LAND AND WATEK 
November 21, 1914. 
At tliis, for the present, yse must leave the matter; but 
there is obviously some kind of sequel yet to be ascertained. 
THE NORTH SEA, ETC. 
About mid-day on November 11, the old gunboat yiger, 
uras submarined in the Downs. She sank slowly, and the 
casualties were practically nil. This is the third German 
euceessful submarine action in and about the Straita of Dover, 
tlie other two being the refugee ahip Amiral Gautheume and 
Ute British cruiser Uermes. 
Although nothing official has yet been issued about it, 
there are various circumstantial reports of submarines having 
been sunk off Dover. It has long been believed that German 
•ubmarines, having reached a " likely place," lie at the bottom 
for considerable periods during the day, taking perhaps an 
occasional periscope peep, coming to the surface at night to 
replenish air, etc., and obtain information from a supposed 
neutral boat or else by light signals to and from agents on 
shore. 
According to the story, a careful watch was, therefore, kept 
on bubbles. Some having been detected, the place was dredged 
with a mine, and there was presently an explosion, and a good 
deal of oil floated up to the surface. 
An alternative version is that a submarine was dredged up 
and then sunk by gunfire from destroyers as she came to the 
surface. 
There is a strong possibility that the incident really 
occurred, but it is also probably safer to discount all stories 
of sunken submarines unless there is very full official con- 
firmation from one side at least. We should not, however, put 
too much on official silence, because both sides are clearly 
developing in practice various ofiensive schemes against sub- 
marines, and naturally they are reticent as to details. Fish- 
ing for submarines is a very old tjieory, but only in war can 
it be tested. 
For the rest, I can only reiterate the view which I have 
consistently held in these notes, that, invincible though the 
submarine may be in certain circumstances, the end of the 
war will find it in less esteem as a weapon than it was before 
the war broke out. 
I am not sure that this is altogether a matter of congratula- 
tion, because our submarine service is qua service and rather 
more efiScient and twice as numerous as the German submarine 
service. If and when the British Admiralty sees fit to publish 
statistics as to the known German attempts which did not 
succeed, the public which is now so uneasy whenever a German 
Bubmarine success is reported would find itself very consider- 
ably reassured at the low rate of success to failure. 
It would be further reassured by corresponding statistics of 
British submarine results. These counted as results in units 
are very meagre, but, considered in relation to opportunitief, 
would certainly be found to exhibit a marked excess over the 
German ratio. 
Unfortunately, we have, generally speaking, to wait for 
our innings, and by then both sides will have still more per- 
fected means of offensive defence against submarines. Conse- 
quently, all tlirough the war we may expect to have thoughtless 
critics asking why our submarines are proportionately behind 
the Germans in numerical results. 
The easiest answer ia that we are less adept than they in 
making use of a neutral flag for " mother ships." But the 
real answer is that our opportunities cannot keep pace with 
the progress being made in neutralising submarines. 
So far as using the neutral flag as cover of some sort is 
concerned, available statistics to date indicate that there have 
been only three cases without it. Of these two were British 
sucaesses (both E9), and one a German failure (U15). 
It is further unofiicially reported that on November 14 a 
French torpedo boat rammed a German submarine off Ostead. 
THE HIGH SEAS. 
The destruetion of the Emden and the circumstances in 
which she was de.stroyed by the Australian cruiser, Sydney, 
briefly referred to in my last week's notes, goes far to suggest 
— as I prognosticated in the issue of Land and Water for 
November 7 — that she had reached the end of her tether 
owing to our persistent cutting off of her supplies. We had 
then last heard of her in a purely military operation entirely 
un-germano to commerce warfare— the sinking of a Russian 
cruiser at Penang. She was caught, engaged, driven ashore 
p.nd destroyed while employed in another act also more or 
less quite distinct from corsair work, i.e., the destruction of 
ft wireless station in the Cocos Islands-^a further suggestion 
that Captain von Muller knew that his days as a commerce 
destroyer were numbered. The moment he was sighted tha 
news was, o| course;, mrelessed everj;where. 
The nearest British cruiser was the Australian lighfc 
cruiser, Sydney. She caught the Emden with some of her 
crew ashore. Leaving these behind, the Emden attempted a 
running fight with conspicuous ill-success. The Sydney had 
the speed-gauge, longer range, and heavier guns, the respec- 
tive broadsides being five 6-inch against 4.1 — more than two 
to one against the Emden in her weight of metal. 
The Emden only got in two hits in a chase and action 
which altogether lasted about an hour. This indifferent 
shooting may partially be attributed to poor gunnery, but 
to a far greater degree it was due to the superiority in vreight 
and size of the Sydney's broadside. In the very eai-liest stage 
of the action the Sydney appears to have secured an advantage 
which she steadily maintained. Two of the Emden's funneia 
were quickly shot away, and shell exploded on the gun deck 
amidships, which implies good shooting. The Emden, which 
went ashore, was merely a blazing wreck. 
The destruction of three wireless stations would in no 
way have compensated Captain von Muller for the tactical 
error of allowing lumself to be definitely located as being 
and going to be somewhere at the time of being there. IIo 
clearly, tlierefore, had engaged on last efforts. Hitherto all 
news of the Emden was late, and as such of no help worth 
mention to her pui'suers. Von Muller was invaluably careful 
dn this connection, and had good reason to be .so, because 
larger issues than commerce destruction depended on his 
elusiveness. He had the moral effect on the population of 
India to consider in his defiance of all the might and power 
of the British Navy. This is eaid by Anglo-Indians to have 
been very considerable. 
The material damage to trade done by the Emden is esti- 
mated at about two and a quarter million pounds. It would 
be interesting if we could ascertain how much her career has 
cost Germany. Quite apart from the value of the ship 
(roughly a quarter of a million) and the loss of her services 
for war work proper, we have to take into consideration that 
the elaborate system of supplies for her, the loss by capture 
of some store ships, and the diversion of others must altogether 
represent a very considerable dead loss. 
Commerce warfare is negative unless it can be carried 
on on a scale so large that the enemy is very heavily incon- 
venienced, or else it must be carried on as a profit^making 
machine. 
This entails harbours into which to send prizes. It hardly 
seems creditable that Germany can have overlooked a fact 
eo obvious as this or failed to realise that the first use of 
our superior sea power would be to capture or blockade every 
German oversea possession. 
It is conceivable that she overlooked the problem of how 
to hoodwink the United States authorities in a matter of 
being able to skip out of New York with converted liners. 
But it is not probable. It is altogether improbable that she 
would fail to calculate that in any case we should be on Iho 
watch outside tlie moment war was expected. 
One way and another, it really looks as though Germany 
believed that our domestic differences were such that wo 
should not take part in the war, or else that she relied upon 
the early capture of French harbours into which prizes could 
be sent. 
In any case, in some way or other, the machine has worked 
imperfectly. 
It is satisfactory, too, that at and about the same time 
as the Emden was destroyed the Konigsberg should have been 
r»n to earth up the Rufugi River, opposite Mafia Island 
(German East Africa). The behaviour of this particular 
cruiser has been somewhat peculiar. She was first heard of 
in an attack at Zanzibar on H.M.S. Pegasus, which was con- 
sequently driven ashore and sunk. 
This attack on the Pegasus was somewhat of a tactical 
error, like that of the Einde7Vs affair at Penang. The risk of 
damage run was, of course, not so great, as it was expected 
tkat the Pegasus's old guna would fail to reach the attacker. 
But it gave an exact location of the Konigsberg at a known 
date, which could be, and was, acted on immediately by the 
Allies. 
The result of this, it eeems clear, was an instant loss of 
expected supplies- — nothing else can well explain why the ship 
should have interned herself as she did up the Rufugi River in 
very shallow water, with shore entrenchments to defend 
herself. 
It is seldom remembered how absolutely dependent these 
German raiders are on coal supply. They have mostly a 
maximum nominal radius of five thousand miles at slow speed, 
but the really effective war radius is nearer two thousand miles, 
if that, because at any moment steam for full speed may be 
required — certainly a week would be the utmost " life * with- 
out recoaling. 
The Konigsberg waa located by the Chatham^ which drcv? 
W 
