November 28, 1914. 
LAND AND V/ATER 
niuni of 11,000,000 men of useful military age. 
Germany has about 68 men to Austria-Hungary's 
62— counting in the latter the population of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. That proportion is as 17 to 13, 
or, again, where Germany can produce 11,000,000 
Austria can produce not quite 8| — to be accurate 
8.41. 
The composition of the Austrian regular 
forces is both complicated and diverse ; the forma- 
tions of the reserve have not the simple and local 
connection with the active army that is found in 
either the German or the French systems. There 
is included, for instance, an imperfectly-trained 
militia, which is reinforced by regular artillery. 
There are bodies of cavalry also, like our own, 
which are not exactly regular cavalry, and yet 
have so excellent a tradition, and are so trained 
as nearly to count with the first line. But if we 
estimate the total number of men which the Aus- 
trians put into the field at the beginning of the 
war at 2,000,000 or a little under, v.e shall not be 
very wide of the mark. If their regular armies 
thus produced at the first mobilisation had 
alone suffered the casualties mentioned in the 
following estimate, they would have ceased 
to exist, but, of course, these casualties have 
fallen upon far larger bodies than the troops 
first put into the field. They cover the 
whole first three months of the war, and 
include the casualties of new levies and ultimately 
reserve formations, which were rapidly gathered 
upon the first news of the first defeats. Let us 
say that Austria has so far raised and trained 
sufficiently to put into the field 8,000,000. She 
would still, upon the analogy of the German num- 
bers, and allowing for the men that must l>e left 
at home to " run the country " and the inefficient 
that do not pass the doctor, have some 2h million 
or perhaps more nearly three million to draw upon. 
With 8.4 as the number of her millions between 
21 and 45, with 1.7 as a deduction for inefficients, 
and 1,000,000 as a minimum in a country largely 
agricultural to be further deducted for non-mili- 
tary service, you still have 3.7 million available 
for training. Thus, on account of Austria's origin- 
ally smaller army, we fir.d the paradox that, in 
spite of her inferior population, she has a larger 
proportion of untrained reserve to call upon for 
the future than has Germany. She can also, of 
course, if she chooses, do what Germany may be 
driven to do, unwise as it is, and summon the boys 
that are not of age. It is this large reserve in 
Austria vv'hich probably accounts for the new 
armies, especially for the one that has appeared 
upon the Servian border, concerning the action of 
which I have dealt with above. 
In closing, it should always be remembered 
that no mere numerical calculation of Austro- 
Hungarian forces is sufficient unless we bear in 
mind the curiously heterogeneous character of the 
population in the Dual Monarchy. Out of some 
52,000,000 or {perhaps a trifle more, only 
12,000,000 are the German-speaking population 
which rcallv has its heart in this war, and of those 
12,000,000 only 10,000,000 will be in one group; 
the remaining 2,000,000 are scattered in Hungary. 
Hungary, again, though quite at one with her 
partner in fearing the danger of Russian power, 
only counts 10,000,000 Hungarians proper, that 
is, Magyar-speaking. I'he northern group of 
Slav-speaking subjects of Austria are Catholic, and 
therefore largely detached from the general 
Slavonic movement, but they are strongly anti- 
German, and they number eight million. Tho 
Polish population is, on the whole, sympathetic 
with Austria, or at least lukewarm. But it is 
bitterly anti-German and especially anti-Prussian. 
It counts five million. The Ruthenian population 
is Russian in sentiment for \l\e most part, and it 
counts 3,000,000; while, when we count the more 
or less disaffected Slavs of the south, and the cer- 
tainly disaffected Latin-speaking elements of the 
south, the Roumanians who are upon the whole 
also disaffected, and who inhabit the eastern por- 
tion of what is politically Hungary, we get another 
six million ; nearly a million and a-half true Ser- 
vians, orthodox in religion, further weaken this 
conglomeration. 
One may sum up by saying that the weakness 
of this service consists not only in its extraordi- 
narily diverse character, but also in the fact that a 
good half of it is more or less disaffected. Its two 
principal nuclei, German and Magjar, are in per- 
petual latent conflict, and something like one- 
quarter, or at any rate more than one-sixth of the 
whole actively desires the defeat of the armies in 
which it is compelled to serve. 
THE AUSTRIAN CASUALTIES. 
An estimate of Austro-Hungarian casualties 
cannot be based upon such good evidence as that 
which allowed us to estimate the losses of their 
Allies. To begin with, the Austro-Hungarian 
Government has not published quite such full lists. 
The Austro-Hungarian forces are not homogene- 
ous, and there seems to have been a policy pursued 
by their Government of restricting news upon this 
head. 
A document has, however, reached England 
(and was published in the Morning Post last week) 
which bears all the marks of authenticity, and 
gives us results very much what we should expect 
upon the analogy of the German losses. Upon the 
basis of this it is possible to make a tolerable esti- 
mate. 
There are three fields upon which the Austro- 
Hungarian Army has been employed — excluding 
the ca,valry (and probably not a little of the in- 
fantry) which has been lent to the Germans in the 
West, and excluding also the heavy artillery which 
is known to have been lent to the Germans in the 
West. These three fields are (1) the Servian front, 
(2) the comparatively small operations in the 
Middle Carpathians and over into Bukovina, and 
(3) the main Galician field, including action in 
South Poland, where the bulk of the armies of the 
Dual Monarchy has been employed. 
In the first of these fields, the Servian, the 
number of killed, officers and men, admitted up 
to November 1st, is 38,438. A fair test of the 
accuracy of these figures is afforded by the pro- 
portion the officers bear to the men ; not quite 800 
officers to rather over 37,000 men. The same 
truth which was brought forward with regard to 
German casualties applies here: the numbers 
given up to November 1st, being drawn from lists 
published a couple of days after, are almost cer- 
tainly imperfect, that is, there are almost cer- 
tainly a larger number of killed on this front than 
can have been duly registered in so very brief a 
delay after the last date given. But it will serve 
to keep our estimate within the mark — always a 
desirable thing— if we accept tlicse figures only, 
and do not attempt to add to them. 
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