LAND AND WATER 
November 28, 1914. 
We start, therefore, on this Servian front 
with the total figure 38,438 killed. To these the 
Austrian lists add 92,955 wounded and 17,205 
missing, making in all 110,160 casualties beyond 
the killed. Now we have here exactly the same 
phenomenon that we found in the German lists, 
and it is just what we should expect. Even allow- 
ing for every one of the missing to be a wounded 
man (which is ridiculous), we have a proportion 
of wounded to killed altogether too small to be 
credible. But this is not due to any deliberate falsi- 
fication of figures; it is due to the fact that com- 
manding officers can be and are much more careful, 
after a difficult and chaotic moment, in numbering 
their dead than in numbering their wounded ; and 
also to the fact that at first only the graver cases 
of wounded would be reported. One is perfectly 
safe in allowing but one man killed out of every 
ten total casualties. Such is about the proportion 
sufiered, for instance, by the British forces during 
the recent exceedingly heavy fighting in Flanders. 
But for the sake of keeping our estimate well 
within the mark, let us take a multiple, not of ten, 
but of eight. This would give us for 38,438 killed 
a total casualty list of 307,504. Let us again, for 
the sake of being vnthin the mark, scale that down 
to a round 300,000, and say that the Austro-Hun- 
garian Armies on their Servian front have lost 
300,000 men. Unless the figures of the killed 
given in the of&cial lists are exaggerated — ^which is 
so unlikely as to be morally impossible — that figure 
of 300,000 is certain to be very far below the truth ; 
but we will leave it at that. 
Now turn to the Galician field, where very 
much larger forces were employed. We have 
here a total loss admitted of 752,756 ofiicers and 
men up to November 1st last, and here again we 
have exactly the same phenomenon : an altogether 
incredible proportion of dead. The dead ai'e given 
at 181,102, or, say, roughly, rather less than one 
in four, 25 per cent. To be accurate it works out 
at 24.05 per cent. Now, as we have seen, one 
in ten is a fair average, but let us again scale that 
down to eight. Then, with the dead at 181,102 
in the Galician field we have for total losses 
1,448,816. Here, again, let us deduct for the sake 
of being still more certainly within the truth, and 
also for the sake of getting round figures, and call 
the losses but 1,400,000. This, added to the Ser- 
vian losses, gives you 1,700,000. Of the losses 
among the troops lent to Germany we have no 
figures save those for three regiments of cavalry, 
which admitted only 3,000 losses, while the few 
troops engaged in the Carpathians and towards 
Eukovina admitted less than 2,000 losses. It is 
obvious that these last fragments are altogether 
short of real losses, and are not intended to repre- 
sent them. We had better, therefore, omit them 
altogether, and stand by and consider only our 
lowest estimate of losses in the two main fields, the 
Galician and the Servian, and there we fimd, as 
I have said, 1,700,000. Here, as was the case 
with the German losses, we are confronted with a 
total which, strict as is the method of estimation, 
looks when one has reached it, too large, and that 
IS especially the case when we consider first that 
the Austro-Hungarian Army was considerably 
smaller than the German Regular Army at the 
outset of the war; and, secondly, that the German 
losses at which we arrived were less. 
But against this consideration must be set the 
fact that the Germans have not suffered any great 
reverse in the field. The retreat of their superior 
numbers before the strategy of General Joffre, 
known as the Battle of the Marne, wa,s a perfectly 
orderly affair, costly only to their rearguards; 
there was no tactical defeat on a large scale. But 
one-half of the main Austrian Army acting in 
Galicia was broken to pieces at Lemberg, some 
hundreds of its gmis captured, and, by the Aus- 
trians' own admission, nearly 180,000 prisoners. 
Further, this army was reduced to chaos and 
vigorously pursued for days in the early part of 
September. We also know that during the first 
part of the fighting against Servia the Austrian 
troops were exceedingly roughly handled, and the 
very heavy losses on the Servian frontier may in 
pai-t be accounted for by the fact that the Dual 
Monarchy had in this field to use in its haste forces 
mobilised in the immediate neighbourhood and 
consisting largely of men who sympathised with 
the enemy. At any rate, this figure of 1,700,000, 
high as it is, must be, if the statistics of death are 
to be trusted (and they are apparently the ofiicial 
statistics up to November 1st), within the mark. 
A FURTHER NOTE ON THE GERMAN 
NUMBERS. 
Letters received from many correspondents 
prompt me to add this week a little detailed note 
upon the German numbers supplementary to the 
analysis I made of those numbers last week. 
I then dealt with round figures because round 
figures are more easily retained, and give one all 
one needs for practical conclusions; and it will 
be remembered that I gave the men of military 
age at about 11 millions ; the largest possible num- 
ber of trained men available in any shape at five 
million, and therefore the reserve of untrained 
material at six million, with a deduction of 2|- 
million from that six for the proportion that would 
not pass the doctor.* 
I will now give the detailed figures, and I hope 
to establish the thing finally. 
There are, by the last figures before me : — 
Of young German men in the first four 
years of maturity, that is from the 
21st to the 25th birthday 2,210,000 
Of men in the next five years — 25-30 ... 2 , 545 , 000 
—30-35... 2,370,000 
—35-40... 2,130,000 
., „ ,, —40-45... 1,785,000 
iTctal 
11,040,000 
This is near enough to the round figure 
11,000,000, which I gave as the total of males of 
military age. Of these the trained army ac- 
counted, before the last increase hurriedly made 
in preparation for the present war, for 4,300,000. 
It counted with the addition of that hurried in- 
crease perhaps 4,500,000, leaving of untrained 
men, who might be used as a reserve to be trained 
and ultimately added to the army, almost exactly 
six millions and a-half. 
I said that of these 6| million, roughly 2^- 
million at least would not be passed as fit for mili- 
tary service. We have here no precise statistics 
to go upon, but we can work upon the analogy of the 
French Service, where every single young man in 
* Ey a couple of regrotteble misprints upon page 9 of last week'a 
issue, column 2, 27(th line from the bottom, a 10 was printed for the 
figures 11, and tliree lines below a 5 for a 6, but the context of th« 
passage and ill the further figures m^de my meaning clear. 
