LAND AND WATER 
October 31, 1914 
after Dixmude following the contours of a stream which 
ithasAvidened. The original Ysernver itself or httle 
Yser " is now but a small stream lying to the west ot tins 
badly to the souui .u.u. .. y^^^ -- ^ eanal ; but the word " Yser " is often used for the canal, 
Gennan attack, that west of Lil e, f J!^^^ 7?^ " even by local people, because the canal has become the 
"l"o,l «fill further in, then the Allied hne m fiont ^^^^^^^^ /^Z ^^.^^^i^ {^j^ ^f ,,^tcr in the neighbourhood. 
It is nowhere very deep ; there are even places 
where it is just fordable. It will be seen that about 
four miles north of Dixmude and about six miles 
south- cast of Nieuport the canal makes a big bend 
Germans advancing on Cdais --/"^ -npoljl- 
li Ypres and ArmcntiiiTS Wd l>a fa bac 
„omerof ^ithi a^F-^tly), but the Oerman 
Smce beyond it ^ exJiimely slow and -^^ 
It would seem a mathematical certainty that 
a successful German advance along the sea-coast 
towards Calais was impossible until or if the German 
iad by sheer weight, along the main fron befo e 
Ypi^s Ld before Armenticres, pushed back the great 
bodv of the Allies which occupy that sahcnt. 
^Eemember that nearly all this is llat country ; 
that the main roads lead north and south not east 
and west; that the same is true of the main 
railways, steam ti-amway lines and even main water, 
courses. In a word, every ai-tificial advantage for 
takin- the sea coast in flank exists, none for 
defending the flank of an advance along it, and 1 
do not see how it is possible to occupy that coast 
until you have first made certain that the whole 
country to the south is clear of your enemy. Of such 
a clearance there is not even a beginning to-day. 
There is the strategic argument for and against 
the German march on Calais, put as simply as the 
present writer can put it; and I repeat what I said 
at the beginning of this passage ; it is not a soldier s 
move, it is a politician's move. There are, without 
doubt, at the German Headquarters to-day, men stdl 
protesting against its bcmg attempted at all, and 
still asking for remforcemcnts to be sent south of 
Lille, where a real decision is still conceivably 
possible. Moreover, it seems ti-ue at this moment of 
writuig (Tuesday evening) that the Gennan push 
along the sea coast has been too expensive; that 
exhaustion is already upon it, and its opponents may 
at any moment advance and reverse the whole move- 
ment. 
THE COUNTRY BETWEEN THE YSER 
CANAL AND CALAIS. 
But apai-t from this presumption that a confusion 
in their objective and too great an expenditure of men 
has compromised this advance, the ground between 
Yser and Calais is bad for advance in general and 
contains in particular a first rate line to hold in front 
of Calais. Let us consider the nature of this ground. 
The study in some detail of this portion of the 
field will repay the reader, though it be spared from 
attack. It is perhaps the most important piece of 
ground wc have yet had to deal with ; for it is that 
upon the occupation of which the enemy are gambling 
veiy high and the occupation of which is directly 
intended to the luu-t of this country. Fhst of all let 
us consider the lino which sufficed for ten days' 
defence — the line of the River Yser, or rather of the 
canal lateral to it, which talces most of its water and 
which is the most considerable ditch in this region. 
The canal runs from Ypres to Nicuport. 
From the tovm Ypres to the sea at Nieuport is 
nearly twenty-one miles. It is almost exactly twenty 
miles from the Cloth Hall at Ypres to the railway 
station at Nieuport. But the town of Nieuport itself 
lies somev\-hat inland and the mouth of the canal is 
more than a mile beyond the to\\Ti to the north. All 
the w-ay from Ypres to the sea runs this canal, 
artificial and often straight, so far as Dixmude, and 
eastward. This bend is the most obvious point upon 
Avhich the Germans could concentrate for a crossing. 
They had of course to be attacking everywhere along 
that line m order to occupy their enemies and to 
attack other passages of the Avater, but the reach 
Avhich bends thus eastward in a loop Avas their_ prime 
opportunity. The principle, as shown in the 
diagi-am opposite, is quite clear. If an obstacle 
O has to be crossed by a force A in the 
direction of the aiTOW against a force B, A 
AviU naturally choose some part in the line of the 
obstacle where he can most easily beat B off from the 
other side. Now it is obA-ious that Avherever there is 
a re-entrant 'angle towards A, m the line of the 
obstacle, there A has his best opportunity for crossing ; 
because he can, from cither side of the re-entrant (at C 
and C) converge fire upon the force Avhich B has sent 
into the bend to prevent the A's crossing. The forces 
of B inside the bend are in a much Avorse position 
than the forces of B at C and C on the outside of it ; 
B's fire is dispersed outAvards ; A\hile the fire from C 
and C converges inwards. It is therefore al.vays at a 
point of this kind that the chief crossing of an obstacle 
is attempted. There seem to have been two such 
attempts, the first unsuccessful, the second successful. 
The Germans coming by the road.s from St. Petei-'s 
Chapel tried to rush both the bridges, the one in 
front of St. George's and the other m front of 
Schoobakke, Avhile a much larger force came up from 
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