LAND AND WATER 
November 7, 1914 
stream, altliongli sucli crossings had been actually 
accomiilished in more tlian one i)lace. 
Since this throwing hack of the line in the first 
Russian successes, the Russian pursuit has been 
methodical and continuous. It is ridiculous to use 
the word " rout " of the German retreat, which has 
been orderly, and in which everything essential 
has been sa^ed, which apparently has lost no very 
large body in prisoners compared with its siae, and 
which still maintains a perfectly intact formation. 
But though it is an orderly retreat, it is a retreat 
none the less, and one wdiich renders more and more 
certain as it proceeds the fate of the campaign in 
the East. 
It is here that the importance of the fighting 
iipon, aiid afterwards west of, the middle Vistula 
appears, and the subordination of the efEort further 
cast along the San to this main effort of the Austro- 
Germans. For, as the Austro-Germans fall back 
westward and south-westward, it becomes clear that 
the eastern effort cannot be prolonged. The line is 
still intact, and beyond Sandomir is continued up the 
San Valley ; but all the noi-th-western portion of it is 
bending backwards and further back towards the 
south, and the prolongation of such a strain upon the 
main forces of the enemy by the Eussians must 
involve the withdrawal of the Austrian forces opera- 
tine: further south to the east. If these were to 
maintain their positions (they can hardly hope to 
advance — and even advance would be of no value) the 
line would ultimately find itself bent into a bow from 
Cracow, along the Vistula, and then up the San. It 
would not even be covering Silesia — the keeping of 
the Eussians out of which, much more than the 
keeping of them out of Galicia, is the prime object 
of tlie German Empire in this field. One may put 
the matter diagramatically thus ; — 
If the shaded portion S represents Silesia, then 
the Russian pressure has already bent back the 
northern portion of the Austro-German line and 
is bending it back further still. From "W X P 
("Warsaw, Sandomir — at X — Pi-zemysl), which w^as 
occupied nearly three weeks ago, the Austro-German 
line is bent back to L X P (Lodz, Sandomir, Przemysl). 
Should it be bent back to C X P (Cracow, Sandomir, 
Przemysl) Silesia w^ould be uncovered, and any Russian 
success between X and P (the Russians can throw 
their perpetually arriving reinforcements where they 
choose) would be not only the r«in of Silesia but of 
the whole Austro-German line. It seems certain 
therefore that such a line as A B, falling back again 
to A D, will be the result of the Russian pressure. 
But in order to maintain such a line the Austrian 
eastern advances in Galicia, now holding X P, will 
have to fall back first to B, and then to D. 
It is therefore upon this continual advance of the 
Russians from the middle Vistula south-westward, and 
the as continual retreat of the Germans and Austrians 
before them in this region, that the fate of the 
campaign depends ; for it involves with it an idtimate 
retirement from the San and from East Galicia as well. 
How far this retirement has proceeded at the 
moment of writing (Tuesday evening) the Russian 
official news informs us. The main German bodies 
are out of Lodz, though we have no news as yet that 
this town is occupied by the cavahy of the Russian 
pursuit. Piotrokow is apparently entii-ely abandoned 
by the enemy, and already occupied by the Russian 
advanced cavalry. So is Opocsno. So is Osowiecs, 
and apparently even Opatow, though here there has 
been strong resistance. Sandomir is stiU the pivot of 
this great retreat. 
The whole thing singularly resembles the corres- 
ponding German failure in the West, generally called 
the Battle of the Marne — with Lodz to stand for 
Soissons and Sandomir for the pivot at Verdun. But 
there is this difference : that the marching wing or 
exti'eme of the retreating enemy's line has had to go 
more than double the distance it had to go in France, 
and, much more important, with the inability of the 
enemy so far to make a stand. For there is this great 
difference between the German retreat through 
Russian Poland from in front of Warsaw and the 
German retreat through north-east France from in 
front of Palis — that the pursuers greatly outnumber 
the 2)ui-sued, and that the numbers of the pm-suers are 
increasing every day. "VVlien von Kluck turned back 
from in front of Paris on the discovery of Joffre's 
reserves, he carried with him indeed the whole 
Gemian line as far as Verdun. It all had to fall back. 
But the troops that pressed it back ^through Chateau 
Thierry and Vitry v»'ere less in number than tha 
troops they were pursuing. It was possible for the 
majority that was retreating to spare men for the 
preparation of a position, to rally there, and to begin 
a prolonged resistance. A corresponding resistance 
has not yet taken place in Poland, and it is the whole 
object of this methodical Russian pursuit, compara- 
tively small as its results in men and material captui-ed 
have yet been, to prevent such a resistance. Only the 
futm-e will show whether it has been found possible 
to prevent it or no. 
Meanwhile an exceedingly important point, upon 
which judgment must be held in suspense, is, whether 
i7i this pursuit the Russians have managed to divide those 
tvhom they are pursuing into two separate bodies. ^Ji 
they have, a very great deal has been accom^jlished. 
Certain unofficial telegi'ams maintain that they have 
done so ; but I cannot, from a study of the map, see 
that the trick has really been done, ^^^lat that 
separation w^ould mean, and how it might be effected, 
may be grasped from the next diagram. 
Here is an army in two portions, A and B, 
retreatmg in front of another army, also divided into 
two portions, E and F. It has right across its retreat 
an obstacle M N, which separates its two portions 
A and B. It has further two great avenues of com- 
munication along which its retreat is facilitated, 
(1) and (la), both leading to C. But from (1) a 
secondary avenue of communication (2) diverges 
towards K. A — ^B is divided by the natural obstacle 
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