LAND AND WATER 
November 21, lOM. 
TACTICS AND STRATEGY. 
HOW OUR MEN ARE FIGHTING IN FLANDERS. 
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B. (late R.E.). 
THE thing that pains me most in reading the day-to- 
day accounts of this long-drawn-out series of en- 
gagements in Flanders is the knowledge tiat only 
the expert in matters of fortification can begin to 
understand the extraordinary loyalty between all 
ranks and all units to one another, and to the common cause 
-which is necessary to ensure the successful defence of such a 
long line of more or less detached positions. 
To the uninitiated nothing would appear simpler than the 
definite task of defending a given section of trench to the last. 
The trench givea cover, and a firm support for the rifle to fire 
from, and under a heavy rain of artillery projectiles there is 
certainly no temptation to risk leaving it for the rear. There 
is also, unfortunately, even less inducement to leave it for 
the front in a counter-attack against advancing enemies, and 
this is generally held to be its weakest point. Yet, again and 
again, both in Flanders and along the Aisne, our men have 
counter-attacked with the bayonet, in a manner which even 
in the old long-service British Army of the Crimea was held 
to be almost impossible for any troops once accustomed to the 
feeling of security a bullet-proof breastwork aSords. 
But this is only a part of the matter applying essentially to 
continuous lines of entrenchments, delilierately selected and 
prepared by competent experts; an entirely new set of compli- 
cations arises when the defensive linos have, so to speak, 
prown up automatically, aa the result of a day's desperate 
fighting to gain ground to the front. 
Similar situations constantly arose during the desperate 
struggles in the intricate and wooded country of Spottsylvania 
and the Wilderness during the American Civil War, and lest 
the censor should think I am divulging confidential informa- 
tion, let me state that what follows is taken from American 
sources and American maps to be found in the library of the 
building in which he at present exercises his functions. 
Enemy's Position, 
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TIPICAL DiaiaiBUTION OF TRENCHES AT THE CLOSE OP A HAKD DAY'S 
nOHXINQ IN THE KEIGHBOUBHOOD OF COLD HAEBOTJE, ATEGISU, 1864. 
'Anything more disorderly than the above illustration it 
would be diflScult to imagine; yet it evolved itself quite natur- 
ally from the circumstances, just as similar situations are 
developing with us in Flanders almost daily, and tliis is the 
explanation. 
A body of troops some six units strong — whether the units 
«re companies or battalions does not matter — is thrown 
into more or less broken country with general instructions to 
advance in the direction of the big arrow. 
Unit A meets with somewhat less resistance than its fellows, 
and perhaps unconsciously slides down the line of least 
resistance along a very slight declivity, till it reaches about 
nightfall the position indicated, and at once proceeds to " dig 
itself in." B has more difficult ground, and finding tlic fire 
coming more from its right front, unconsciously brings up 
ita left shoulder, and finally comes to rest as in the diagram, 
digging itself in with equal vigour, and so all along the line 
with the result indicated. 
Now this disposition shows no less than twelve Tulncrablo 
flanks — where a continuous line would show only two and 
engineers and stafl officers are at once sent oS to bring order 
o»it of chaos, and induce A to fall back to A 1, B to B 1, and 
■c on. 
But A and its commander having made themselves com- 
fortable and secure, want io know why the 
(words deleted by the censor) the other fellows have left them 
in the lurch. B is quite satisfied where he is, and does not 
see why his tired men should move and dig fresh entrench- 
ments, and with variations, C, E, and so forth, all state the 
same argument with equal or greater vehpmence. Then, while 
they are still arguing — I am speaking, of course, of 
America still — comes the " rebel yell" from the 
front, and in one moment grey flitting forms are 
round all the flanks, and the rest is confusion and slaughter. 
Hitherto this has been almost universal in all armies, 
and, knowing this, the other side, in so far as it 
has been capable of attacking at all, has always chosen this 
critical moment of dissension and reaction to attempt a final 
counter-stroke in the hope of changing the fortune of the day, 
and very often, indeed, with success. 
This is the explanation of the countless night attacks the 
Germans, with rare gallantry, have so often delivered; but 
the results pro've that for once we, as an army, have com- 
pletely overcome the internal jealousies with which formerly 
every army has had to reckon, and have almost automatically 
readjusted our front by the voluntary sacrifice of advantage 
■won by desperate fighting, the very last thing the average 
individual of any rank ever cares to give up. 
That this has actually happened can bo read between the 
lines of such information as we have been allowed to receive 
by anyone who has been trained for this special purpose, i.e., 
by any properly qualified stafi ofiicer, and the broad proof that 
the facta are, as I have stated them, is clearly given by the 
uniform failures which have attended all such German efforts 
to surprise us in the anticipated hour of our greatest weakness. 
There has been no hour of " greatest weakness " or we should 
not now bo where we undoubtedly still are. 
Frankly, I do not believe that our army of thirty years 
ago could have survived the tests of the last six weeks. The 
regiment, or other unit, was too exclusively tho ideal, not the 
collective good, and the change we owe mainly to the efforts of 
two great leaders, Lorcl Roberts and Sir Evelyn Wood, who 
first, as Directors-in-Chief of our manoeuvres, managed to 
bring homo to the average regimental officer that the whole is 
greater than the part, and under the pressure of events in 
South Africa this idea made even greater strides than ono 
could have dared to hope. 
To the layman it may seem inconceivable that personal 
egoism can possibly obtrude itself in moments of such critical 
importancfe; but they forget the effect of long-continued 
strain and excitement upon tlie nerves, and fail to realise how 
the nervously overwrought man throws back instinctively to 
the type of much earlier generations, and during these earlier 
generations, whether in France, England or Scotland, it was 
this excessive sense of tho importance of the unit as embodied 
in its overlord that, again and again, brought about an. 
adverse decision in tho Army in which tho feeling was most 
pronounced. I say nothing of the cases in Scottish history, 
where one clan refused to go to the help of tho other because 
of some fancied insult to the head of tho clan. But even in 
regular war seasoned armies, such as those which fought 
tinder Marlborough in Flanders, this state of things was still 
so pronounced that tho principal occupation of the staff was 
arranging the troops in tho fighting line strictly according to 
their order of precedence; and a very ticklish job this must 
have been, judging by contemporary letters and documents. 
Even as recently as at Balaclava, Kinglakc, on tho authority 
of eye-witnesses, tells us that all through the duration of the 
charge of Scarlett's Heavy Brigade. Lord sat looking 
on at tho head of his Light Brigade without dreaming of 
moving to their support, only exclaiming from time to time, 
" Oh, damn the Heavies, they have got the laugh on us this 
time." French officers, looking on from the heights, were 
absolutely amazed at his inaction, and one was heard explain- 
ing it to another as due to the English attitude towards a 
prize-fight, "it would not be etiquette to interfere in a fair 
fight." 
We have travelled a long way since those days, and it is 
■well that it is so, for this faculty of tho co-ordination of all 
towards a common end is really tho secret of our successful 
imperial growth, and wo shall need all we have of it before 
pur present enemy is beaten to his knees. 
J4* 
