LAND AND WATER 
November 7, 1914 
historically no great force has ever taken it, though 
there may have been Arab movements of which I am 
ignorant ; but the Eoman, the Egyptian of Pagan 
times, the Assyrian, the Greek, and the Frenchman 
have all chosen the sea route. 
In aU this analysis of the difficulty in approach- 
ing Egypt fi-om Syria (and the Akaba route has 
become the more difficult as I vnite from the now 
reported destruction of the Akaba stores and fort by 
a JJritish man-of-war), it must be remembered that 
rapid modern transport would, for small numbers, 
have no such problems to face such as I have 
mentioned. On either route right up to the neigh- 
bourliood of the canal petrol traffic could move at will, 
and cany such armament as petrol will carry within 
a day for light rehicles, within forty-eight hours for 
heavy ones. But petrol vehicles, save in very great 
numbers, though they may seize important points 
ahead of an army, will not convey an ai-my. 
I win conclude my notes this week by a thorough 
examination of a subject on which I have not yet 
touched, or touched but superficially, and which is yet 
of prime importance to the judgment of the campaign. 
I mean, the factor of rjcastage. At what rate is the 
enemy losing men ? The reply to such a question is of 
vital consequence to the future — for other things being 
equal, numbers are the deciding factor in war, and to 
disarm your op^jonent — no matter how — in greater 
numbers than he disarms you is the tdtunate end of 
strategy. 
ESTIMATE OF WASTAGE. 
This factor of wastage has three important 
healings upon one's judgment of a militaiy situation. 
First, a comparison between the wastage of one 
side and the other gives us a record of relative strength 
at various moments in the campaign. It is the only 
way of establishing such a record. We know at the 
beginning of a campaign how the numbers stand. 
We can only judge by some estimate of comparative 
wastage how they continue to stand as the campaign 
progresses. 
Secondly, the rate of wastage of both parties 
combined give one some power to judge the approach 
of exhaustion. Such figures are, though but a vague 
indication, yet some indication as to the maximum 
possible length of a campaign, or at any rate its 
maximum possible length on the scale to which it was 
planned and begun. After a certain proportion of 
waste upon both sides, though the campaign may 
drift on, it will not be what it was in its first fury. 
Thirdly, the proportion of wastage (and this is 
the most important point) is also an indication of 
success or failure according to the type of campaign or 
action which is being fought. For instance, any one 
taking the losses by wounds, death, and capture of 
Napoleon's advance into Kussia in 1812, and con- 
trasting it with the coiTesponding wastage upon the 
Ilussian side, would have had little in the mere 
figures to guide him as to the probable result of the 
whole movement. But when those figures were made 
alive by a consideration of the nature of the cam- 
paign, when one remembered the steaddy increasing 
numerical strength of the Eussians, the immense and 
as steadily increasing length of communications upon 
which the French depended, the bad roads, the late- 
ness of the season, &c., then one could compare. 
One could say that if the wastage had been nearly 
equal upon both sides, that was for the French a very 
bad omen indeed. 
Take a converse case : The immense wastage of 
the Gennan armies in 1870-71. No one marking those 
figures with any judgment would have thought the case 
of Gennany any the worse, at any rate up to November, 
1870. She was attacking to win at once. She was 
undergoing a veiy heavy strain with that direct 
2)ur])ose. She had undertaken many very severe 
marches. She was fighting late in the year. She 
had, after the fii'st few weeks, no regulars against 
her. While she was fighting regulars she had 
sacrificed men without counting because she thought 
or know that the blow could be driven home at once. 
But if the French had succeeded, as they so nearly 
did, in pinning the Gennan effort in the late winter, 
then the later figures of German wastage would have 
been very significant indeed. 
Bearing these three points in mind as to the way 
in which wastage is an indication as to the trend of a 
campaign, let us try to get at approximate figures. 
Our basis for such a calculation is very crude and 
insufficient. We have to guide us nothing but the 
official Prussian lists of killed, wounded, and missing, 
tlie official German statements of the prisoners they 
hold, a rough — and now old — unofficial estimate of 
the German prisoners in France, British ofiicial and 
unofficial statements of loss in the British contingent, 
some knowledge of the type of fighting upon each 
side — and, for the rest, nothing but the apphcation 
of common-sense to all these fragments. Never- 
theless such an application will lead to appreciable 
results. 
Let us begin with the Gennan account of their 
own wastage. The lists of which we have hitherto 
had notice in this country (1) apply to Prussian losses 
alone and (2) cany us no fiu-ther than the middle of 
September. 
These lists give 36,000 killed, 160,000 wounded, 
and 55,000 missing. 
To correct these official figures with regard to 
Prussia we have no counter check save the unofficial 
French estimate of 65,000 German prisoners in France 
somewhat earlier in September. This one check, 
however, is not without its value, for it corroborates, 
roughly, the Prussian figures of missing. For the 
difference may well be German reticence in counting 
as certainly missing many who may yet (it is hoped) 
appear, and captives not notified at the moment their 
lists were made. But though we have no counter 
statistics with which to check these Prussian lists, we 
can apply to them a general criticism wluch should 
enable us to arrive at tolerably accurate inferior and 
superior limits. 
For the principles of this criticism let us first 
remember that it is the characteristic of German 
official statements in this war at once to suppress news 
which the German Government happens to think 
weakening to its cause, and to be singularly accurate 
in the news it does publish. 
It is very important, in this connection, that we 
should not confu.se the various types of information 
furnished by German agency to the world. There 
is plenty of German falsehood, some of it fantastic. 
But the falsehood is calculated and organised. There 
are, as it were, zones of information. The Germau 
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