LAND AND WATEE 
Kovember 7, 1914 
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railway which runs towards Lyck from the fortress of 
Oso-wiecs, and so into the heart of Prussia. 
Why do we find such a disposition so far east- 
ward and to the north of the South Polish field, 
in which Germany has need of eveiy man she can 
spare ? 
The question needs an answer the more from the 
fact that a fidl retreat of the Gennans in the south 
from Eussian Poland must inevitably, sooner or later, 
involve the retirement of the smaller German forces 
from East Prussia. Not only must it inevitably 
involve their retirement, but as Bussia continues to 
call up its reserves of men (very much larger than 
those at the disposal of Germany) there is a certitude 
that this German force, if it remains upon the Eussian 
frontier in front of Lyck and Magrabowa, will be 
taken in reverse and wUl be in danger of isolation. 
It is true that a movement thus coming from the 
south over the Eussian frontier into East Pi-ussia 
directly is hampered by the long region of lakes 
which lies along that frontier, and of marshes, the 
defiles between which are all strongly held and 
fortified. But long before the Vistula is reached this 
region ends ; the Eussians can cross in force into West 
Prussia, and a German force thus isolated on the 
eastern frontier would be in grave pcril. 
This does not mean that we should look to the 
isolation and destruction of such a force. What it 
means is that the moment the peril begins to threaten 
that force will have to retire. Why then does it 
remain fixed at such a distance from the retirement of 
its much more numerous brethren ? There is no such 
Eussian force in front of it as could join the main 
Eussian forces southward with much effect. It dis- 
poses of every facility for getting round to reinforce 
the main German bodies in the soiith. Yet it not 
only remains in force upon this frontier, but in 
sufficient force to attemjjt the counter-offensive. It 
has indeed made that attenij)t with violence during 
the last few days. 
The answer to that question is a political one, 
and in that answer we may discover much that wUl 
explain the next phases of this war in the West as 
well as in the East. 
It is of solid and serious advantage to the 
Germans — an advantage which perhaps they ex- 
aggerate but which is of very high moral value — that 
the war has hitherto been fought off German soil. 
What it means for a war to be fought upon the 
enemy's soU, France and Belgium well know. And 
for a few moments Germany knew it, when the 
Eussian ii-ruption into East Prussia, though pursued 
but for a few miles, involved £20,000,000 worth 
of material damage, and was sufficient to throw 
such alarm into Berlin as produced the heavy reiu- 
foi"cements of two months ago, and the German victory 
at Tannenburg. That the enemy's armies, though 
only occupying a corner of France, can yet hold and 
ruin that comer, is something; and the whole tone of 
the English people at this moment depends upon the 
fact that English soU is as yet inviolate. The 
voluntary system depends upon that, and a hundred 
other things. 
But even more important than the effect upon 
the enemy of fighting ujoon his soil, is the effect upon 
the German population of the Geri)ian armies being 
able to maintain this boast. It is the whole German 
theory of this war, that it must be fought with every 
available man and gun and horse in this, its first 
phase ; that if victory is not now assured it wiU never 
be recovered. To procure that effort — which, as we 
know by the new levies attacking us in Flanders, is 
far more than the ordinary effort of a full mobilisation; 
it is the staking of a whole nation upon the cast — the 
immunity of German soil is essential. Nor can we 
yet judge of what a revolution there will be in the 
moral condition of Gennany when it is Gennan towns 
that burn and are destroyed, German civilians that 
are shot in batches for spying or for informing the 
enemy, or even as hostages, and German goods that 
are sequestrated to the advantage of the invader. 
Meanwhile, we may be certain that this political 
consideration will fetter German strategy more and 
more as the campaign proceeds. 
Now, it is to maintain German soil immune that this 
" siegework " is being mainfained at the known cost of 
ultimate peril upon the frontier between East Prussia 
and Eussia. The labyrinth of lakes and marshes 
helps the effort ; but even if it were open country and 
needing far more troops, that effort would still be 
maintained. And it is worth prophesying that the 
retirem^ent from the East Prussian frontier wUl not 
come until the very last moment, when its peril of 
being cut off is extreme, perhaps not even then. 
We may prepare to hear, then, of an immovable 
situation all along this front, until the main German 
bodies in Southern Poland have retreated much 
further than they have already done. 
B.— THE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN 
POLAND. 
I have said that the operations in Southern 
Poland should be divided for purposes of analysis into 
two limbs ; A — B, the limb wliich is concerned with 
the middle Vistula, and in wliich the Germans are 
retreating from that stream, pursued by the Eussians, 
and B — C, the limb along the Eiver San. 
Of these two the first is by far the most important. 
Upon it will ultimatel}'- depend, for reasons which I 
shall jiroceed to show, the fate of the Avliole campaign 
in the East. The Austro-German object in that 
campaign, so far as the main operations \ipoa the 
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