October 24, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
NOTE. — THIS ABTICLB HAS BEEX SUBMITTBD TO THB PEESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THa PtTBLIOATIOS AS CEXSOBIB 
AND TAKES KO RESPOXSIBILITT FOB THE COKEEOTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS. 
L.y-V'^ 
THa BALTIC ABSA OP CONFLICT SHOWIKQ THB MOST IMPORTANT FORTIFIED POINTS. 
THE SUBMARINE MENAGE. 
yA T the moment of writing the German week's bag — 
/^k by submarines — is one Russian armoured cruiser 
/ ^k and one old British protected cruiser. It works 
/ ^ out at two of something for nothing ! And it is 
idle to deny that a species of submarine panic is 
spreading. 
The actual asset remains small. To dat« no German 
submarine has achieved anything whatever likely in the 
remotest degree to ailect final issues. But — the Germans have 
secured enough " moral effect " to make everything else seem 
possible. Many of us envisage them, out of tho way, lying in 
harbour till such time as they have sunk by submarines enough 
of our Navy to make a fleet action a " toss up," or else odds in 
Germany's favour. 
So far they have — except in the case of the Pallada— 
merely submarined ships which " don't matter." But we may 
take it that they will pursue this policy steadily until they have 
sunk various capital ships of ours which do matter very much. 
And it is just about hero that German calculations seem 
likely to go astray. 
Supposing that they attain their object; supposing that they 
sink some of our Dreadnoughts until battle fleet equality or 
an advantage therein is obtained ? The German fleet may then 
come out at the "selected moment." But — and it is a very 
big " but " indeed — it chances that we have more than twice 
as many submarines as they have, and, as I described in a 
recent article, submarines manned on thosd democratic lines 
which alone can bo relied on for ultimate success in this kind 
of warfare. Whatever risks we may have run, their risks will 
be twice as great. 
That, however, is oveilookod. German agents in this 
country have made a strong but so far only partially successful 
effort to raise a submarine panic. It cannot be too clearly 
understood that it is not the loss of ships and men on which 
the enemy relies so much as " the panic." It is in tho chapter 
of accidents that not long before the war Admiral Sir Percy 
Scott, in a letter, and Sir A. Conan Doyle, in a story, should 
have invested the submarine with a very high potentiality. Of 
thcee entirely extraneous circumstances capital is already 
being made. 
Presently more capital will be made, because it is reason- 
ably certain that, sooner or later, the German submarines will 
secure some of our Dreadnoughts. The first Dreadnought 
secured we may be certain of seeing the " panic " sequel worked 
to the uttermost. 
Now, this is one of those few troubles which are best met 
half way. As I suggested some weeks ago, the loss of a dozen 
Dreadnoughts by submarines is among the things that are 
■possible. We should meet it by thinking of it as a ■probable 
event. The more we anticipate it the better, for by so doing 
wo shall keep our heads. 
To date, the losses due to submaiines have been propor- 
tionately far less than people imagine. For example, here is 
a list of all losses which have taken place in what may be called 
" submarinable waters " : — 
Allies. 
GeRUAKS AND AnSTUT.lNS. 
Submarines 
Pathfinder 
Cressy 
Eogne 
Aboukir 
Hawke 
PaUada 
Hela 
S 126 
Mines 
Amphion 
Speedy 
t.b.l9 (Austrian, Accidental) 
Gunfire 
K. Luise (minelayer) 
Zenta 
U 15 
V 187 
Magdeburg 
Koln 
Mainz 
Ariadna 
S 115 
S 117 
S 118 
S 119 
18» 
