OctoW 31, 1914 
LAND AND WATEE 
I 
back in tliis region, would straighten the line again 
and compensate in some degree for the bending back 
of it in the north. 
In other words, it is worth while in these very 
long and extended modem actions for your centre 
and untlu'eatened wing to try, even through some 
days, to retrieve the misfortunes of your defeated 
wing. 
That the Gennanic allies have at some points 
upon the Upper Vistula near Sandomu* and upon the 
river San crossed these two streams, I take to be 
indubitable. Wliat we do not know is how far they 
have really established themselves upon the eastern 
bank. The chances are that though the Austriaus 
and certain of the Germans have crossed the San and 
the Upper Vistula, the movement here has not been 
anything like as decisive against the Russians as has 
the Russian movement against the Germans in the 
north. And one's evidence for this is that the official 
communiques of the Austriaus and the Germans do 
not speak of any real success upon the right of their 
line (they are of course perfectly silent as to their 
reverses on the left), while the Russian communiques, 
though admitting vigorous attack upon the line of 
the two rivers, admit no serious reverse south of 
Jozefow. Meanwhile there is a somewhat detailed 
report of Austriaus recrossing the stream below 
Saudomu", proving that it was crossed a few days ago 
iind also suggesting that now the whole of the Vistula 
(though not yet the San) is being slowly given up by 
the Germanic allies. 
It is indeed certain that a very heavy effort is 
being pushed forward by the Austrians near Przemysl. 
It is not true that this fortress is completely disengaged. 
It is true that all the western sectors have been dis- 
engaged for nearly a fortnight. Further Ave must 
note that very great and partially successful efforts 
have been made by the Austrians to clear the passes 
of the Carpathians, not only in front of Przemysl, but 
far to the oast of that ]X)int. 
What is not tenable is the conjecture that any 
Austrian movement on this south end of the line will 
really turn the Russians and threaten them. That 
could only be done by a gi'eat numerical superiority. 
It is not possible that Austria should discover that 
numerical superiority either now or later. 
We may sum up and say that the opeititions 
upon the Vistula and upon the San are on the whole 
in our favour, and that they have (what is all-import- 
ant to the West) prevented the Gennans from releasing 
any considerable body from the East for operations 
in Flanders or in LoiTaine. 
But there are stiU two questions of great mterest 
to be asked with regard to tliis field. The first is, 
with what rapidity can the Russian " pressure " in 
Gei-many be applied ? The second is, upon what 
line will the German retirement fall if the present 
Russian advance is maintained ? 
As to the first of these questions, the early 
stages of the war in the east, the known operations 
of the two opponents, the nature of the country over 
which these actions are fought, and the type of 
German advance which the war in the west has 
already acquainted us with, furnish a sufficient 
answer. It is the same that has been insisted upon 
in these notes from the very beginning ; a warning 
not to expect the Russian " pressure " upon the 
German foi-ces in the east to be rapid — tliough it 
may be, before it is ended, overwhelming. The nature 
of the actions fought and to be fought, the t3rpe of 
communications in Westei'n Poland, the fact that all 
the armies of the Germanic Allies are in being there 
and do not seem to have lost really heavUy in recent 
operations (how many guns, for instance?) the 
indeterminate climate between the mud of autumn 
and the frost of winter, the very distances involved — 
all point to a movement of advance on the part of 
the Russians which will only be slow during the next 
few weeks. 
As to the second question, where a long German 
resistance is likely to be offered to such an advance, it 
would seem that the line of the River Warta affords 
the best opportunity for this. That river does not, 
indeed, present a regular and parallel front to the 
German frontier, but the front it docs present is, as 
the accompanying sketch map will show, a sufficient 
DANTZIC 
" CR>»COW 
TEa LIKB or THB WXBTA. 
protection to the German frontier to make it an 
obvious line for the Germans to hold. There is a 
gap of more or less open country between Koto and 
the fortress of Thorn, a gap about 50 miles wide, 
wliich would want particular attention, but which 
would be defensible with entrenchments. Southward, 
the hilly country where the three Empires meet, 
should be a sufficient defence for even a sparse body 
of troops to continue the line ; and it may well be 
found that if the Russians push back the whole 
Austro - German line westward, after these first 
successes of theirs, the line of the Warta, continued 
tlu'ough the hiUs and on in front of Cracow, will 
be the holding point attempted by the enemy against 
our eastern AUy. 
It must be remembered that the German 
Government attaches the greatest importance — 
military as well as political — to keeping operations 
off Germanic sod. It is probable that every effort 
will be made, if the German army in the east is really 
forced back, to hold this line of the Warta and to 
continue the Gennan administration of the Polish 
province of Kalisz. This would have the advantage 
of preventing communications between the Russian 
Poles and those oppressed by Germany to the west, 
of keeping the war off German soil, and of producing 
— though much nearer her own territory than 
11» 
