LAND AND WATER 
November 14, 1914 
offensive following upon their defeats in the beginning 
of September ; and that eonnter-offensive was made 
possible by the withdrawal of Russian forces north- 
wai-d to meet the great main German attack upon the 
middle Vistula. At first it looked as though this 
effort ujwu the San was going to be successful. It 
had (supposing the German plan had come off, sup})os- 
ing Warsaw had been taken and the middle Vistula 
held) a high strategic value. The forcing of the line 
of the San, the relief of Przemysl, and the threatening 
of Lemberg would obviously have tuinod the Russian 
south end or left ; and this Russian left was at first 
weak from the withdrawal northward of the forces I 
have named. 
But Russian reinforcements were perpetually com- 
ing u]) upon the San from the interior, and at the same 
time the German effort upon the Vistula broke down. 
The moment it broke down it was strategically necessary 
for the Austrian forces that had been trying to cross 
the San (and had in some jjlaces succeeded), and 
had also successfully pushed forward across the 
Carpathians along the arrows A — A towards Lemberg, 
to fall back at once into line with the Austro-German 
retreat to the north. For some reason or other this 
retirement was not effected ; at any rate it was not 
effected with sufficient rapidity. There were Austrians 
still at Jaroslav and roughly along the line B — ^B at a 
moment when the Russian advance beyond the Vistula 
had already reached the line C — C, which is that of 
the River Nidisca. It is here that the capital 
importance of the capture of Sandomir by the Russians 
last Tuesday week is apparent. It gave them a chance 
of cutting off a portion at least of tiie Austrian forces. 
The now lai'gely increased Russian bodies on the San 
made good their crossings at Nisko and Rudnik and 
before Leheisk. By last Sunday they had got into 
Jaroslav, and it is fairly certain that they have already 
completely reinvested Przemysl. Their main line in 
Galicia was on Monday last less than 100 miles from 
Cracow and their cavaliy in Russian Poland less than 
30 jniles from that fortress. 
Further, there has been on this front a real 
success in the way of harrying the Austrian retreat. 
The official communique gives 12,000 jDrisoners taken 
along the San and, though apparently no guns, a 
certain number of maxims. 
I should here perhaps explain to the reader why 
I have not counted either, in describing the retreat of 
the Austro-Germans from the Vistula as orderly, 
Eeuter's report of nearly 10,000 men taken prisoners by 
the Russians, with forty guns, or the report from Rome 
of 200 guns taken on the San with 25,000 prisoners. 
My reason is, not that these accounts may not 
be true or based upon truth, but simply that they are 
no part of the official communiques. News received 
from any other source than the official communiques 
must, for the pm-poses of an accurate judgment, be 
closely checked. Sometimes it vividly illustrates some 
hypothesis upon which there are other converging 
lines of proof ; sometimes, by some accident, it betrays 
a useful and unexpected bit of knowledge. But mere 
rumours of losses like these should always be looked 
at with reserve and compared with the declarations of 
the General Staff. And all that we have from the 
Russian General Staff at the moment of writing is 
the announcement of 12,000 Austrian prisoners ui)on 
the San, with no mention of field pieces or howitzers. 
German forces there are strictly on the defensive; 
the Russian forces are evidently increasing, and the 
frontier has been just crossed at the point where the 
main international line cuts it. 
(B) The main operations in the South have gone 
steadily in favour of the Russians, and while there 
has been, apparently, no cutting of the chief German 
line north of the Vistula, it is possible that certain 
of the Au.strian forces in Galicia will be cut off from 
that chief line. 
Meanwhile [B (1)] the main Austro-German force, 
which has been retreating through Russian-Poland, 
will be compelled immediately to give battle, probably 
well behind the line of the Warta and nearer the 
line of the frontier, on peril of losing Silesia. This 
main enony force in Poland is still intact and has 
retreated with success, though with rapidity. 
But [B (2)] the corresponding Austrian effort 
along tlie San, which was the prolongation of tlie line 
through Russian-Poland, has also failed, with less 
order in its retreat. ]\Iany prisoners have been lost ; 
and there seems a probability of this body being cut 
oft" from the main body in Russian-Poland beyond 
the Vistula, or at the least of the eastern portion 
being cut off unless it can escape across the 
Carpathians, in which case it will still be divided 
from the main body. 
So much for the campaign in the Eastern field, 
which is still the decisive one in the campaign. The 
Western operations, though more vitally near to- 
om-selves, have, for the moment, less interest, and 
ma}^ be more briefly told. 
in. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. 
We may sum up and say that so far as the 
operations in the Eastern field of war are concerned : — 
(A) The East Prussian frontier is still held ; the 
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