November 7, 1914 
LAND AND WATEE 
M N into two portions, and so for tliat matter is tlie 
victorious pursuer E — F. But tliis obstacle comes to 
an end at M. Now, if botli portions of A — B — the 
A portion and the B portion — stick to the two main 
lines of retreat (1) and (la) and are able to get back 
behind M to the level of the dotted line Gr H L, they 
wiU join hands again, and from that point onwards 
tlie two avenues of retreat converging towards C will 
serve them jointly. If, on the other hand, the A 
portion tends to slip off after reaching II along the 
secondary avenue of retreat too, towards K, and to 
take up a position such as that at Q, and to continue 
its retreat thence toward K, while B pursues its 
original following of the main avenue of retreat, and 
stands at P marching towards C, Q will get more and 
more separated fi-om the southern portion P as the 
retreat proceeds. The more the retreat proceeds the 
wider the gap wiU get, until at last the pursuers E F 
wiU be able to step in between through the gap, 
and the position will be like that in the following 
diagram with Q and P finally broken asunder by 
E F, which can deal with each of them in detad. 
E F would have done sti-ategicaUy what is done 
tactically in a battle when you break your enemy's 
line. 
It wiU be asked why should the A portion of 
the retreating enemy be so foolish as to go along the 
secondary line (la) until it gets to Q and is thus 
separated from its southern portion B, which has got 
to P. The answer is that it may either have been 
shepherded or edged outwards by the superior mobility 
and cleverness of E pursuing it, and have been got 
away north before it reached the end of the obstacle : 
or that a political desire to protect some piece of 
tcrritojy, such as the shaded portion S may have lured 
A away from his companion B in the middle of the 
retreat when both bodies were approaching the erifl of 
the obstacle that separated them. Only reasons of 
this soi-t, strategic or political, could compel A to be 
so foolish as to remain out of touch with B one 
moment longer than the obstacle M N kept him so 
separate. 
Now, apply this diagram to the sketch map 
No. 3. The two separated retreating bodies A and B 
are the Germans north and south of the marshy lower 
course of the Eiver Pilica, which is the obstacle M N. 
A is the Germans lying to the north of that marshy 
stream and just beaten back fi'om the line Warsaw- 
up-Vistula — mouth of Pilica to the line. Skierniewice 
— New Misslo. B is the Germans who have retreated 
from the Vistula to a line passing through Eadom south 
of the Pilica : that is the position of rather more than 
a week ago. The Pilica ceases to be a serious obstacle 
at about the point marked M on this same sketch 
map 3. The two great avenues of retreat (1) and (La) 
are the main railway lines from Eadom to Cracow 
and from Warsaw to Cracow. The subsidiary diverg- 
ent avenue of retreat is the railway line branching off 
from the first through Lodz to Kalisz. The shaded 
area S, the defence of which might lure the retreat 
into dividing into two bodies, is Silesia. Another 
lure which might tempt the northern part of the 
German line to go directly westward while the rest 
went southward, would be the opportunity of defend- 
ing the line of the Eiver Warta, on which a good deal 
of labour in entrenching has already been spent. It 
is therefore quite on the cards that the German retreat 
might get split into two bodies such as are repre- 
sented by the dotted bodies X and Y on map 3. 
These bodies would, of course, liy to keep in touch 
with each other; but it would be the object of 
the Eussian pursuit, as the angle between them 
approached breaking point, to push in and separate 
them. 
Now certain unofiicial telegrams from the 
Eussians claim that they, in their pursuit, have 
virtually done this, and that while one body is 
inevitably pinned to the two great railway lines 
that go south-west towards Galicia and Cracow, 
the other is already depending upon the line 
going due west to Kalisz and 
by the 
to Berlin. 
shortest 
There 
communique the 
of the enemy 
is " of enormous 
road into German Poland, and so 
is even in the official Eussian 
vague phrase that the retreat 
north and south of the Pilica 
importance." 
But, I repeat, we have not yet any evidence 
that the separation of the retreating Austro- 
German body into two has really taken place ; and 
such a separation would be so disastrous, it would be 
so much the object of the German commanders to 
prevent it at any expense, that we ought not to 
believe it has taken place until the very best of proof 
has been offered us. Of that as yet we have none. 
IVhat we do know is that the German retreat from 
the Vistula, following upon the German retreat in front 
of Warsaw, is quite definite and final, and that the 
Germans will not retrieve it. They may entrench 
again and fight a whole defensive position as they 
have done in the west ; but they have lost their first 
objective, and have been foiled in their original plan 
of campaign. They can no longer reinforce the 
West from the East without suffering what 
they most dread — the presence of the enemy upon 
their own sod. As that enemy continually increases 
in numbers, his presence upon their soil may yet be 
afflicting them before the fuU winter sets in a month, 
hence. 
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