LAND AND WATER 
November 28, 1914, 
orocL 
— © 
60 KIEV 
-..,,,'1 ^".,.""^ 'M-y?'^ 9lisko 
JLl 
sians in the north past the line Lowicz-Lodz until 
he again threatened Warsaw; and the German 
idea was that, in view of such peril to its right, the 
whole Russian line would fall back and the great 
masses at B, B, B, in the south would give up their 
attempt to invade Upper Silesia (A), would aban- 
don the investment of Cracow, would give up their 
attempts at raiding Hungary over the Carpathians 
^from New Sandec, Dukla, Sanok — places at the 
root of the passes over the mountains), and would 
mass back all their troops towards the north in an 
attempt to save Russian Poland — especially its 
capital, Warsaw. TheGermansby suddenly striking 
thus in from the north between the Vistula and 
the Warta at D, hoped to relieve the increasing 
Russian pressure against the front Czestochowa- 
Cracow, which threatened Upper Silesia with 
ruin— for we must always remember what the Rus- 
sian and German commanders never forget, that 
an invasion in force of Upper Silesia is the begin- 
ning of the end for Germany. Von Hindenburg's 
fine move was further based upon this considera- 
tion : that while he could swing round with his ten 
army corps to the north by the use of an admirable 
and intact railway system behind the German 
frontier, his opponent had in all that vast space 
but three lines, only two of these double-lines, all 
three divergent, and all three rendered useless for 
the moment by the Germans during their retire- 
ment from Warsaw. Re could swing round in four 
days. They could not concentrate from south to 
north in ten. He hoped thoroughly to defeat C^ 
C2 in the north before the southern reinforcements 
from B, B, B, could possibly come up. 
Now, it is apparent that, like every other 
military effort, and especially like every military 
effort dependent upon surprise, speed was here the 
most essential factor. It was the business of the 
Germans, appearing thus unexpectedly at D in 
the north, to press on to Warsaw with the utmost 
speed. They knew that the Russians could 
always, if they could manage to get time, bring 
up reinforcements from the interior ; not from the 
south at B, B, B to the weakening of their southern 
forces, but fresh troops from the depots in the east 
at Warsaw and behind it. These reinforcements 
would make the Russians, even in the northern 
field where they had hitherto been weak, become 
strong. 
•Further, Hindenburg knew (and this is very; 
important) that the three Russian bodies, the com- 
paratively small one in the North C^, the compara- 
tively smail one in the centre CS and the very 
large one B, B, B in the south, depended upon 
three separate lines of communication; which I 
have marked on the map with the numbers 1, 2, 
and 3. The first one goes through Warsaw, the 
second through Ivangorod, and the third througli 
Lemberg and so to Kiev in South Russia. 
.This meant that the northern body, which w^ 
a« 
