November 21, 1914. 
LAND AND WATER 
the official news from both sides is as meagre as it 
always is just before a general action develops. 
THE BATTLE IN DEFENCE OF 
SILESIA. 
It is evident in the first place that the Ger- 
mans are going to open this struggle by massing 
the weight of their troops against the Russian 
right and on their left. They are already advanc- 
ing along the gap between the Vistula and the 
"Warta (Plan A). They have already thrust back the 
Russian right wing in this district and are here in 
greatly superior numbers. While the Russians had 
their ma,in bodies at D marching on the all-impor- 
tant point A, where the three empires meet in 
Upper Silesia, the Germans have come out in force 
at B, and the Russian centre at C, has had to fall 
back also. 
Why have the Germans done this? 
Largely for political reasons : for those poli- 
tical reasons which, as I have perpetually pointed 
out in these notes, sometimes support, but mostly 
must fetter modern German strategy. Behind a 
main battle developing in the region marked A 
upon the sketch below this you have more than 
100 miles of territory, which though technically 
German is really not German at all, but Polish, 
and if the main effort of both opponents is at- 
tracted to this field what suffers, even in a case of a 
German retirement is not that territory of German 
speech and German traditions, which it is politic- 
ally essential to save from invasion. 
ilU TEe T^w Trona 
^^oUtS Spea^no' » t tV l^jUStian 3c Germaa. 
Territoru. ^ »" 
Wfutg,GeTmanu 'Pcoptr. 
But apart from the political motive, there is 
here a strategic plan which modern Germany in- 
variably pursues. Even where she has the mis- 
fortune to be acting with inferior numbers against 
a superior enemy, she will always attempt to turn 
the enemy's flank rather than to pierce his centre. 
It is part of that powerful routine, the following 
of which has been in history commonly tJie 
strength, but in certain fatal moments the ruin, 
of Prussia. 
Moreover, to act thus upon the flank furthest 
removed from danger-point of Upper Silesia has, 
or is expected to have, two great effects. In the 
first place it relieves pressure from the threatened 
industrial district ; in the second place it prevents 
the massing of Russian troops at that fork of the 
roads that leads north-westward and south-west- 
ward to Berlin and to Vienna. In general, the 
German thesis is to hold the Russians in front of 
the Upper Warta. A little to the north of this 
to hold them along the Prosna, and in the north- 
ernmost field of all between the Warta and the 
Vistula at once to press back the Russian right 
flank, and to attract the weight of the Russians 
thither northwards. 
If it be asked how the Germans can hope thus 
to resume the offensive with numbers inferior to 
their enemy, the answer is to be discovered in t»he 
frontier railway system which modern Prussia has 
developed with a single eyn to action upon this 
field. 
Glance at the accompanying sketch. In the 
first place you have from the industrial district of 
Thorn, 
"Miles 
Posen^ 
Bres^ 
Frantt£r — ..^.— ^ 
^Anetworkaf 
GermaaKoilwqys .. f^^Pg^f ^ 
■^ indmttmRamvm^ 
Upper Silesia round Konigshutte right up the 
frontier to Thorn and everywhere immediately 
behind it, one line of railway which is, so to speak, 
the twin of the frontier itself. Next, you have a 
whole series of lines feeding this line from the 
back and connecting it with the great depots and 
garrisons and accumulations of rolling stock re- 
presented by Breslau, Posen, Thorn and Glogau. 
In the third place you have the numerous branch 
lines which from this main lino parallel to the 
frontier lead up to and bring troops upon the 
frontier itself. Contrast with this ability the Ger- 
mans have for moving troops rapidly from end to 
end of their chosen field of battle, the lack of simi- 
lar facilities upon the Russian side. Here only three 
railways serve the Russian Army. (1) The. main 
line from Thorn to Lowicz ; (2) the main liijo fjom 
g* 
