November 7, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
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AKABA 
it, therefore, is the commonplace problem of crossing, 
vinder the protection of one's artillery, a broad but 
sluggish unfordable stream over pontoon bridges. 
Unless superior artOlery is present upon one's own 
bank to dominate the artillery of the enemy, such a 
crossing cannot be effected. If it is present the cross- 
ing can be effected. The problem is further simplified 
from the facts that there are no heights or gun 
positions upon either side. It is simply a question of 
having the larger guns, better served, and, under their 
protection, effecting a crossing. If the proposed in- 
vasion has not that superiority the obstacle is absolute ; 
if it has, the obstacle is clearly negotiable. Save 
for one other important and quite exceptional 
factor. 
The Suez Canal — tinlike an inland water-way — 
is accessible to ships carrying heavy guns. That is 
where it differs from your broad river to which it is 
the parallel. Similarly it is bridgeable, as an inland 
river rarely is, from the presence of large ships within 
it ; for ships can be slung across it. 
Much more important however, than the obstacle 
which is the strategic frontier of Egypt is the Desert 
across which all land approach to that country must 
be made. This desei-t is the Isthmus and Peninsula 
called after the group of mountains which contains, 
towards the south of the Peninsula, the traditional 
peak of Sinai. The high mountains, I say, lie in the 
Peninsular portion of this bit of land, between the 
Gulf of Akaba and the Gulf of Suez. The northern, 
or continental portion, though crossed (especially at 
the north-east) by ranges of hills is not mountainous. 
The whole region is however desert. There is 
hardly any water. Such water as there is confines all 
travel to two tracks and to two tracks only, and the 
supply of water is, nowadays, very limited upon each. 
These two tracks are the Sea Boad — which is that 
taken by all the gi'eat historical invaders of Syi'ia 
from Egypt, and of Egypt from Syria — and the lladj 
or Pilff rim's Road from Suez to Akaba, which was the 
road followed by the Mohammedan pilgrims (especially 
in the old days before steam traffic came to change 
the conditions of the pilgrimage) on their way from 
Egypt to Mecca. The northern or sea road after 
going down the coast of Palestine through country 
increasingly dry, crosses the conventional frontier 
of modern Egypt at Rafa and is already under 
desert conditions at El Arish. From El Arish 
to the town of El Kantara or The Bridge, is a 
matter of over 100 miles. It suffers as a road 
of invasion towards Egypt from two disabilities. 
First, the earlier or eastern part of the march is 
exposed to fire from the sea. 
The second difficulty is, of course, the difficulty 
attaching to all this district — the difficulty of water. 
It is much more than a day's march, it is over 30 
miles, from El Arish to the next supply of water — 
by which distance all danger from the sea has dis- 
appeared, as the road is by this time protected by 
wide shoal lagoons which stretch between it and the 
Mediterranean. This water (found in a single well 
with no great depth of water) is at the point of El 
Maza ; another equally long stretch — far more than a 
day's rharching — takes one to a much better supply 
of water at Bir-el-Abd. A long day's march further 
west again is Katieh ; and from this point the 
chief difficulties of the desert march are overcome. 
There is a sufficient supply of water at Katieh not only 
in existing wells, but obtainable by digging. The 
remaining march to El Kantara is indeed much more 
than a day's going : but the supply of water obtain- 
able at Kateih and the presence, once the Suez Canal is 
reached, of the fresh water from the Nile Canal along- 
side of it, disposes of the main difficulty. If a force 
can reach Katieh it can reach the Canal. The fresh 
water supply at El Kantara, however, is controllable 
by those who possess the further bank of the Canal. 
And indeed in all this problem of the march thi-ougli 
desert on to Egypt one has to consider the fact that 
the obstacle, when one reaches it, is still passing 
through desert land. A force not too large might 
supply itself with water at the various points (Napoleon 
did so with a force indeed much smaller than should 
be required for any operation against Egypt to-day, 
but he was going the other way into Syria, and in his 
time the obstacle of the Canal did not exist). But 
such a force, though it had managed to cross the 
desert, if it should fail at the obstacle for any 
appreciable time would find the difficulty of continued 
water supply insuperable. 
The march on Egypt by this route is, therefore, 
if feasible at all, a matter for a comparatively small 
force, especially so long as that force finds the sea 
under the control of its enemies. 
The southern route from Akaba to Suez, though 
everywhere perfectly good going, is very much worse 
provided with water. Opposite Akaba, from the 
palm gi-ove of Tabah, after a sharp climb for some 
2,000 feet, you are on a flat hard plateau running 
directly in the direction of Suez betvv^een low bills, 
and the Pilgrim's Road is marked faMy clearly 
upon this hard plateau. 
At what is very nearly the central point between 
Akaba and Suez you get the fu-st reserve of water. 
A modern force upon the march would not reach that 
reserve until the end of the third day at the very 
earliest. There are cisterns to hold a great pro^asion 
of water ; whether these are, or now can be, kept filled 
I can find no authority to tell me. The remainder of 
the way to Suez there is but one point of Avater, the 
Well of Moses, " Ayun Mousa," a short march 
before Suez. It is evident that this second marching 
route is much harder than the first, and I believe that 
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