LAND AND WATEB 
November 7, 1914 
Bixschotte is one srach town, and north of it the 
flooded countiy forbids German action. Poelcapelle 
is another such town ; Paschendaele is another ; 
tCPERINGHE 
v. -A 
•aAlIXJUL" 
Bcccalaere another ; Zenwode another ; Hollebeke 
another, and Messines the hist of this series. Beyond 
the ideal north-and-south line which unites Bixschotte, 
Ypres, and Messines — that is, to the west of such an 
ideal line — there are no German forces. Of the 
villages mentioned a little above, Paschendaele is 
the most eastern point of the salient which it is 
the German business to reduce and flatten back on 
to Ypres. 
The main German effort in the pui'suance of this 
task (the effort on to which they have put their best 
troops and no resei-ves) has come from the south. 
There lies here a belt of wooded land. The wood is 
not continuous. It consists in a number of separate 
plantations and parks, many private houses and 
gardens, which often join, or nearly join. Special 
effort has been made by the enemy upon the three 
points Zenwode, Hollebeke, and Messines which are 
on the line of these woods and slight rises. These 
three villages were all at one moment — last Friday or 
Saturday — in the possession of the enemy, and it v,-as 
at this moment pcrliaps that Ypres was most gravely 
threatened. 
Whether Zenwode is recovered or not at the 
moment of wi'iting we have no information, but 
Hollebeke was retaken two days ago. The fate of 
Messines appears to have been tbis. It was first taken 
at the bayonet, largely, we are told, through the efforts 
of a Territorial unit — the London Scottish — who suffered 
very heavily and very gloriously. It was next partially 
lost, and appears to have been during the course of 
Monday a scene of fierce struggle. For the final nev.s 
on Sunday from both sides — Gennan and French — 
give us that impression, the French telling us that 
"' part of the village " is occupied by the enemy, the 
Germans claiming the capture of the Aillage. 
It is obvious from the map that the line which 
the Allies will make for, as the first outpost of an 
advance from Ypres when the counter-offensive shall 
be taken against the enemy, is the line of the Eiver 
Lys. So far that nan-ow, sluggish and winding 
stream, between Messines and Lille, is in German 
hands. 
There is, therefore, a double importance attacliing 
to this struggle for Ypres, and for the projection into 
the enemy's positions held by the Allies all round the 
east of Ypres. A German success will pave the way, 
if it is not achieved at too great an expense of men, 
for pressing more heavily than ever the attack upon 
the critical point of La Bassee. But if the Allies 
maintain a successful advance, the occupation of Ldle 
by the enemy will be near its end, and of course, as a 
consequence, a retirement of the Germans from all 
the La Bassee country, and the end of this very 
critical struggle. 
For the issue, we can, at the moment of writing 
(Tuesday evening) only wait. We s])all have in this 
struggle exactly what we had between Dixmude and 
Nieuport ; the enemy bringing up much larger 
numbers than the defensive at the moment commands, 
numbers composed in part of first-rate material, in 
part of the new levies which are formed of material 
less and less excellent as the slaughter proceeds. 
There will be a much lai'gcr loss on the side of this 
determined attack than on the side of the defence, 
and if the attack be thrust back that factor of final 
victory upon which the whole French strategy of 
reserve is counting — the exhaustion of the enemy — 
will come into the field of Europe as a whole, and 
bring the campaigns, not only in the west but in the 
east, into quite another phase. 
What this factor of exhaustion may be at the 
present stage of the war I will attempt to estimate 
U2)on a later page ; meanwhile there is little more to 
be said of the campaign in France. 
There has been a little j^rogress in the Vosges, 
and the passes into Alsace are now commanded by the 
French. In the old line of trenches of the Aisne, 
where forces very much thinned face each other across 
the slopes of the chalky hills on the right bank of 
that river, there has been a sharp little German 
success carrying a local advance almost down to the 
stream near Vailly, while the French have got 
almost abreast of Noyon to the west, and are occupy- 
ing or standing immediately in front of Trecy-le-Val. 
Both matters are so far too small to be w^orthy of 
special comment or illustration. Neither is the dead- 
lock in the Argonne appreciably advanced upon either 
side at the moment of ^viiting. It is still through the 
Wood of the Storks (La Grurie) that the German attack 
on the French troops takes place north of the Verdun 
road, and it is still fi'om the Wood of La Chalade, 
south of it, that corresponding French counter-attacks 
arc made. There is one last point that is worthy of 
attention and of a brief analysis, and this is the 
menace to the Egyptian frontier if, as seems now 
certain, Turkey shall come into the game. 
THE EGYPTIAN MARCH. 
An attack delivered from Syria against Egypt 
depends upon two obvious factors— the desert and the 
Suez Canal. Unless transports are ready to convey 
troops and munitions across the MediteiTanean, unless 
their troops and munitions have been long prepared 
and unless the eastern ^MediteiTanean is at the same 
time empty of French and English men-of-war, there 
is only the land route. The ability or inability of the 
enemy to traverse the desert and to overcome the 
obstacle of the Suez Canal sum up the whole 
business. 
It is perhaps the canal which should be first 
remarked. It is a continuous obstacle from sea to sea 
of a minimum breadth comjjarable to a broad inland 
river such as the Lower Mouse ; everywhere deep, of 
course, equally of course nowhere bridged and nowhere 
affected by a strong cun-ent. The problem of crossing^ 
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