the 
point where it falls into the Vistula ; one may give 
to this line, say, from the main Ghlician railway 
northward, a distance of over sixty miles. The upper 
part of the San River is fordable. The fords 
naturally get less frequent as one goes down stream ; 
all the lower part is even naiigable. Further, a main 
railway line leads up to and feeds this southern wing 
of the enemy, and a branch line, leading northwai-d 
along the left bank of the San from Jaroslav, acts as 
a main avenue of supply, an opportunity for concen- 
tration of troops upon any chosen point of it. If the 
best troops, the strictest organisation, and, above 
all, the strongest ai-tUleiy were to be discovered in this 
region, one might predict an attempted forcing of the 
line here rather than further north. The obstacle is 
less formidable, the communications are much more 
perfect. Bit it is precisely here that you have no 
more than the recomposed fragments of the defeated 
or second Austrian aimy and the first, which though 
not hitherto defeated has suffered from weeks of 
retreat under considerable loss and at some expense 
to its organisation. 
It must further be remembered that a crossing of 
the water and a breaking of the line so far south as 
even the middle San, if the pri?icipal operation were 
here undertaken, would not be decisive, as a breach 
effected nearer the centre would be. It is a universal 
truth in every form of attack, strategical or tactical, 
by land or by sea, that, other things being equal, 
a line is more effectively broken in proportion as the 
stroke comes nearer its middle ; for thus is the largest 
of the two fragments at least still small. But tlie 
doctrine pai-ticularly holds in this case, because the 
main Russian communications lie far to the north 
of any threatened point upon the San. There will be 
attempts to cross the San ; one vigorous one has 
ah-eady been made near Nikso — just below the first 
bridge upon the junction of the San with the Vistula. 
Some measure of success was claimed by Austria 
(but unofficially, I think) for this attempt. 
The main effort, however, to break the Russian 
line wUl hardly be undertaken in this section upon 
the San ; it will fall in the middle section between 
the town which the Russians now call Ivangorod 
(a site known in Polish histoiy as Demblin) and 
the little, ancient, and once strong borough of 
Sandomir, which lies but a few miles above the 
junction of the Vistula and the San. 
Tliere are several reasons why the main attack 
should be delivered in this central of the three sections. 
Here, to begin with, you come immediately upon the 
main communications of the Russians after piercing 
their line : or at least their main communications as 
a united army. Get through there, and you throw the 
northern half of their line back on to the main road 
and railway Warsaw-Brest, and the southern half of 
their line back upon the other railway Lemberg-Eaef . 
Fm-ther you bring to bear (upon whichever of the 
separated halves you choose) the whole weight of the 
invading advance through Poland upon the breach 
so made. 
Again, this section is tackled by the most 
efficient portion of the Allied Germanic Powers, the 
German troops ; it is presumably better supplied with 
heavy artillery, under the action of which alone could 
the crossing of a deep, broad, and rapid stream be 
attempted. 
These reasons alone should be sufficient foa- 
expecting the main attack to be delivered in the 
section Ivangorod- Sandomir, the second or central 
section of the line. But there are further reasons. 
This is the portion of the Russian line which is 
least well backed by railway communication. There 
is here no railway along the eastern bank. But on 
the western bank, where the Germans lie, the main 
line through Radom'up to Warsaw throws out an 
extension towards the Vistula, the railhead of which 
is at Ostrowiecs, a depot central to any attempt upon 
this portion of the stream. There is no other railhead 
equally well situated for a concentration anyv^^here 
between Sandomir and Wai-saw. (See Map II.) 
To the north of Ivangorod crossing is more 
difficult ; apai-t from its being too far from the centre, 
you have considerable belts of marsh along the stream, 
a crumbling bank, and this usually steep and a matter 
of from 50-100 feet in places above the nonnal 
water level. It is true that the country through 
which this central section (Sandomir-Ivangorod) 
passes is hiUy, the hills becoming bolder (especially 
upon the left bank) the more one goes southward and 
upstream. The Great Plain does not begin until 
after New Alexandria (wliich is the Russian name 
for the site more congenially known in Polish history 
as the Palace of Palawy). But this hiUy country is 
not so confused or broken as seriously to intercept an 
advance, and there is firmer opportunity for landing 
upon the right or eastern bank, and less opportunity 
for the concentration of the enemy. 
"What is more, two considerable obstacles 
separate any effort undertaken against the line 
Vistula-San below Ivangorod or above Sandomir from 
any effort undertaken in the central portion 
between the two towns. The first and least of these 
obstacles is the great belt of forest 50 miles by at 
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