LAND AND WATER 
October 31, 1914 
hm «n.l thorc. or anmchcrc, with orders to do as much destruction 
and kidltir as possible. . i « ii. • 
1 should not care to bet on the ultimate pro.pccts of the.r 
access other than psychologically; but 1 do think that thera 
"every possibUity cither of the attempt being made, or of the 
8ubmarinV transports being used as a menace just as Napoleon 
used those " Hat bottoms," designed to ro^y across in a calm 
when the British warships were helpless. 
In the old days this policy led us into a vast expenditure 
on MarteUo towers and the retaining in England of thousands 
of troops which else had been sent to the Continent. Ihc German 
Generai StaS has studied history. 
THE BALTIC. 
There is no news whatever from the Baltic, in which a 
Bpccies of stalemate seems to obtain. The Russians appear to 
be employing against the Germans exactly the same tactics as 
the Germ'ans are using against us, and the Germans are at a 
loose end accordingly. . 
This Russian action (or rather, inaction) is probably ol tar 
more value to us than we vet realise. So long as the Russians 
adhere to their present policy so long wiU it be impossible for 
the Germans to attempt an attack on us— or on some of us— 
in full force. ,, , . ••, j 
To attack with less than full force would be suicide pure and 
simple. One way and another it still looks as though the Russian 
main fleet lying inside the harbour at Libau is the real controlling 
agencv. It is probably no exaggeration (wild as it may seem 
to-day) to say that the key of the whole situation lies m the 
Baltic and with the Russian fleet. It sounds like incoherent 
prophecy ; but if anyone considers the question carefully, it must 
be obvious that if Germany concentrates against us she must 
leave the bulk of her sea coast (mostly Baltic) undefended 
against an unbeaten Russian force. 
Her coastline in our direction is small and heavily defended. 
In the Baltic it is large and very lightly defended. 
In the present state of affairs it is no more safe for Germany 
to abandon the Baltic than it would bo for us to desert the North 
Sea. Unless Germany is prepared to take abnormal risks she 
dare not attack us in force so long as the Russians are a " fleet 
in being " in the Baltic. Hence the presence of German warships 
in the Aaland Islands. 
It is dan;;crous to prophecy where Germany is concerned, 
but strategically she must defeat the Russian main fleet in the 
Baltic before attempting anything serious in the Xorth Sea. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
The Adriatic continues to be the theatre of vague mmour 
and little fact to go on. So far as can be gathered, recent events 
have been very slightly in Austria's favour to date of writing 
[October 26th). We hear of submarines which have moved 
against the Franco-British force oft Cattaro ; the retreat of that 
force and the sinking of two or more submarines. Little 
or nothing is officially confirmed, and I am inclined to fancy 
that in the matter of the sunk submarines it is a case of " the 
wish being the father to the thought." A submarine stands 
very little chance of injury by gunfire from a big ship. 
The retirement is probable. It is certainly logical. There 
ia no hurry about Cattaro ; no object in risking anj'thing. The 
Austrians Lave but eleven submarines all told, and some of 
these are not really effective. Six ia nearer the number in the 
fighting line. The Allies can easily afford to delay matters for 
a month if necessary till these six are destroyed, as they are 
bound to be if they have to continue an unsupported campaign. 
Once more I would insist that as the weapon of the weaker power 
the submarine is merely a temporary weapon. It is really the 
Kcajpon of the slroiu/er power, and no matter what losses wo 
may suffer, I, for one, am absolutely convinced that long before the 
war is over this fact will be demonstrated. The stronger power 
has always a numerical superiority in every hind of arm ; and the 
real or problematical advantage of any given weapon is discounted 
accordingly. Austrian submarines may delay the fate of Cattaro, 
but that is the utmost which they can effect. 
THE NORTH SE.\. 
Ecliittd official reports of the Heligoland affair of August 
2Sth have now been issued. They add little to what we already 
knew, or had surmised. That little, however, is very important. 
At the time of the affair I stated in these notes that in 
"Act II" we believed that we were getting the worst of it. 
This is very apparent from Admiral Beatty'a report. 
For the rest, the feature of prime importance is the persistent 
reference to a " large four funnelled cruiser." This ship was 
Bubsequently reported sunk and what not ; hat none of the ships 
cjKialhj reported by either side a3 sur.h had four junnch. From 
which we must assumo that cither the liwn or Yorck was out— 
m any case that the Germans were out in strength— possibly 
their battle-cruisers uwro not far off and thcii lattlo fleet no 
Ver/ great distance jwaj. 
It now seems absolutely established that the Germans 
were in stronger force than was to have been anticipated in 
the ordinary way, and that the entire issue rested upon the 
fact that Admiral Beatty took risks and chanced everything 
to support our light division, and that on this and thb alone 
our success rests. , 
^ii9e 
rCUTLj 
^^^ 
h 
.Aretliusa. cmdL 
O BRITISH 
TO ILLCSTEATH VERT AP1T.0XIMATEI<T TITB TOSITION Olf AFFAIBS 
IN THB EAELIEB STAGES OF THB BIQUT OF HELIGOLAND BATTLH. 
A brief summary of all the official reports pieced together 
ia as follows : — ■ 
About seven a.m. some of our destroyers, led by the 
Arethusa, sighted and chased a German torpedo-boat destroyer. 
An hour later our division founi that it had been led into a trap, 
and had rather a bad time from German cruisers — the Arethusa 
being the target of a very superior force. Coincident with this, 
our first flotilla hammered an entirely different German division, 
and sank one German (F 187). 
Subsequently, all our torpedo-boat destroyers and the 
Arethusa seem to have joined up and nothing in particular 
happened until eleven a.m., when the Germans appeared in 
superior force — the position being roughly that they had got 
far the better of the affair. So tar as I can read thinjis — their 
DioaraiTL IT 
" <-/ ' 
att Lisht c^ 
1 
British. T.B-D. ajtcLAretkiLsa. 
British. 
Light . 
Cruisers \ 
I Oecinajx scibiiuaiiiijes , 
k— ... .... 
.*...*.• — .*.« 
/ 
BriXLsli Battle Cruisers 
□ BRITISH 
GERMAN 
TO ILLUSTBATH THB APPEOXIIIATH POSmo:sS WTIEX, BUT FOB 
ADIUSAL BEAl-nr'a ADVANCB THttO0QH THE SirBMARINES, THB 
BKITISH rOECH WOULD HATH BEEN ANNnTILATED. 
armoured cruisers entered into the fray, and absolute defeat 
was assumed to be our portion. 
Our position at tliat lime appears to have been very near 
" defeat accepted." On the other hand, the Gcrmsns having 
lost F 187 and having been hammered more than we- were aware 
of, were ignorant of the advantage which they had secured, and 
Ii» 
