LAND AND WATER 
October 24, 1914 
lca.t 20, which lies roughly triangular a couple of 
days' nm-ch south of Eadoni. This, though travei-s- 
ablc of course by two or three good roads may be 
regai-dcd as the southern boundary of tlie belt over 
which the Germans must advance towards tlie cross- 
ing of the central Vistuk. It cuts off for an 
advancing body the columns working north ot 
Sandomii- from those working south To the north 
is the very serious obstacle of the Pahca. bhould a 
l^issian turning movement by the north be even 
partially successful, then the obstacle of the Palica 
would afford delay for the withdrawal westward ot 
such Gorman troops as might have already passed 
successfully to the further bank of the Vistula between 
New Alexandria and Sandomir. But an attempt to 
i)ut the main Gorman force over the river north of 
that obstacle would speU disaster ^/thc Gei-man left 
in the ncighom-hood of AVarsaw were senously 
menaced ; still more if it were timied. The Palica 
with its marshes would hem in the reti-eating army. 
There would hardly be time to -\Aithdraw the advanced 
bodies that might have approached or even crossed 
tlie A'^istula ; and there is no natural obstacle between 
AVarsaw and the Palica to fend off the Eussians 
approachhig from the north to cut the communi- 
cations of the bodies that had just crossed or were 
just crossing. 
It is evident that the German.s, while their 
numbers may not be sufficient so much as to threaten 
a turning movement here against the Eussians, would, 
by only liohUng AVarsaw, make their advance across 
the central Vistula (should they succeed in crossing 
the stream) secure. They must of course not only 
hold AVai-saw : they must also mask, attack, or in a 
paradoxical way repose upon the enemy's fortress of 
Novo Georgievsk (the true name of which is the old 
Polish name of Memlin). They must mask also the 
secondary fortress of Ivangorod. But containing the 
garrisons of these two, without fuiihor advance 
east and west there, if they cross the Vistula 
further south at some central point between 
Ivangorod and Sandomir, and if they there break 
the Eussian line, such a breach, while AVarsaw 
was held, would decide the action as a whole. All 
this means that an attack upon and an occupation 
of AVarsaw and with it the holding of the line 
AVai*saw-Ivangorod while a crossing is eft'ected some- 
where further up above Ivangorod is the obvious 
GciTuan plan. 
AVlien we look then at the three sections (1) the 
San, (2) the Vistula between Sandomir and Ivangorod 
and (3) the Vistula from Ivangorod down to AVarsaw, 
we see, as I have said, that the central one of these 
is the most favourable for the chief attempt of the 
Austro-Gcrraan allies at crossing the river ; and we 
know that, as a fact, the attempt has been made 
(with what hnal success or ill-success we do not yet 
know) at one particular point especially chosen therein, 
the jwint near Jozefow. 
In order to undei-stand why this pai-ticular spot 
was chosen the following sketch map may be of 
intorest. The A'istula happens at this point to be 
narrower than it is at any place cither above or below. 
It is even nan-ower than at Sandomir. Above, there 
are marshes ; bclo\v, islands and the entry of a tribu- 
tary which balks an advance. 
That the Vistula is here con-espondingly deeper 
does not affect the problem, because it is not, in any 
case, fordable. That it runs more swiftly is an adverse 
consideration for the Germans attempting to cross it ; 
but this exti-a cm-rent is not sufficient to outweio-h 
the great advantages of a passage which can be "-aiiied 
more rapidly (if it is gained at all) than at any other 
point for many days march above and below. 
Nor is this the only advantage of the crossing 
place of Jozefow. It is the nearest point (by road) upon 
the Vistula from the railhead at Osowiec. Further, 
there are two roads leading from that railhead to the 
head of the river bank opposite Jozefow. The one 
goes north of a belt of wood at this point, the other 
south of it ; and the total distance from the railhead 
to the right bank is but twenty miles as the crow 
flies — less than thirty by either road. 
The Eussians upon the opposing bank have no 
svicli advantage. Their railway is fully half as much 
a^ain, even as the crow flies, behind them ; and they 
have but one road to it — though a longer road 
down the river leads to New Alexandi-ia and a more 
distant point upon the same railway. 
If, as is reported, the German attempt at crossing 
the A^'istula opposite Jozefow has failed, the check to 
the invaders, though not decisive, is heavy. No 
equally good opportunity is to be found for breaking 
the middle of the Eussian line. 
Upon the San, of course, there are numerous 
opportunities of crossing. That river is not more 
than 150 yards broad in its lower courses, it narrows 
rapidly as one approaches the mountains, the bridges 
across it and roads leading to these bridges are 
numerous, the opportunities for gun positions to 
defend the crossings are, in such hilly country, also 
numerous. But it must not be forgotten that the 
effect ujion the Eussian line here would be but 
partial. It would be a blow delivered too near the end 
of the line, which can hardly be turned, as it reposes 
upon the mountains ; and the nearer one is to this 
extreme end of the line the better are the Eussians 
supplied by the great railway from Lemberg and Kieff. 
Again, below New Alexandria and between 
Ivangorod and AVarsaw, the opportunities for 
crossing grow rarer and rarer as one goes down- 
stream. The river broadens out, is marshy upon 
one bank or the other (sometimes upon both), and is 
not served, upon the German or western side, by the 
railway. 
There is one last point of considerable strategic 
importance to be watched, and that is the junction 
of the two rivei's, Vistula and San. This point is not 
of great impoi-tance to the attackers at the present 
moment, for there is no particular reason why the 
Austro-Germans should try to cross near here more 
than at any other place. But if the tide of the 
battle turns, and a Eussian pursuit of a German 
retirement begins ; if the main Austro-German line 
is turned round its AVarsaw flank and has to retreat 
from the rivers, the7i this river junction will become 
of the very gi-eatest importance to the Eussians. 
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